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Abstract 
 
Co-operatives are often regarded as alternatives to capitalist forms of business organisation. 
This thesis argues that this alterity has been circumscribed by the legal recognition and 
constitution of co-operatives as bodies corporate within a broader system of political 
economy in the mid-nineteenth century, in which co-operatives came to be regarded 
primarily as commercial entities. Drawing on the work of Michel Foucault, this thesis 
pursues a genealogy of the co-operative in order to expose the conditions of its constitution, 
beginning with a critique of dominant historiographical approaches to the co-operative 
movement that regard legal recognition as ‘enabling’ for a co-operative form that already 
existed outside the law. Following an alternative historical account that locates the 
beginnings of the co-operative movement in the late eighteenth century, in what E.P. 
Thompson referred to as the ‘moral economy of the English crowd’, this thesis situates 
legal recognition within shifting forms of power and governmentality in the creation of the 
modern state, while also emphasising the historicity of the legal form of the body corporate. 
The body corporate imports a transcendent form of unity from the medieval church that 
becomes normalised in the nineteenth century as part of the emergence of liberal and 
biopolitical governmentality, serving as a form of metaphysical enclosure that facilitates 
market discipline. While co-operatives do offer a meaningful alternative by virtue of an 
ethos of mutuality derived from the moral economy, this thesis argues that legal recognition 
was depoliticising for the co-operative, not in the narrow terms of political economy, but 
through what Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe and Jean-Luc Nancy refer to as ‘the closure of the 
political’.  
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Introduction 
Co-operatives are often regarded as an alternative to capitalist forms of business 
organisation, and they form a key part of attempts to build an alternative economy in the 
United Kingdom and around the world.1 While co-operative structures vary from place to 
place, they generally share a set of principles and values that serve to differentiate them 
from businesses that exist primarily for profit.2 The main difference is that co-operatives 
are owned and democratically-controlled by their members, not by shareholders, and exist 
primarily for the purposes of their mutual benefit, not profit.3 However, while co-operatives 
offer an alternative to capitalist forms of organisation, they have also developed and operate 
within a predominantly capitalist system, and they have been shaped by this inclusion.  
 Drawing primarily on the work of Michel Foucault, this thesis takes a genealogical 
approach to the history of the co-operative movement in England, focusing particularly on 
the legal recognition of co-operatives in the mid-nineteenth century. Legal recognition, as I 
will argue, rather than simply enabling or legitimizing co-operatives, has functioned 
constitutively, determining to a considerable extent what we think a co-operative is in the 
first place. While early co-operative societies developed as a form of mutual aid in response 
to the depredations of an emerging market economy, their legal recognition as bodies 
corporate in the mid-nineteenth century served not only to subordinate co-operatives to the 
                                                     
1 See for instance the essays collected in Rob Harrison, ed., People Over Capital: The Co-operative 
Alternative to Capitalism (Oxford: New Internationalist Publications, Ltd., 2013).  
2 The current list of co-operative principles, as provided by the International Co-operative Alliance 
comprises: voluntary and open membership; democratic member control; member economic participation; 
autonomy and independence; education, training and information; co-operation among co-operatives; and 
concern for community. See "Cooperative identity, values and principles," International Cooperative 
Alliance, accessed September 26, 2018, https://www.ica.coop/en/whats-co-op/co-operative-identity-values-
principles. 
3 In the United Kingdom, in order to be registered under the Co-operative and Community Benefit 
Societies Act 2014, a society must satisfy the registering authority (the Financial Conduct Authority or FCA) 
that it is either a ‘bona fide’ co-operative or a community benefit society. For the former, the FCA has 
explicit regard to the principles as defined by the International Co-operative Alliance Statement of Co-
operative Identity. See Financial Conduct Authority, Guidance on the FCA’s registration function under the 
Co-operative and Community Benefit Society Act 2014, Finalised guidance 15/12. November 2015.. 
However, it is not necessary to register under this Act in order to be a co-operative and in practice those 
wishing to form a co-operative can choose from a range of available legal forms.  
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state, but also to constitute co-operatives as economic entities within the narrow discursive 
framework of nineteenth century political economy. Co-operatives, as a consequence, were 
both depoliticised and subjected to the discipline of the market. The legal idea of the co-
operative thus presumes its inclusion within the market and its subordination to the state. 
This does not mean that co-operatives are not actually ‘alternatives’ capitalist businesses, 
but that in order to understand and encourage them to develop as alternatives, it is necessary 
to understand how the idea of alterity itself has been shaped and limited by legal 
recognition.  In this introductory chapter, I will first provide a contextualized account of 
some of the problems and tensions in the idea of the co-operative and make the case for 
exploring the genealogy or “constitutive historicity” of the co-operative.4  The chapter then 
turns to the question of alterity and draws on the work of Jean-Luc Nancy on ontology and 
community conceptualise the possibility of alterity that co-operatives present.  
 This project began several years ago, when I became involved with The People’s 
Supermarket, a consumer co-operative in central London. It was an attempt to create an 
alternative to the dominant model of supermarket through community ownership.  Much 
more than just a supermarket, it provided a home for a wide array of hopes and desires for 
change, as well as a means of realising those visions in the present. In addition to purchasing 
a nominal one-pound share and participating in the democratic management of the co-
operative, member-owners were required to work a four-hour shift each month as way of 
contributing to the day-to-day running of the store and keeping overhead costs low.5 
Mundane tasks like stocking shelves and working the till became exercises in community-
building. While far from perfect, it created real opportunities for people to relate to one 
another differently and to exercise a much greater degree of control, beyond that of mere 
consumers, over something central to their lives.  
                                                     
4 The phrase “constitutive historicity” comes from Judith Butler, “Critically Queer,” GLQ: A Journal of Gay 
and Lesbian Studies 1, no. 1 (November 1993): 19. 
5 In this respect it had been modelled after the well-known Park Slope Food Coop in Brooklyn, New York.  
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 For better or worse, The People’s Supermarket also received a considerable amount 
of media attention in its early days, reflecting in part the growing popularity of discourses 
around ‘social enterprise’. The project attracted the attention of no less than the 
conservative Prime Minister David Cameron, who had been busy promoting the Big 
Society; a short-lived and ill-fated programme to encourage the expansion of the voluntary 
or ‘third’ sector whilst simultaneously pursuing, and many would say attempting to mask, 
dramatic cuts in government spending.6 He praised our project as a perfect example of the 
Big Society and dropped by for the requisite photo opportunity. Two days later, at a 
meeting of the membership of The People’s Supermarket, members voiced serious 
concerns about being associated with the programme. One who spoke said, “what we are 
doing is not political, we are simply trying to get good food at affordable prices into our 
community,” and another replied, “for that reason, we are very political.” 
 That our co-operative could be so readily seen as part of the Big Society, a 
programme apparently antithetical to its aims, speaks to a pervasive indeterminacy around 
the idea of co-operation more generally. Aspirations from across the political spectrum can 
and have been mapped onto ideas of co-operation and indeed subsist within them. They 
are often conceived of as part of a ‘third way’: a space understood broadly as lying between 
states and markets. 7 The malleability of these ‘alternative’ projects, which include co-
operatives but also a range of other kinds of organisation, seem to stem from the very idea 
                                                     
6  Robert Osley, “Prime Minister David Cameron bids to bolster his Big Society idea with visit to People’s 
Supermarket,” West End Extra, February 17, 2011, http://www.westendextra.com/news/2011/feb/prime-
minister-david-cameron-bids-bolster-his-big-society-idea-visit-people%E2%80%99s-supermar (accessed 
November 7, 2016).  
7  Nikolas Rose, “Inventiveness in Politics,” Economy and Society 28, no. 3 (1999): 481. The phrase ‘third 
way’ is currently most closely associated with social democracy and specifically Tony Blair’s New Labour. 
According to Anthony Giddens, the phrase “third way” was in use as early as the late nineteenth century. 
Anthony Giddens, The Third Way: The Renewal of Social Democracy (London: Polity Press, 1998), 25.  
J.K. Gibson-Graham laments the loss of the original meaning of the third way: “[i]n the war of words that 
makes up political debate, reference to what we might consider the original ‘third way’ has been lost or 
blurred. Deploying terms like ‘trust,’ ‘mutual obligation’ and ‘reciprocity’ that hail from the cooperative 
support systems of the early 19th century, contemporary third way politics offers a language that softens the 
impact of a neo-liberal economic agenda obscuring, even rendering desirable, the withdrawal of state 
benefits.” J.K Gibson-Graham, “Enabling Ethical Economies: Cooperativism and Class,” Critical Sociology 
29, no. 2 (2003): 129. 
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of ‘the third way’ itself. For J.K. Gibson-Graham, the third way is a space for leftist economic 
imaginaries and experimentation with emancipatory economic projects.8  In conservative 
discourse, by contrast, the third way is a space in which “[e]conomic health is to be governed 
indirectly, not through direct intervention upon the workplace or upon ownership and 
control, but through fostering an ethos of human enterprise and moral responsibility."9 
 This tension and indeterminacy in the political meaning and purpose of co-operation 
was also accompanied by what seemed to be a structural constraint. While The People’s 
Supermarket was attempting to build an alternative to the mainstream, corporate 
supermarket which almost completely dominates the market for groceries, it nonetheless 
had to compete with those same supermarkets for custom. This inevitably produced 
significant compromises—some more obvious than others—to the original vision. As 
Johnston Birchall writes of the co-operative movement more generally: “[i]t seems that we 
cannot have both efficiency and small-scale democracy in the modern trading world; either 
we stick to principle and go out of business, or become just like big business and have no 
principles left to stick to. Either way we lose.”10 Despite being situated ‘between’ state and 
market, co-operatives are very much subject to the vicissitudes of the market and must, at 
a minimum, be commercially viable.  
 Initially these two sites of tension seemed unrelated: the political malleability and 
vulnerability of co-operative projects was separate from the inherent difficulties of making 
such projects commercially successful while also maintaining a commitment to co-operative 
values. Subjection to the market seemed to be a necessary, if unfortunate, condition of 
existence, while politics was a matter of how we conceived of our project. Yet, as I will 
demonstrate in this thesis, the ‘middle’ between state and market that co-operatives are said 
                                                     
8  Gibson-Graham, “Ethical Economies,” 124.  
9  Rose, “Inventiveness,” 484.  
10  Johnston Birchall, Save Our Shop: The Rise and Fall of the Small Cooperative Store (Manchester: 
Holyoake Books, 1987), xii. 
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to occupy is not a middle at all. The concept of a middle or a ‘between’ would imply that 
the state and the market are distinct and separate domains; that the state is a self-sufficient 
and sovereign entity and that the market in turn is a purely immanent and natural sphere, 
regulated only by the pursuit of self-interest. However, the market as we have come to 
understand it was largely constituted through the direct intervention of the state in the 
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, and requires continual intervention and regulation.11 
The state, meanwhile, is not a sovereign or coherent entity, but, as Timothy Mitchell argues, 
“the metaphysical effect of practices that make such structures appear to exist.”12 
Consequently, as this thesis will argue, co-operatives cannot be located in between state and 
market, but instead have been constituted by the state, as part of shifting forms of 
governmentality and dominant modalities of power, in order to compete in and  be 
disciplined by, the market.  
 In this sense, co-operatives form part of an order that has been created through state 
regulation, and being a constituent part of it, they also do not necessarily challenge that 
order. However, despite being thus constituted, they also gesture toward and manifest the 
possibility of alterity: co-operatives offer a means of self-organizing and relating to others 
differently, in ways that undermine and expose the limitations of the state sovereignty and 
the immanence of the market. The politically-vexed position of co-operatives arises from 
the fact they simultaneously affirm and exceed the established order.13 This dynamic, and 
                                                     
11  Karl Polanyi, The Great Transformation: The Political and Economic Origins of our Time (Boston: 
Beacon Press, 2001), 71-89.  
12  Timothy Mitchell, “Society, Economy, and State Effect,” in The Anthropology of the State: A Reader, 
ed. Aradhana Sharma and Akhil Gupta (Malden: Blackwell Publishing Ltd., 2006), 174. 
13  One obvious name for this ‘established order’ would be capitalism. However, in this thesis, and in 
keeping with its Foucauldian orientation, I will largely avoid ascribing a monolithic identity to this order. 
While capitalism is certainly a significant logic of the dominant modalities of ordering, they are not 
reducible to capitalism. The many legal forms which we associate with capitalism, and particularly the body 
corporate which I will focus on here, have histories that long predate the development of capitalism and 
their integration into governmental practice cannot be construed as a response to capitalism. Thus while 
there will be many resonances here with Marxist critiques of legal form, I have not adopted a specifically 
Marxist approach. For a good example of this approach, see Isaac D. Balbus, “Commodity Form and Legal 
Form: An Essay on the ‘Relative Autonomy’ of the Law,” Law and Society Review 11, no. 3 (1976-1977): 
571-587. The relationship between the co-operative movement and Marxism will be discussed in more 
detail in chapter 1.  
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particularly law’s role in creating it, has often been overlooked. There is a tendency to 
emphasize the vision of alterity and ethos of mutuality and solidarity that often animates co-
operative projects at the expense of reckoning with the ways in which co-operatives may be 
limited or shaped by the forms they take, as well as their own history. The historian Stephen 
Yeo, for instance, suggests that co-operatives are inappropriately seen as functioning within 
a system which it is “their project to replace.”14 However, while it may sometimes be their 
project to replace that system, they also do operate within it, and they have been shaped by 
this inclusion.  
 Legal recognition has been one of the main mechanisms of this inclusion. Co-
operatives were given legal recognition in the United Kingdom in 1852 through the passage 
of the first Industrial and Provident Societies Act. In the history of the co-operative 
movement, this is often seen as a watershed moment, which finally allowed the movement 
to grow and expand.15 The movement, particularly the consumer co-operative movement, 
did grow significantly after a legal form was created for co-operatives.16 While co-operative 
societies existed in varying levels of abundance in the first half of the nineteenth century 
(up to 500 societies existed at the height of the movement in the 1830s), it was in the latter 
part of the nineteenth century that they came to control increasingly significant amounts of 
capital. In 1852 there were 192 co-operative retail societies on record, with an estimated 
20,000 members and £250,000 in annual trade. By 1901, there were 1229 co-operative 
retail societies in operation, with a membership of 1.5 million and annual sales exceeding 
£48.9 million.17 Today, co-operatives are more prevalent than many would guess. At the 
                                                     
14 Stephen Yeo, ed., New Views of Co-operation (London: Routledge, 1988), 27.  
15 See for instance David Lambourne, Slaney’s Act and the Christian Socialists: A Study of How the 
Industrial and Provident Societies Act, 1852 Was Passed (Boston: David Lambourne, 2009). This attitude 
is reflected more generally in G.D.H. Cole, A Century of Co-operation (Manchester: Co-operative Union, 
Ltd., 1944), 114-126. 
16 The fact that it is primarily the consumer co-operative movement that grew, rather than worker co-
operatives, is indicative of some of the structural difficulties in developing and sustaining co-operative 
projects. This will be discussed in more detail in chapter 1.  
17 These figures are drawn from Martin Purvis, “The Development of Co-operative Retailing in England and 
Wales, 1851-1901, a Geographical Study,” Journal of Historical Geography 16, no. 3 (1990): 315-316.   
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most recent counting, there were at least 7,226 independent co-operatives which 
contributed £36.1 billion to the United Kingdom’s economy in 2017-2018. 13.1 million 
people in the United Kingdom are active members of co-operatives, and they employ close 
to 235,000 people.18 Meanwhile, the International Co-operative Alliance is the largest non-
governmental organisation in the world, with more than 1 billion members.19 
 This model of success as expansion takes for granted that co-operatives will compete 
in a market and function predominantly as commercial entities. The success described here 
is largely put in economic terms, while its political import is assumed as a function of the 
co-operative form itself. However, while legal recognition no doubt enabled the co-
operative movement to grow, it did so in a way that was constrained by the biopolitical and 
disciplinary logic that structured recognition. Legal recognition not only served to 
subordinate working class, co-operative, forms of association to the state but also to 
constitute them as bodies corporate, thereby subjecting them to the disciplinary effects of 
the market. Thus, legal recognition functions constitutively, determining at a very basic level 
what we think a co-operative is, such that the very idea of co-operative is already a legal one. 
The constitutive process is so effective that the co-operative’s subjection to the market goes 
unnoticed or is perceived of as a natural condition of its existence. It also has significant 
practical consequences for co-operatives. This history of legal recognition necessarily 
shapes how we think about and practice co-operation (how we form co-operatives, what we 
expect them to do, and ultimately also our vision of alterity) in the present, and how we 
perceive its limits and possibilities. Yet the nineteenth century process of legal recognition 
was not, and could not, ever be completely determinative of co-operation. There is always 
an uncontainable excess which allows co-operation to retain an openness and an 
                                                     
18 Co-operatives UK, The Co-operative Economy 2018, http://reports.uk.coop/economy2018/ (accessed on 
September 25, 2018). 
19 The International Co-operative Alliance, “The Alliance,” last modified 2015, 
http://ica.coop/en/international-co-operative-alliance (accessed November 8, 2016).  
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indeterminacy. This excess can be engaged by groups seeking to actualize the vision of 
alterity and alternative values that can come with co-operation. Nevertheless, when the legal 
and historical constitution of co-operatives is taken for granted, the very idea and possibility 
of alterity suffers.  
The “Constitutive Historicity” of the Co-operative 20 
Co-operation is a concept which can be taken so generally as to seem without 
history, meaning simply to work [operari] together for some shared end. This end need not 
be ‘good’ by any measure;21 yet many of the strongest advocates of co-operation as a form 
of organisation over the past two centuries have figured it as part of a fundamental human 
nature; a biological necessity and predisposition, which is paradoxically at once both 
necessary (for survival) and laudable.22 As the story goes, the idea of mutual co-operation 
found its clearest and most enduring expression in the founding of the Rochdale Society of 
Equitable Pioneers in 1844 by twenty eight impoverished weavers, influenced by nothing 
but the hardship of their own circumstances. The Rochdale society is often regarded as the 
first modern co-operative. They both created the business model that would see the 
widespread growth of the co-operative movement and articulated a set of principles that 
would define and guide co-operatives internationally until the present day. 
                                                     
20  Butler, “Critically Queer,” 19. 
21  As when Karl Marx discusses the centrality co-operation in the development of capitalist industry, by 
which he refers to the concentration of labour that forms the basis of capitalist exploitation, in Chapter 13 of 
the first volume of Capital. Karl Marx, Capital, Vol. 1 (London: Penguin, 1990), 439-454.  
22  This kind of view has been articulated by wide range of authors. Peter Kropotkin, for instance, describes 
mutual aid as “a feeling infinitely wider than love or personal sympathy—an instinct that has been slowly 
developed among animals and men in the course of an extremely long evolution, and which has taught 
animals and men alike the force they can borrow from the practice of mutual aid and support, and the joys 
they can find in social life.” Peter Kropotkin, Mutual Aid: A Factor of Evolution (Mineola: Dover 
Publications, 2012), xvi. Much more recently, Richard Sennett has provided a similar reading of co-
operation. While suggesting that co-operation is something desirable, he also provides the following 
definition: “[c]ooperation can be defined, drily, as an exchange in which the participants benefit from the 
encounter. This behaviour is instantly recognisable in chimpanzees grooming one other, children building a 
sandcastle, or men and women laying sandbags against an impending flood. Instantly recognisable, because 
mutual support is built into the genes of all social animals; they cooperate to accomplish what they can’t do 
alone.” Richard Sennett , Together: The Rituals, Pleasures and Politics of Cooperation (Yale: Yale 
University Press, 2012), 5.  
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While the Rochdale society certainly existed and has been very influential in the 
domestic as well as the international co-operative movement, much of the story around it 
is a myth. It was not opened by starving weavers devoid of outside influence, nor was it the 
first successful co-operative.23 Although ostensibly a story about origins, the myth of the 
Rochdale Pioneers serves to remove co-operation from its history. In this narrative, a set of 
immutable values are married to an exceptional historical event. The story, from that point, 
is largely told as one of success which serves to reinforce the integrity of the founding, and 
the fidelity of the movement to its values and principles, which themselves exist somewhere 
outside of history, in our very biology. This kind of history does precisely what Foucault 
suggests that we often want history to do for us: “confirm our belief that that the present 
rests upon profound intentions and immutable necessities.”24  So long as our present 
understanding of co-operation is tied to a mythic past there is no need to question the idea 
of the co-operative itself, even when co-operatives encounter difficulties. Though there is 
undoubtedly some truth to the dominant narrative, it also avoids difficult questions around 
the political malleability of co-operation and the subjection of co-operatives to the market 
presented in this chapter’s opening. To understand how this impermeable object of the co-
operative came about, it is necessary to look beyond any single story, and explore the 
“constitutive historicity” of co-operation, or how our contemporary idea of the co-operative 
emerged historically.25  
“Constitutive historicity” is the idea that rather than being fixed, discourse is shaped 
by a history that gives it meaning.26 It draws on the work of Foucault and his genealogical 
approach to history.27 Genealogy has been described by Foucault and his many 
                                                     
23  Brett Fairbairn, “The Meaning of Rochdale: The Rochdale Pioneers and the Co-operative Principles,” 
Occasional Paper, Center for the Study of Cooperatives, University of Saskatchewan (1994), 1.  
24  Michel Foucault, “Nietzsche, Genealogy, History,” in Essential Works of Foucault, Volume 2: 
Aesthetics, Method and Epistemology, ed. J.D. Faubion (London: Penguin, 1994), 381.  
25  Butler, “Critically Queer,” 19.  
26  Ibid. 
27  Ibid., 19, 4, 5.  
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interlocutors as a “history of the present.”28 It is intended to be the opposite of any search 
for origins. Although a search for the origin or essence of ideas motivates much historical 
research, it endows the present with a stability that it does not possess. As Foucault suggests, 
the search for an origin is an attempt to capture an “essence of things” or a “pure identity” 
which is then assumed to have been adulterated though the passage of time.29 The search 
for origins “assumes the existence of immobile forms that precede the external world of 
accident and succession.”30 Genealogy, by contrast, resists “the metahistorical deployment 
of ideal significations and indefinite teleologies.”31 It is the very things we assume to be 
without history, taken to be transcendent and immutable values, rooted in a fundamental 
nature or principle, that are the products of often “arcane and ignoble” histories.32 
Genealogy designates a different positionality in relation to history, one in which, as 
Nietzsche would have it, “a new demand becomes audible,” a demand to question “the 
value of…values themselves” which requires “a knowledge of the conditions and 
circumstances in which they grew, under which they evolved and changed....”33  
The first step in a genealogical inquiry then is to recognize how discourse functions 
constitutively to create objects about which truth claims can be made, rather than reflecting 
a purely given reality. Genealogy, as Foucault says in an early treatment of it,  
applies...where discourse is effectively formed: it tries to grasp it in its power of 
affirmation, by which I mean not so much a power which would be opposed to that 
of denying, but rather the power to constitute domains of objects, in respect of 
which one can affirm or deny true or false propositions.34 
 
                                                     
28  Michel Foucault, Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison, trans. Alan Sheridan (New York: 
Vintage Books, 1995), 31. See also Wendy Brown, Politics Out of History (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 2001), 121-137. .  
29  Foucault, “Nietzsche,” 371. 
30  Ibid. 
31  Ibid., 370.  
32  Todd May, Between Genealogy and Epistemology: Psychology, Politics and Knowledge in the 
Philosophy of Michel Foucault (University Park: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1993), 56. Emphasis in 
original. 
33  Friedrich Nietzsche, On the Genealogy of Morals, ed. Walter Kaufmann (New York: Random House, 
1989), 20. 
34  Michel Foucault, “The Order of Discourse,” in Untying the Text: A Post-Structuralist Reader, ed. 
Robert Young (Boston: Routledge and Kegal Paul Ltd, 1981), 73.  
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Discourse creates objects which mediate the relationship between language and the world: 
objects of discourse, in turn, do not correspond directly and completely to things in the 
world. In his work on sexuality as an object of discourse, for instance, Foucault asserts that 
“it is precisely this idea of sex in itself…that we cannot accept without examination.”35 
Although ‘sex’ would often be equated with biology, and situated as part of an objective 
material reality, he insists that we must avoid this assumption and recognize that “sexuality 
is a very real historical formation; it is what gave rise to the notion of sex, as a speculative 
element necessary to its operation.”36 In this formulation, the word ‘sex’ does not designate 
an isolated object in the world, it is rather “the most speculative, most ideal, and most 
internal element in a deployment of sexuality organized by power in its grip on bodies and 
their materiality.”37  
 By analogy, in this thesis, it is the very idea of the co-operative that needs to be 
questioned. The historical narrative and normative reading of co-operation presented in 
the Rochdale origin story takes the specific history of the modern co-operative 
organisational form to be the manifestation of a transcendent and immutable set of co-
operative values. We need to invert this relation and see the history of the organisational 
form as that which produces co-operative values subsequently taken to be without history. 
Rather than existing outside of history and manifesting in the Rochdale Pioneers, the idea 
of co-operation was formed and constituted by the historical experience leading up to the 
founding of that society, and indeed well beyond it. As will be discussed in chapter 1, many 
of the practices associated with co-operation long precede the application of the term and 
can be found in the riots and rebellions of the lower classes in the late eighteenth century. 
Early co-operative societies formed on the back of protests and riots, as part of what E.P. 
                                                     
35  Michel Foucault, The History of Sexuality, Volume 1: An Introduction, trans. Robert Hurley (New 
York: Vintage Books, 1990), 152. Emphasis in original.  
36  Ibid., 157. 
37  Ibid., 155. 
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Thompson calls “the moral economy of the crowd,” giving them a more enduring 
organisational form and presence.38 As a distinct set of ideas, co-operation began to coalesce 
in the mid-nineteenth century around the writings and projects of Robert Owen (regarded 
as the father of English socialism) and only came to designate a specific type of 
organisation—‘a co-operative’—a few decades later.39 In this historical sense, co-operation 
emerges as a distinct idea in the context of the upheavals of industrialisation, as the opposite 
of competition, and as something which offers, at a minimum, the possibility of the 
amelioration of social ills, particularly in the absence of state welfare provision. For many it 
also offered the vision of a wholly other society which would supersede the current one. In 
the English context, co-operation is the original form of socialism and for a time was 
understood interchangeably with it. By the mid-nineteenth century, co-operatives were 
increasingly regarded as a legitimate and praiseworthy form of organisation for the working 
classes, and one that would expose the working classes to the laws of political economy. 
This is the context in which co-operatives gained legal recognition through the Industrial 
and Provident Societies Act 1852.  
Creating a coherent narrative for the co-operative movement which centres on 
innate values and the founding moment of the Rochdale Pioneers has required disavowing 
certain elements of this history; particularly, the violence of the riots and the politics of early 
socialism, as well as the constitutive effects of legal recognition. Legal recognition, as noted 
earlier, is usually seen as key to the success of the co-operative movement, giving it a basis 
of legitimacy on which to grow and expand.  This view can be traced back to J.M. Ludlow 
                                                     
38  E.P. Thompson, “The Moral Economy of the English Crowd in the Eighteenth Century,” Past and 
Present, no. 50 (1971): 76–136. 
39  It is not clear exactly how or when the term came into this usage, though it appears to derive directly 
from Robert Owen’s idea of Villages of Co-operation.  The historian Jennifer Tann, writing of the range of 
organisations formed as part of the response to the Corn Laws in the late eighteenth century, which will be 
discussed in chapter 1, suggests that it did not come into general usage until the 1820s, and was not used in 
conjunction with similar types of organisation in the eighteenth century. Jennifer Tann, “Co-operative Corn 
Milling: Self-Help during the Grain Crises of the Napoleonic Wars,” The Agricultural History Review 28, 
no. 1 (1980): 47, 23. 
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and Lloyd Jones; two prominent nineteenth century Christian Socialists who were largely 
responsible for the legal recognition of co-operatives as a distinct form of organisation. They 
observed that legislation created for building societies and co-operatives (the Regulation of 
Benefit Building Societies’ Act of 1836 and Industrial and Provident Societies’ Act of 1852, 
respectively), were “anticipated by the spontaneous efforts of the working class.”40 These 
forms of organisation were “not the creature of Parliament, but the working man’s own 
creation.”41  
In one sense, it is true that the co-operative was not created by Parliament, but rather 
by associations (both working and middle class) operating without any explicit sanction from 
the state. However, this reading of legal recognition takes for granted not only the stability 
of the co-operative as a form of organisation existing outside the law, but also the law as 
neutral conduit for recognition. In this narrative, the co-operative form of organisation finds 
its expression in law and passes through the process of legal recognition without any 
discernible effect except to be legitimized and enabled.  At the very least, processes of legal 
recognition run the risk of “misrecognition,” in which the identity of whatever is to be 
recognized is distorted from its original or self-determined form.42 For example, in the initial 
Industrial and Provident Societies Act of 1852, co-operatives were denied fundamental 
capacities such as the ability to hold land and devote funds to education. Later amendments 
to the Act rectified these inadequacies, granting co-operative organisations more power and 
discretion over the use of their resources. However, these deficiencies and eventual 
improvements to the law do not necessarily detract from the more fundamental problem 
of recognition itself or the aptly named “bringing within” that it effects.43  
                                                     
40  J.M. Ludlow and Lloyd Jones, Progress of the Working Class 1832-1867 (London: Alexander Strahan, 
1867), 96.  
41  Ibid.  
42  Charles Taylor, “Politics of Recognition” in Multiculturalism: Examining the Politics of Recognition, ed. 
Amy Gutmann (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994), 25. 
43 For a critique of the idea of misrecognition and the political theory of recognition as elaborated by Charles 
Taylor, see Patchen Markell, Bound by Recognition (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2003), 39-58. 
 
 
INTRODUCTION | 21 
 
 
Instead of simply recognizing a pre-existing co-operative form, law served, at least 
in part, to constitute it. The legal idea of the co-operative is not a pure reflection of the 
working-class co-operative society (assuming there even was or could be such a pure form 
existing outside the law) but also reflects the historicity of legal forms and their shifting 
relation to life in relation to liberal and biopolitical forms of governmentality.44 This thesis 
will focus specifically on the body corporate as legal form. This form, which was given to 
co-operatives by an amendment to the Industrial and Provident Societies Act in 1862, was 
most certainly not “the working man’s own creation.”45 The body corporate and the legal 
personality attributed to it have a long history, extending back to the medieval church. In 
the early modern period, incorporation was a narrow privilege, available only by Royal 
Charter or Act of Parliament, and it served as a means by which the state could extend its 
authority over diverse areas of life. In this capacity it operated as part of what Foucault 
regards as a primarily sovereign or juridical form of power.46 This dynamic shifted in the 
nineteenth century, when incorporation was made available to joint stock companies 
through a relatively simple process of registration.47 As a consequence, as part of what 
Foucault regards as a normalisation of law, accompanying the emergence of disciplinary 
power and liberal or biopolitical governmentality, incorporation came to be seen as a 
private right, and a form of commercial freedom granted to pre-existing entities.48 The 
                                                     
In effect, misrecognition presumes the possibility of recognition—that a group or individual would have their 
own distinctive identity--and in so doing, reproduces and reinforces a model of sovereignty.  
44 This could come from a range of potential sources, but one of the most direct discussions of law in 
relation to shifting modes of governmentality comes from Michel Foucault, “Truth and Juridical Forms,” in 
Essential Works of Foucault, Volume 3: Power, ed. J.D. Faubion (London: Penguin, 2002), 1-89. There is 
a longstanding debate over Foucault’s thinking on law, with the dominant stance being that he ‘expelled’ law 
from his theories of disciplinary and biopolitical forms of power. See for instance, Alan Hunt and Gary 
Wickham, Foucault and Law (London: Pluto Press, 1994). In spite of this, they suggest it is possible to read 
a constitutive theory of law in Foucault’s work, even if he would not have endorsed such a theory himself. 
More recently Ben Golder and Peter Fitzpatrick have offered a different reading of Foucault which 
highlights the integral role of law in Foucault’s theories disciplinary power. Ben Golder and Peter 
Fitzpatrick, Foucault’s Law (Abingdon: Routledge, 2009). This debate will be discussed in chapter 3.  
45 Ludlow and Jones, Progress, 96.  
46 Michel Foucault, “Two Lectures,” in Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings, 1972-
1977, ed. Colin Gordon, trans., Colin Gordon et al (New York: Pantheon Books, 1980), 88. 
47 Joint Stock Companies Act 1844.  
48 Foucault, History of Sexuality, 144. 
 
 
INTRODUCTION | 22 
 
 
normalisation of law is crucial here. It ensured that legal forms, like the body corporate, 
could appear to have an identity with life, in spite of their enduring connection to 
sovereignty.49 It naturalised and concealed the dimensions of legal recognition that enabled 
co-operatives’ subordination to the market, while at the same time allowing legal recognition 
to be seen as enabling. 
The normalisation of law and the presumption of incorporation as a right and a 
freedom, obscures the constitutive effect of incorporation, allowing the corporate form and 
legal recognition more generally to function in a way that both disciplines and depoliticises 
the co-operative. In particular, incorporation, occurring specifically in the context of 
biopolitical governmentality, constituted the co-operative as economic or commercial 
entity, instantiating the divide between the political and the economic that characterises 
nineteenth century political economy.50 This legally constituted idea of the co-operative 
shapes how we understand the limits and possibilities of co-operation as an alternative form 
of organisation and association today. Co-operatives’ legal constitution as bodies corporate, 
poised for competition in the market, is taken for granted when they are viewed as situated 
‘between’ state and market. 
The Limits of Alterity  
However, the process of legal recognition and the constitutive history briefly traced 
do not completely determine what the co-operative ‘is’, nor could they. As suggested at the 
opening of this chapter, co-operatives both affirm and exceed the established order. They 
can be easily appropriated for the purposes of the prevailing politics of austerity, but they 
can also present a real opportunity to practice different forms of relation and to create new 
forms community. Co-operation retains an openness and an indeterminacy which can be 
                                                     
49 See chapter 3. 
50 See also Michel Foucault, The Birth of Biopolitics: Lectures at the College de France 1978-1979, ed. 
Michael Sellenart, trans. Graham Burchell (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), 13-17; and Polanyi, 
Great Transformation, 120.  
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engaged by those seeking to actualise a vision of alterity. Particularly in recent years, there 
has been a resurgence of co-operativism at a grassroots level; part of what has been called 
“the new co-operativism.”51 These new cooperatives are distinguished by their lack of 
connection to older cooperative movements, their engagement with ‘everyday’ politics of 
meeting the needs of communities, more horizontal organizing practices and a stronger 
connection with local or immediate communities.52 These projects have, to some extent, 
breathed new life into the idea of co-operation, manifesting the “leftist imaginaries” that 
Gibson-Graham wants to read into the third way.53 As Gibson-Graham warns, an 
overemphasis on the ways in which these projects may be determined by various structural 
constraints can have a stifling effect and blind us to the ways in which they are alternative.54  
The genealogical study of the creation of objects of discourse or regulation 
presumes, even requires, that these objects do not completely determine the world: there 
is a necessary separation between words and things without which genealogy would not be 
possible. If words had a complete identity with the world, there would be no need to 
question their history, nor would there be any scope for changing meaning, as the entirety 
of possible meaning would already be present in the word itself. The legally-constituted 
idea of a ‘co-operative’ would already include all its possible manifestations. As Foucault 
notes “[i]f language was as rich as being it would be the useless and mute double of things; 
it would not exist.”55 This might be described as the constitutive insufficiency of discourse.56 
It is echoed by Jean-Luc Nancy who suggests that "[i]f there is an illusion from which one 
                                                     
51  Marcelo Vieta, “Editorial: The New Cooperativism,” Affinities: A Journal of Radical Theory, Culture, 
and Action 4, no. 1 (2010): 2.  
52  John Curl, “The Cooperative Movement in Century 21,” Affinities: A Journal of Radical Theory, 
Culture, and Action 4, no. 1 (2010), 13. 
53  Gibson-Graham, “Ethical Economies,”124.  
54  J.K. Gibson-Graham, The End of Capitalism (As We Knew It): A Feminist Critique of Political 
Economy (Cambridge: Blackwell, 1996), 3. 
55  Michel Foucault, Raymond Roussel (Paris: Gallimard, 1963), 207-208. Quoted in Beatrice Han, 
Foucault’s Critical Project: Between the Transcendental and the Historical, trans. Edward Pile (Stanford: 
Stanford University Press, 2002), 53.  
56  The phrase “constitutive insufficiency” is borrowed from Ben Golder and Peter Fitzpatrick, Foucault’s 
Law (Abingdon: Routledge, 2009), 65. They use it in relation to Foucault’s idea of disciplinary power, 
rather than discourse. 
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must protect oneself today more than ever, it is the illusion that consists in getting hung up 
on words (history, philosophy, politics, art...) as if they were immediately to be equated with 
things."57 While this project is primarily concerned with tracing the constitutive historicity of 
co-operation, appreciating the significance of this constitution requires maintaining a sense 
of this excess and indeterminacy; the possibility of alterity that co-operatives gesture toward 
and manifest. This is particularly necessary for understanding what is at stake in the process 
of legal recognition and constitution, both what may have been closed or restricted, and 
that which may continue on.  
This thesis approaches this sense and possibility of alterity within the co-operative 
movement from a historical perspective; not the mythologised history of the Rochdale 
Pioneers, but the eighteenth century “moral economy of the crowd.”58 In contrast to 
dominant historical narratives of the co-operative movement, chapter 1 will argue that the 
moral economy of the crowd, which Thompson locates in the eighteenth century, can be 
seen as the genealogical “beginning” of the co-operative.59 The co-operative derives some 
important features from these beginnings—in particular, what Thompson refers to as an 
“ethos of mutual aid,” will be read as both a form of resistance to the depredations of an 
emerging market economy and the manifestation of an alternative way meeting basic needs 
denied by the market.60 The moral economy has often been read as a paradigmatic example 
of ‘custom’ or ‘tradition’, perpetuating a romanticisation of its social forms. In contrast, I 
will argue, drawing primarily on Nancy’s ontological reading of the political, that this ethos 
of mutuality should be understood as a political gesture.  
Foucault’s genealogy and Nancy’s ontology may at first seem like unlikely 
bedfellows.61 The very idea that there could be an essential content to being, that would be 
                                                     
57  Jean-Luc Nancy, Sense of the World (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1997), 6. 
58 Thompson, “Moral Economy,” 76.  
59 Foucault, “Nietzsche” 371 
60 E.P. Thompson, The Making of the English Working Class (New York: Vintage Books, 1963), 423. 
61 The connections between Foucault and Nancy no doubt run more deeply than can be explored here, 
particularly given the importance of Martin Heidegger for both thinkers. Even if Foucault, perhaps 
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the object of an ontology, is undermined by genealogy’s commitment to the rejection of 
such ideal and ahistorical notions. However, Nancy offers an ontology which, like 
genealogy, resists transcendent and essentialized categories of meaning.62 Being, for Nancy, 
is always “being with,” bound up in an inoperative (dèsoeuvrement) “originary or 
ontological ‘sociality’.”63 We are always-already in common with one another, prior to and 
co-extensive with all of other forms of sociality. Community, for Nancy, “is not a project to 
be realised, it does not occur as a series of social practices, and it is not a value or an idea–
rather, it is only as shared finite existence.”64 More broadly, inoperativity evokes a sense that 
the world is always in excess of the categories which we create to conceptualize it, the 
categories by which we render things operative and designate them “as such.”65 The very 
possibility of alterity resides in this inoperative sociality which prevents closure and 
totalisation.  
Modern deployments of community, often tied to a longing for a lost community, 
in need of retrieval, or attempting to realise a fully unified community in the present, 
obscure the inoperativity of sociality. The figure of the absolute individual, and 
correspondingly, the fully realised community, function as though the relationality that 
makes them possible in the first place did not exist. Community is regarded as an essence 
and given an ideal content—a brotherhood or fraternity, a society or a state. As Nancy writes, 
                                                     
inadvertently, precludes a Heideggerian solution to the questions he poses, the amenability of a 
Heideggerian ontology to Foucault’s project remains (see Beatrice Han, Foucault’s Critical Project, 54-60). 
Making no pretension to philosophical mastery, I have brought these two strands of thought together for the 
sake of their practical confluences. As far as I am aware, there has been very little work drawing together the 
thought of Foucault and Nancy.  
62 See Ian James, “The Ground of Being Social” in Being Social: Ontology, Law, Politics, eds. Tara 
Mulqueen and Daniel Matthews (Oxford: Counterpress, 2015), 17-32.  
63 Jean-Luc Nancy, Inoperative Community (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1991), 28. 
64 Ian James, The Fragmentary Demand: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Jean-Luc Nancy (Palo Alto: 
Stanford University Press, 2005), 186. 
65 Nancy, Sense of the World, 13. The distinction Nancy draws between “being as being” and “being as 
such” parallels the distinction he makes between sense and truth. “Being as such” posits being with a 
particular truth, whereas “being as being” is sense, or being-toward. “[T]ruth operates, whether it wants to or 
not, an untenable separation between being as such which it presents and being as being” (ibid., 12). 
Importantly, being as being and being as such are “inseparable from one another,” yet “truth proceeds to 
operate the separation” (ibid.). Being as such appears as essence, in some particular fashion, with particular 
characteristics. Being as being would be inoperative with “being as the action of the verb ‘to be’, that is, 
being that ‘makes’ (things) come to presence (and that, consequently cannot itself be presented)” (ibid., 13). 
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“…economic ties, technological operations, and political fusion (into a body or under a 
leader) represent or rather present, expose, and realize this essence necessarily in 
themselves.”66 While complete immanence is impossible—or, more precisely, it is possible, 
but only in death or in ceasing to be— and consistently unworked by the inoperativity of 
sociality, modern forms of community nonetheless attempt to realise it, whether through 
claims to sovereignty, or simply the presumption of presence. Nancy refers to these 
attempts as forms of “totalitarianism” or “immanentism.”67 These terms are not restricted 
to "certain types of societies or regimes” but instead refer to the “general horizon of our 
time, encompassing both democracies and their fragile juridical parapets."68  
In his early work with Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe, Nancy figures immanentism as 
the “closure of the political,” precisely because it obscures sociality and possibility of 
alterity.69 The political (le politique), Nancy argues, “is the place where community as such 
is brought into play.”70 The political—before any particular program or project—is concerned 
with the very possibility of alterity and the unworking of the limits of any established order. 
The political (le politique), in this sense, is not any form of instituted politics (la politique), 
but rather the question of relation itself. In Chapter 1, I will argue that the ethos of mutuality 
that derives from the moral economy of the crowd can be read as political in this Nancian 
sense, outside the terms afforded by political economy, in which the political would be 
predominantly associated with the state, in opposition to the economic. The ethos of 
mutual aid exemplifies a form of politics that does not “stem from the will to realize an 
essence.” 71  
                                                     
66 Nancy, Inoperative, 3.  
67 Nancy, Inoperative, 3.  
68 Nancy, Inoperative 3). 
69 Phillipe Lacoue-Labarth and Jean-Luc Nancy, “Foreward to The Centre for Philosophical Research on 
the Political,” in ed. Simon Sparks, Retreating the Political (London: Routledge, 1997), 112. 
70 Nancy, Inoperative, xxxvii. 
71 Ibid., xl.  
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While this ethos of mutuality continues to animate co-operatives, I will argue that 
incorporation functions as a form of metaphysical enclosure that both disciplines and 
depoliticises the co-operative. The sense of a lost community, for Nancy, derives 
fundamentally from Christianity. As he writes, “[b]ut the true consciousness of the loss of 
community is Christian…the community desired or pined for…is understood as 
communion, and communion takes place, in its principle as in its ends, at the heart of the 
mystical body of Christ.”72 Modern attempts to achieve communion are a reflection of a 
process of secularization, and an attempt “to respond to the harsh reality of modern 
experience: namely that divinity was withdrawing infinitely from immanence.”73 The legal 
form of the body corporate derives specifically from this idea of the corpus mysticum, 
importing a transcendent conception of unity from the medieval church. This thesis will 
trace the historicity and political theology of the body corporate form, and its integration 
into English law, as a way of elaborating its metaphysical dimension.74  
Legal recognition thus served as a means of “managing alterity,” and also containing 
it.75 This is not to suggest, however, that legal forms are themselves devoid of alterity. The 
possibility of alterity subsists within law itself, as law’s responsiveness.  As Ben Golder and 
Peter Fitzpatrick explain,  
[w]hilst law must assume a definite content—and this content is given to law in 
standard jurisprudential perceptions by such entities as a sovereign, a class, a society, 
and so forth—the law cannot remain tied to any given content and must 
incorporatively engage with what is other to it, with resistances and transgressions 
which challenge its position.76 
                                                     
72 Ibid., 10. 
73 Ibid.  
74 There are, as Alberto Toscano has pointed out, potentially significant tensions between the concept of 
genealogy and political theology as it is generally understood, particularly by Giorgio Agamben. For the 
purposes of this thesis, a political theology of the body corporate arises as a consequence of genealogy 
because theology, while not the only aspect, is a key element of its historicity. The influence of theology 
arises not only as a general paradigm, but as the more or less direct influence of the medieval church on 
English law. This theological influence is not taken to be pernicious. Instead, it is a matter of historicising 
the concept which in turn, as an important aspect of any genealogy, helps to denaturalise it in the present. 
See Alberto Toscano, “Divine Management,” Angelaki: Journal of the Theoretical Humanities 16, no. 3 
(2011): 125-136.  
75 Judith Butler and Athena Athanasiou, Dispossession: The Performative in the Political (Cambridge: Polity 
Press, 2013), 75.  
76 Golder and Fitzpatrick, Foucault’s Law, 77.   
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The experience of the co-operative movement in England readily demonstrates this 
responsiveness in the very fact that the law changed in order to accommodate a new mode 
of organisation and recognise the rights of working-class people to organise themselves for 
the purposes of their own mutual aid. Law has “a fluid nature” that gives social movements 
the ability to influence their circumstance. Thus, although "[l]aw reflects the state's power” 
it can also, and often must, be used as tool of resistance.77 However, while law is responsive, 
it is not infinitely so. This is not to devalue the responsiveness of law, but to suggest that 
understanding the limits of these forms, and the often subtle ways they shape and 
circumscribe visions of alterity is also important. Law constructs meaning and constitutes 
identities, as well as "our imagination about what is politically possible."78 Moreover, “it is 
the state that gets to decide whether constituents are worthy of legal rights and what kind of 
rights they can have and when those rights may be invoked.”79 While there is much that co-
operatives can do within the confines of this form, there are also persistent difficulties 
presented by the subjection to the market entailed by the form and its history.  
                                                     
77 S. Barclay, L. Jones, and A.M. Marshall, “Two Spinning Wheels: Studying Law and Social Movements,” 
Studies in Law, Politics and Society 54 (2011): 3. This, of course, is the well-worn territory of critical race 
theory. See for instance Kimberlé Williams Crenshaw, “Race, Reform, and Retrenchment: Transformation 
and Legitimation in Antidiscrimination Law,” Harvard Law Review 101, no. 7 (1988), 1331-1387. See also 
Brenna Bhandar and Jonathan Goldberg-Hiller, “Law, Sovereignty, and Recognition,” in eds. Brenna 
Bhandar and Jonathan Goldberg-Hiller, Plastic Materialities: Politics, Legality, and Metamorphosis in the 
Work of Catharine Malabou (Durham: Duke University Press, 2015), 209-232. Acknowledging the alterity 
and relative indeterminacy of co-operative forms of relation shares similarities with Bhandar and Goldberg-
Hiller’s argument that within forms of recognition, there can and indeed must be movement. In the settler 
colonial context, for instance, aboriginal communities have turned to the law “out of necessity” (ibid., 213). 
And more broadly, it is not possible to simply step outside of frameworks of recognition. They draw on 
Catharine Malabou’s conceptualization of plasticity, and particularly the function of temporality, to show 
“how subjects confined to particular historicities survive, psychically speaking, by thinking, acting and living 
according to a temporality that exceeds and perhaps even contradicts the confines of sovereign orders" 
(ibid., 220). A similar dynamic could perhaps be read into the working class co-operative movement, insofar 
as the co-operative is a utopian project, the full realization of which is always projected at least partly into the 
future. In addition, working class people could hardly have persisted with co-operative projects without 
some form of legal recognition, particularly given the difficulties in collectively holding property without 
some form of legal personality. This will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 4. For further reflection on 
the relationship between property and legal form, see Brenna Bhandar, “Disassembling the Legal Form: 
Ownership and the Racial Body,” in eds. Matthew Stone, Illan rua Wall and Costas Douzinas, New Critical 
Legal Thinking: Law and the Political (London: Routledge, 2012), 112-127.   
 
78  Sandra R. Levitsky, "Law and Social Movements: Old Debates and New Directions," in The Handbook 
of Law and Society, eds., Austin Sarat and Patricia Ewick (Chichester: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 2015), 385.  
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Chapter Overview 
 The thesis begins from the question of alterity and its relationship to the political in 
the history of the co-operative movement in England. The first chapter offers a critique of 
the dominant historiographical approaches to the co-operative movement which have, 
paradoxically, tended to remove the co-operative from its history. Drawing on the critical 
resources of Foucault’s concept of genealogy, I argue that the history of the co-operative 
movement has been told within a discourse of political economy, which is predicated on a 
well-defined separation between ‘the political’ and ‘the economic’. The ‘origin’ of the co-
operative movement with the Rochdale Pioneers instantiates the divisions created by that 
discourse, by providing a moment that stands outside of history. In so doing, these histories 
efface the conditions of constitution for the co-operative, and particularly the role of law in 
this constitution. This chapter then offers an alternative approach to this history, which sees 
the co-operative as historically linked to what E.P. Thompson called “the moral economy 
of the crowd” in the eighteenth century.80 Instead of reading the history of the co-operative 
movement as derived from a mythic origin in the Rochdale Pioneers, this alternative 
approach leads to the question of how the disparate practices associated with the moral 
economy were transformed into the discrete organisational form of the co-operative.  I 
argue that the history of the co-operative movement is one of depoliticisation, not in the 
narrow terms of political economy, but through the “closure of the political” as described 
by Lacoue-Labarthe and Nancy.81 
The second chapter argues that both the moral economy of the crowd and the co-
operative should be seen as emerging from particular forms of relation with the state. There 
has been a tendency, particularly within legal pluralism, to regard both the moral economy 
                                                     
80 E.P. Thompson, “The Moral Economy of the English Crowd in the Eighteenth Century,” Past and 
Present, no. 50 (1971): 76–136. 
81 Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe and Jean-Luc Nancy, “The Retreat of the Political,” in ed. Simon Sparks, 
Retreating the Political (London: Routledge, 1997), 122-134.  
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and co-operatives as having their own autonomous forms of law and normativity. The moral 
economy, for instance, is thought to manifest a form of traditional or customary law, a 
framing and terminology which implies a relationship of autonomy from, but also inferiority 
to, the state.82 Co-operatives, in turn, have been regarded as a means of maintaining these 
traditional forms of relation and legality within state law. Yet this framing takes for granted 
the ways in which both the moral economy and co-operative may already be the product of 
a relationship with the state.83 Drawing on the work of Peter Fitzpatrick, this chapter argues 
that it is actually law which makes the state possible, inviting an interpretation of law from 
poststructuralist thought and viewing the state not as an ipseity, but as the outcome of a 
process of negation and differentiation from other associations.84  The means by which the 
state constitutes itself through the recognition of associations is explored through a close 
reading of Hobbes’ Leviathan. However, this chapter approaches Hobbes not as the author 
of a totalising sovereignty but, following James Martel, as one “who helps us to understand 
how sovereignty is not so much an actual font of authority, but a rhetorical production.”85 
The Leviathan demonstrates both how the state constitutes itself through processes of legal 
recognition, and how the state uses silence and tacit consent to strategically negotiate its own 
impossibility. The historical shift from moral economy to co-operative is not a matter of 
“bringing within” from “outside,” as the Christian Socialists suggested,86 but a more complex 
constitutive dynamic that reflects shifting modalities of governance and power in relation to 
associations as the modern state comes into being.  
 The third chapter turns to the specific legal form of the body corporate exploring 
                                                     
82 See for instance Harry Arthurs, “Review: Customs in Common: Studies in Traditional Popular Culture,” 
University of Toronto Law Journal 43 (1993): 289. 
83 See Stuart Henry, Private Justice: Towards Integrated Theorising in the Sociology of Law (London: 
Routledge & Kegan Paul plc, 1983), 92-96. 
84 Peter Fitzpatrick, “Being Social in Law and Society,” in Tara Mulqueen and Daniel Matthews, eds., Being 
Social: Ontology, Law, Politics (London: Counterpress, 2015), 36. 
85 James R. Martel, Subverting the Leviathan: Reading Thomas Hobbes as a Radical Democrat (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 2007), 239.  . 
86 Ludlow and Jones, Progress, 96. 
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both its history and the particular historical context in which it came to be used in the 
nineteenth century. In contrast to theoretical debates on the nature of corporate personality 
that have cast it as a reflection of the ‘real personality’ of groups, a mere pragmatic device, 
or simply a right, this chapter argues that incorporation, as a mode of legal recognition, 
functions constitutively, particularly as a consequence of what Foucault calls the 
normalisation of law.87 This chapter traces the history of the body corporate from its roots 
in Roman law through its ‘metaphysicalisation’ in the medieval church, and its eventual 
integration into English law. The chapter then turns to the use of incorporation in the early 
modern period, reading this in connection with new forms of governmentality. In the early 
modern period, incorporation served as a means of extending the authority and reach of 
the state, and was intimately connected with the operation of sovereignty and what Foucault 
refers to as police. This dynamic shifts in the mid-nineteenth century with the introduction 
of incorporation by registration and the emergence of biopolitical governmentality. This 
chapter argues that the introduction of incorporation by registration had the effect of 
normalising the corporate form, obscuring its connection to sovereignty and making it 
appear to be a private right and a form of commercial freedom. This normalisation also 
had the consequence of immanentising the transcendent metaphysical reference acquired 
in the medieval church, making the form “immanentist” or “totalitarian” in Nancy’s terms. 
This is ultimately necessary background for understanding the effects of incorporation on 
the co-operative, when it is given this status in the mid-nineteenth century.  
 The final chapter returns to the specific context of the legal recognition of the co-
operative movement in the mid-nineteenth century, focusing particularly on the Christian 
Socialists and their efforts to secure a legal form for co-operatives. The legal recognition of 
co-operatives is situated in a wider debate about limited liability, and the movement from a 
predominantly evangelical view of the market as a retributory force, to one that demands 
                                                     
87 Foucault, History of Sexuality, 144.  
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and fosters integrity. The chapter explores how it was thought that the legal recognition of 
co-operatives would expose the working classes to the discipline of the market, as a means 
of disabusing them of their immediate desire for political rights, and also teaching them the 
laws of political economy. The chapter then turns to the specific form of the body 
corporate, arguing that it serves as a form of metaphysical enclosure that facilitates the 
discipline of the market. Through incorporation, the co-operative was constituted as an 
economic or commercial entity within the narrow terms of political economy. However, as 
I will argue, it was also depoliticised in a more fundamental way through the imposition of 
the corporate form, which imposes and immanentizes a transcendent form of unity from 
the medieval church, effecting a closure of the political.  
The chapters in this thesis take what may at first appear to be a meandering route 
to its conclusion that the constitution of co-operatives as bodies corporate served as a form 
of enclosure that disciplined and depoliticised the co-operative. However, the theoretical 
movements and enquires pursued in this thesis are led by its genealogical orientation, which 
entails not only a different approach to history and periodisation (chapter 1), but also a 
critique of the modes of thought on which dominant approaches to co-operatives and law 
have been based. The theoretical orientation of most legal and political academic work that 
has been done on the English co-operative movement has been pluralist, starting from the 
German jurist Otto von Gierke, whose theorisation and historiography of German 
associational life influenced many subsequent thinkers, including the most prominent 
historian of the English co-operative movement, G.D.H. Cole. Within socio-legal literature, 
a legal pluralist approach to co-operatives has also been dominant, even if they have only 
been a marginal concern within the discipline as a whole. The affinity between co-operatives 
and these pluralist approaches stems from an underlying concern with group and 
associational life, including the state, and the corporate nature of such groups.   
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However, as I argue in chapters 2 and 3, these perspectives have implicitly 
reproduced a conception of legal recognition, one ultimately shared with more liberal 
theories (such as that of H.L.A. Hart, engaged in detail in chapter 3), which takes for 
granted the ways in which law may have had a constitutive effect on the co-operative, 
regarding such groups as existing prior to and persisting unscathed through their recognition 
by the state. In order to undertake a more thorough genealogy of the co-operative, the 
chapters in this thesis explore the conditions of possibility not only for the legal recognition 
of co-operatives, but the particular way in which this recognition has come to be regarded 
as purely enabling. This requires, in turn, exploring legal recognition first and foremost as 
a historical question that sees legal recognition and the forms that it takes as reflecting 
shifting modalities of power in the constitution of the modern state, as well as the historicity 
of particular legal forms themselves. This thesis contends that a significant part of the reason 
why co-operatives look and function as they do now is a consequence of how the state 
absorbed and attempted to rationalise associational life in the mid-nineteenth century, and 
the subsequent normalisation of law that allowed the state’s coercive power to effectively 
disappear and become ‘facilitative’. In addition, as chapter 3 argues, the specific use of the 
body corporate in the nineteenth century can only be understood with reference to its 
history as a means of collectivisation in the medieval church. The notion of enclosure 
introduced in the final chapter provides a way of describing legal recognition that 
appreciates, but also depends on, both of these prior theoretical insights.   
A Finite History of the Present 
 The constitutive historicity of the co-operative as a legal entity presented here is only 
one possible narrative. It is not inherently more truthful or accurate than any other, nor is 
my intention to propose that this account is definitive. Foucault once claimed that all of his 
work is fiction: “[a]s to the problem of fiction, it seems to me to be a very important one; I 
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am well aware that I have never written anything but fictions.”88 Fiction, for Foucault, is not 
devoid of truth, but rather  
...the possibility exists for fiction to function in truth, for a fictional discourse to 
induce effects of truth, and for bringing it about that a true discourse engenders or 
‘manufactures' something that does not as yet exist, that is, 'fictions' it. One 'fictions' 
history on the basis of a political reality that makes it true, one 'fictions' a politics not 
yet in existence on the basis of a historical truth.89 
 
Discourse, in this sense, serves in a creative capacity, as the means by which we make and 
unmake the world. The goal of this project is not necessarily to pursue a more truthful 
discourse of the co-operative, but rather to challenge the very idea of the possibility of such 
a truth; to recognize that truth is a decision. “The historicity of the truth,” as Nancy notes, 
“lies in the fact that it offers itself to our decision and is never given."90 A particular decision 
about the meaning of co-operation was made with legal recognition. This project traces the 
history of that decision in an effort to understand how it affects how we understand co-
operatives in the present. By constituting the co-operative as a body corporate poised to 
compete in a market, legal recognition has contributed to the framing of co-operatives as 
businesses. This framing takes for granted that the market is a free or natural space, rather 
than one constructed through regulation and state intervention. Recognizing that this 
understanding of the co-operative is a decision opens up spaces for new ways of doing the 
politics of co-operation; ways that must be fictioned.  Genealogy, as Foucault summarizes, 
“is at one and the same time the historical analysis of the limits that are imposed on us and 
an experiment with the possibility of going beyond them.”91 
 
                                                     
88  Michel Foucault, “The History of Sexuality,” in Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other 
Writings, 1972-1977, ed. Colin Gordon (New York, Pantheon Books, 1977), 193.  
89  Ibid. 
90  Jean-Luc Nancy, “Finite History,” in The Birth to Presence, trans. Brian Holmes et al. (Palo Alto: 
Stanford University Press, 1994), 165. 
91  Foucault, “What is Enlightenment?,” in eds. Sylvere Lotringer and Lysa Hochroth, The Politics of 
Truth, (Los Angeles: Semiotext(e), 1997),  127. 
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Chapter 1: Co-operation and the Possibility of the Political 
"It is because law matters that we have bothered with this story at all."1  
The history of the co-operative movement in England is often told as one of 
depoliticisation. As the story goes, the founding of Rochdale Society of Equitable Pioneers 
in 1844 inaugurated a new and more pragmatic model of co-operation. It left behind prior 
forms of co-operation that were more closely associated with the lofty ideals of Robert 
Owen and utopian socialism, as well as more violent forms of action that were part of the 
moral economy in the late eighteenth century. Whether Rochdale is interpreted as the 
beginning of the movement’s success, or, in a more critical reading, lamented as part of a 
broader “drift to reformism,” the modern co-operative was formed though a disavowal or 
loss of the political.2 Law does not figure prominently in these accounts: legal recognition 
merely served, for better or for worse, to enable and legitimate the model of co-operation 
started by the Rochdale Pioneers.  This chapter offers a critique of these dominant 
approaches to the history of the co-operative movement. It suggests that this way of telling 
the history allows it to be taken for granted in the present that co-operatives will function 
predominantly as businesses. Following the critique, this chapter proposes an alternative 
approach to this history; one that enables an appreciation of how law may have mattered in 
the history of the co-operative movement.  
 The chapter begins by presenting an outline of the dominant historical narratives 
of the co-operative movement. I argue that the periodisation of this history reflects less a 
real progression of events than an essentialised idea of the political that simultaneously 
                                                     
1 E.P. Thompson, Whigs and Hunters: The Origin of the Black Act (London: Penguin Books, 1990), 268. 
Emphasis in original.  
2 Eric Hobsbawm, Labouring Men: Studies in the History of Labour (London: Redwood Press, 1964), 341. 
See also Neville Kirk, The Growth of Working Class Reformism in Mid-Victorian England (Urbana: 
University of Illinois Press, 1985), 1-31. 
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creates, and is validated by, the divisions between periods. Periodisation, as Kathleen Davis 
notes, is “not simply the drawing of an arbitrary line through time, but a complex process 
of conceptualizing categories, which are posited as homogeneous and retroactively 
validated by the designation of a period divide.”3 In the mid-nineteenth century, it was not 
so much that the practices associated with co-operation had dramatically changed, but that 
co-operation came to be articulated within the prevailing discourse of political economy, 
which was itself predicated on a clear separation between politics and the economy. The 
market was thought to be determined by natural laws independently of intervention. 
Politics, meanwhile, was designated as a realm of activities associated with the state.4 For 
middle class philanthropists who sought to appropriate co-operation as a means of 
ameliorating tensions between capital and labour, co-operation had to be figured as 
unpolitical, and separated from early socialism.5 The Marxist critique of political economy 
reinforced this way of articulating co-operation: co-operation was an incoherent political 
strategy, vulnerable to the domination of economic forces precisely because it was not 
focused on the state.6  
The founding of the Rochdale Society of Equitable Pioneers in 1844 has 
subsequently served as a point of origin for the modern co-operative movement. It stands 
outside of history; not temporally inaccessible, but rendered ideal and “almost magical,” 
such that the terms attributed to it far exceed mundane historical details.7  From this 
                                                     
3 Kathleen Davis, Periodization and Sovereignty: How Ideas of Feudalism and Secularization Govern the 
Politics of Time (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2012), 3.  
4 See Karl Polanyi, The Great Transformation (Boston: Beacon Press, 2001), 116-135. See also Michel 
Foucault, The Birth of Biopolitics: Lectures at the College de France 1978-1979, ed. Michael Sellenart, 
trans. Graham Burchell (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), 13-17. 
5 See Donna Loftus, “Capital and Community: Limited Liability and Attempts to Democratize the Market 
in Mid-Nineteenth-Century England,” Victorian Studies 45, no. 1 (2002): 93-120. 
6 Karl Marx, “The First International,” Inaugural Address of the International Working Men’s Association, 
Marx and Engels Internet Archive, October 21-27, 1864, 
http://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1864/10/27.htm (accessed 13 January 2017). 
7 Brett Fairbairn, “The Meaning of Rochdale: The Rochdale Pioneers and the Co-operative Principles,” 
Occasional Paper, Centre for the Study of Cooperatives, University of Saskatchewan (1994), 1. 
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vantage, it projects forward in time, giving the contemporary co-operative movement, and 
the form of the co-operative itself, a sense of historical necessity. It also reaches backward, 
defining that which came before in relation to its own eventuality. In the present, we have 
an idea of co-operation founded on a disavowal or loss of the political, that takes as given 
that it must compete on a market. Left behind is a ‘political’ form of co-operation associated 
with Owenism; and before that, only the incoherent and sometimes violent efforts of the 
late eighteenth century. 
This way of telling the co-operative movement’s history locates depoliticisation 
within co-operation itself, retrospectively giving it an historical identity that in actuality only 
developed in the mid-nineteenth century and thereafter. The projection of this identity 
from an idealised, mythic account of the Rochdale Pioneers effaces both the conditions of 
its own constitution as such, and the mechanisms by which this constitution was effected. 
In particular, this way of telling the history obscures the role of law in this constitutive 
process. Law, as noted above, does not figure prominently in these accounts of the history 
of the co-operative movement. In relation to the discourse of political economy, and to its 
critique, law functions in a largely instrumental capacity; whether by enabling the market or 
by being completely subordinate to it.  Law, as I will come to argue, was not simply 
secondary to the market and the economy. It was actively involved in constructing them, 
such that what is often depicted as a ‘free market’ is a realm of activity constituted in part 
by the state, through law.8 In this context, legal recognition served to constitute the co-
operative as an entity that would function on the market.  
However, in order to appreciate the significance of law and the ways in which the 
co-operative was ‘constituted’ in the mid-nineteenth century, it is necessary to have an 
understanding of the history of the co-operative movement that is not already determined 
                                                     
8 See Polanyi, Great Transformation, 71-80. 
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by the discourse of political economy. Following the critique of the dominant 
historiographical approaches to the co-operative movement, this chapter offers an 
alternative approach, drawing on the critical resources of genealogy as articulated by Michel 
Foucault.9 Genealogy proceeds on the basis that discourse does not have a determinate 
relationship with the world. It thereby makes possible alternative histories, as well as a more 
specific analysis of how particular objects of discourse are formed or constituted.  
Genealogy also offers an immediate critique of the discourse of political economy and the 
forms of politics that flow from it, as Foucault suggests that the discourse of political 
economy obscures what he observes as the fundamentally constitutive function of power.  
The chapter concludes with a sketch of an alternative approach to the history of the 
co-operative movement. I suggest that it is the earliest societies, formed in the late 
eighteenth century, rather than the Rochdale Pioneers, that should be regarded as the 
“beginnings” of the co-operative movement.10 These societies are situated amongst a range 
of practices that E.P. Thompson attributes to the “moral economy of the English crowd.”11 
In these early societies, Thompson observes a form of co-operative direct action that 
persists through to the modern form of co-operation.12 Where dominant histories would 
emphasize rupture between three discrete periods in the history of the co-operative 
movement, this alternative approach establishes a thread of continuity. It problematizes the 
self-contained coherence of these three periods by showing how the ideologies of early 
socialism and liberalism interacted with older, more dispersed practices and normative 
frameworks. Drawing on the work of Jean-Luc Nancy and Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe, I 
                                                     
9 See Michel Foucault, “Nietzsche, Genealogy, History,” in Essential Works of Foucault, Volume 2: 
Aesthetics, Method and Epistemology, ed. J.D. Faubion, trans. Robert Hurley and others (London: 
Penguin, 1994), 369-392. 
10 Wendy Brown, Politics Out of History (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001), 101. 
11 E.P. Thompson, “The Moral Economy of the English Crowd in the Eighteenth Century,” Past and 
Present, no. 50 (1971): 76–136. 
12 E.P. Thompson, The Making of the English Working Class (New York: Vintage Books, 1963), 203.  
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suggest that it is possible to see co-operative direct action as political.13 The essence of the 
political, for Lacoue-Labarthe and Nancy—before any particular programme or project—is 
concerned with the very possibility of alterity and the unworking of the limits of any 
established order.  The narrow circumscription of the political within the discourse of 
political economy presupposes the existence of the very system that would be put into 
question by the political.14   
When conceptualised as political, an emphasis on co-operative direct action reveals 
that the arc of the history of the co-operative movement is not simply one of 
depoliticisation, at least not in the terms dictated by political economy, as a foregone 
conclusion and an inevitability.  As I will suggest, the political gesture described as co-
operative direct action persists in forms of co-operation in the present, as the means by 
which they attempt, often successfully, to manifest the possibility of alterity. However, this 
gesture has been limited and circumscribed over time, and particularly by the constitution 
of the co-operative as part of the system it is meant to replace. This analysis invites a 
consideration of the ways in which the very constitution of the co-operative as an object 
depoliticised it, but never completely. This chapter sets the stage for the next three chapters 
which will focus on the significance of legal recognition in constituting the co-operative. 
Where dominant approaches to this history obscure or downplay the role of law, this 
chapter presents a critique and an alternative narrative that raise the possibility that law may 
have played a role that was more than just instrumental. 
 
                                                     
13 Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe and Jean-Luc Nancy, “The Retreat of the Political,” in ed. Simon Sparks, 
Retreating the Political (London: Routledge, 1997), 122-134. 
14 Claude Lefort, “The Permanence of the Theologico-Political?” in Democracy and Political Theory, trans. 
David Macey (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1988), 217.  
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The Political Historiography of Co-operation 
 In general, and in contrast to the vast literature on trade unions, very little has been 
written on the history of the co-operative movement in England.15 Aside from a relatively 
recent renewed interest in this history, a majority of the work produced on the movement 
has come from within, and has been commissioned on, an institutional level.16 For the co-
operative movement,  
…‘history’ was intimately bound up with the success and promulgation of co-
operative forms during this early phase and was construed, not merely as the 
product of passive reflection possible only after the struggle subsided, but as an 
active ingredient in a developing movement culture.17 
 
George Holyoake’s Self-Help by the People, perhaps the first in this genre, told the story 
of the Rochdale Pioneers just thirteen years after the founding of the society.18 The work 
not only contributed to galvanizing the co-operative movement, in England and elsewhere, 
but “served as a practical handbook for working-class activists and was concerned as much 
with the future as with the past.”19 These ‘internal’ histories thus served to promote co-
operation by explaining, in practical terms, how it could be done. These histories tend to 
present more or less celebratory and valorising accounts of the co-operative movement, 
written on the occasion of jubilees and anniversaries of particular societies.20 The co-
operative movement is also sometimes addressed in broader labour histories of working 
                                                     
15 Nicole Robertson, The Co-operative Movement and Communities in Britain, 1914-1960: Minding Their 
Own Business (Surrey: Ashgate, 2010), 4. For a comprehensive overview of historiographical approaches to 
the co-operative movement in England, see Peter Gurney, “Heads, Hands and the Co-operative Utopia: An 
Essay in Historiography,” North West Labour History 19 (1994): 3-23.   
16 Ibid. See also Peter Gurney, Co-operative Culture and the Politics of Consumption in England: 1870-
1930 (Manchester: University of Manchester Press, 1996); Martin Purvis, “Societies of consumers and 
consumer societies: co-operation, consumption and politics in Britain and continental Europe c. 1850-
1920,” Journal of Historical Geography 24, no. 2 (1998), 147–169; Stephen Yeo, ed., New Views of Co-
operation (London: Routledge, 1988); John F. Wilson, Anthony Webster and Rachel Vorberg-Rugh, 
Building Co-operation: A Business History of The Co-operative Group, 1863-2013 (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2013).  
17 Gurney, Co-operative Culture, 118. 
18 George Jacob Holyoake, Self-Help by the People: The History of Co-operation in Rochdale (London, 
1858).   
19 Gurney, Co-operative Culture, 118. 
20 Ibid.  
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class movements.  In this variety of history, the co-operative movement tends to be 
relegated to a place of general inefficacy or unimportance in relation to other forms of 
working class organisation and movement. Within these broader histories of labour, 
"[t]here was a tendency…to use the movement as an example to support broader debates 
rather than studying the movement in its own right.”21 Robertson attributes this to a broader 
marginalization of the consumer side of working class affairs. While these approaches 
diverge considerably in the meaning and significance they attribute to co-operation, they 
also share a similar outline and periodisation of its history. This section offers a brief 
overview of this shared outline.  
Although the Rochdale Pioneers are often described as the first modern co-
operative and positioned as the point of origin for the contemporary co-operative 
movement, they were by no means the first co-operative society. It was not until the 1830s 
that ‘co-operative’ emerged as a term for a specific form of organisation; however, some of 
the earliest roots of co-operative forms of organisation can be found in the food riots and 
rebellions of the late eighteenth century, as part of what Thompson called “the moral 
economy of the English crowd.”22 These early societies were formed, often on the back of 
riots, in response to the creation of local monopolies and increased prices in staple products 
such as corn and flour, and they took a variety of different forms.23 Local shipwrights in 
Woolwich and Chatham founded corn mills with bakeries attached in 1760. In other 
places, such as Derbyshire, associations of working men formed to pool resources and buy 
grain in bulk. The Fenwick Weavers (in Scotland) are thought to have started the first co-
operative retailing effort in 1769, dealing locally in oatmeal, and the first such effort in 
                                                     
21 Robertson, Co-operative Movement and Communities, 4. 
22 Thompson, “Moral Economy,” 76.  
23 Joshua Bamfield, “Consumer-Owned Community Flour and Bread Societies in the Eighteenth and Early 
Nineteenth Centuries,” Business History 40, no. 4 (1998): 16. These societies did not have any particular 
legal form, although they were sometimes set up as Friendly Societies, at least after the first Friendly 
Societies Act in 1795. Their legal status will be discussed in greater detail in chapters 2 and 4.  
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England is thought to have opened in Oldham in 1796.24 Several mills were also founded 
closer to the turn of the century in places such as Hull and Barnham Downs as a result of 
the increase in the price of corn caused by the French Wars. These were relatively small 
clubs, with members pooling money to purchase and mill their own corn.25 They were also 
often quite militant and set up with the explicit intent of undercutting local millers and 
bakers.26 
 There are some forty-six ‘flour and bread societies’ on record between 1759 and 
1820.27 However, despite their prevalence, these societies have been marginalised in 
histories of the co-operative movement.  They are usually mentioned in passing, as part of 
a vague and inchoate past. For instance, G.D.H. Cole writes that “[t]hese beginnings, 
however, were not followed up, and never constituted a movement. They were, except the 
Corn Mills, isolated experiments, and no one knows now who inspired most of them.”28 
Without a leader or a broader strategy of which they would form a part, these efforts are 
thought to have had little direct bearing on the co-operative ‘movement’ which begins to 
take shape in the nineteenth century. As Catherine Webb wrote, indicating both the 
insignificance of this period to the history of the movement and its inferiority in relation to 
later forms of co-operative organisation, “we close the book of the eighteenth century on 
simple, medieval ways of life….”29 Considerably more has been learned about the moral 
economy since Cole wrote his Century of Co-operation in 1944; however, the importance 
afforded to these early societies has not really changed. 
                                                     
24 G.D.H. Cole, A Century of Co-operation (Manchester: The Co-operative Union Ltd., 1944), 14. 
25 For a more detailed account of their activities see Jennifer Tann, “Co-operative Corn Milling: Self-Help 
during the Grain Crises of the Napoleonic Wars,” The Agricultural History Review 28, no. 1 (1980): 45-57. 
26 Bamfield, “Consumer-Owned Community,” 31. 
27 Ibid., 20-21. 
28 Cole, Century, 15.  
29 Catherine Webb, Industrial Co-operation: The Story of a Peaceful Revolution (Manchester: Co-operative 
Union Limited, 1907), 8.  
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 Leaving behind the earliest societies, most histories of the co-operative movement 
begin from the early nineteenth century, and subsequently divide the movement into two 
main periods: Owenite and Rochdale. The Owenite period is named for its close 
connection to the industrialist, philanthropist and early socialist, Robert Owen. He is often 
considered to have been the ‘Father of English Socialism’ and the ‘Father of Co-
operation’.30 Owen envisioned the creation of utopian “Villages of Co-operation,” where 
labourers would live and work together, receive a high quality of education, and be free of 
the worst forms of exploitation driven by the profit motive. They would work shorter hours, 
receive higher pay, and there would be a complete ban on child labour.31 His efforts, and 
those of the Owenite co-operative societies, were mostly geared toward raising capital to 
fund these utopian communities. 
Although the early nineteenth century was filled with a wide variety of co-operative 
projects, historiographical approaches have tended to focus on those efforts explicitly 
connected to Owen and Owenism.32 Amongst these are the first labour exchanges and the 
Grand National Consolidated Trades Union, as well as the experimental communities 
developed at New Lanark and elsewhere. This period is described as one of ‘Enthusiastic 
Experiment’, which has the effect both of marking it as exceptional and of downplaying it.33 
On the one hand, there has been, as Stephen Yeo puts it, a focus on “prophets” over 
“working people’s practices.”34 One finds, for instance, the early co-operators described as 
those “whose enthusiasm was kindled and whose imaginations were fired by the social 
                                                     
30 Beatrice Potter, The Co-operative Movement in Great Britain (London: Swan Sonnenschein & Co. Ltd., 
1904), 16. 
31 Ibid., 13. Robert Owen’s views are most thoroughly elaborated in two publications: Robert Owen, A New 
View of Society: Or, Essays on the Principle of the Formation of the Human Character and the Application 
of the Principle to Practice (London: Cadell and Davies, 1813) and Robert Owen, A Report to the County 
of Lanark (Glasgow: University Press, 1821).  
32 See Andy Durr, “William King of Brighton: Co-operation’s Prophet?” in New Views of Co-operation, ed. 
Stephen Yeo (London: Routledge, 1988), 10-26. 
33 Webb, Industrial Co-operation, 13.  
34Stephen Yeo, ed., introduction to New Views of Co-operation (London: Routledge, 1988), 10. 
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teachings of Owen.”35 On the other, although it is acknowledged that the co-operative 
movement and many forms of co-operation developed independently of Owen, these 
efforts are also seen as uniquely dependent on his intellectual insights. Holyoake wrote that 
“Owen set men’s minds on the track of co-operation, and time and need, failure and gain, 
faith and thought, and the good sense and devotion of multitudes have made it what it is.”36 
Alongside the focus on Owen’s achievements is a corresponding emphasis on the ultimate 
failure of these experiments. At this time, Owenism is said to have been eclipsed by 
Chartism; the struggle for the franchise. A decade of relative inactivity followed, until the 
founding of the Rochdale Society of Equitable Pioneers in 1844.37 
 The period from the foundation of the Rochdale Pioneers to the present day, is 
taken to be the modern period of co-operation. For many, this is when co-operation found 
its most durable, and ultimately successful, model. Within the co-operative movement, 
“[t]he myth of Rochdale has to do with twenty-eight impoverished weavers who started a 
shop in Toad Lane (Rochdale) in 1844; a shop that became the first successful co-operative 
in the world; a co-operative that defined the principles for all later co-operatives to follow.”38 
From the founding of the Rochdale Society, the consumers’ co-operative model spread and 
eventually led to the formation of the Co-operative Wholesale Society in 1862; a federal 
structure for a burgeoning national movement.39 Legal recognition for co-operation is 
                                                     
35 Webb, Industrial Co-operation, 2.  
36 George Jacob Holyoake, The History of Co-operation in England: Its Literature and Its Advocates, 
Volume I (Philadelphia: J.B. Lippincott & Co., 1875), 70. Quoted in Webb, Industrial Co-operation, 10. 
However, as Gurney reminds, “Holyoake did not obscure the Owenite and Chartist credentials of the 
Pioneers. The dividend was not regarded as a sign of ‘embourgeoisement’ but rather as a stepping-stone to 
the co-operative community of the future.” Gurney, “Heads, Hands,” 5.   
37 Holyoake begins the second volume of his History of Co-operation with a chapter entitled “The Story of a 
Dead Movement” which covers the years immediately leading up to 1845. George Jacob Holyoake, The 
History of Co-operation in England: Its Literature and Its Advocates, Volume II (London: Trumbner & 
Co., 1879).  
38 Fairbairn, “Meaning of Rochdale,” 1. 
39 The Co-operative Wholesale Society eventually, in the twentieth century, became the Co-operative 
Group, a very well-known and recognisable entity in the United Kingdom. For more on the Co-operative 
Wholesale Society, and how it eventually became the Co-operative Group, see Wilson et al., Building Co-
operation, 53-98.  
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included alongside these developments, which are presented as part of a narrative of 
progress. As Yeo writes, the passage of legislation “seemed as it came, to confirm their 
capacities rather than to deny them. Thus it seemed transparent, rational, and progressive, 
that large-scale co-operation was the future form, competition the past.” 40 The Owenite 
period is generally downplayed in importance in relation to the period commencing with 
the Rochdale Pioneers. For instance, Sir Arthur H.D. Acland and Benjamin Jones in 
Working Men Co-operators offer a chronology of the movement in which the entire period 
from 1800-1844 is labelled as “[t]he period preceding the formation of the Rochdale 
Pioneers Society.”41 Others, such as Samuel Smiles in Thrift, pass over it completely, 
jumping immediately from the foundation of the Hull Anti-Corn Mill in 1795 to a society 
in Leeds in 1847, claiming that “many years passed before the example… of Hull was 
followed.”42 
 The historical narrative of the co-operative movement in England, insofar as it 
ultimately centres on the Rochdale Pioneers, is based on the idea of a clear divide between 
the Owenite and Rochdale periods. This divide is not only temporal, with nearly a decade 
of inactivity clearly separating them, but also qualitative, with key differences in the ideas 
and practices of co-operation characterising each period. The movement is thought to have 
become more pragmatic in the transition. As Cole suggests, [t]he Pioneers had settled down 
to develop Co-operation not apart from the world as it was but in that world and subject to 
its limiting conditions. They had become realists, even if they had not shed their idealism.”43 
The main differences identified between earlier, Owenite, forms of co-operation and those 
which became prominent in the second half of the nineteenth century, are the practices of 
                                                     
40 Yeo, New Views, 4.  
41 Sir Arthur H. D. Acland and Benjamin Jones, Working Men Co-operators: An Account of the Co-
operative Movement in Great Britain (Manchester: Co-operative Union Ltd., 1937), 13.  
42 Samuel Smiles, Thrift (Chicago: Donohue, Henneberry & Co., 1890), 118.  
43 Cole, Century, 89. 
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shopkeeping and the distribution of dividends. However, although these became primary 
features of consumers’ co-operation, they are nowhere to be found in Owen’s writings, nor 
were they terribly common practices in co-operative societies before the 1850s. In the 
1820s and 30s, shopkeeping was initially adopted as a means to an end. As co-operators, 
specifically Owenites, failed to attract significant philanthropic interest in large-scale, co-
operative communities, shopkeeping came to be seen as a way to generate capital, albeit 
slowly, for co-operative settlements. While some societies at this time were giving out 
dividends, most were set up for the purpose of accumulating capital, which would then be 
invested in the purchase of land for new co-operative villages. As Cole notes, “[t]he leading 
Owenites were mostly very little interested in the growth of store-keeping, save to the extent 
to which it could help them to finance their own plans.”44 While the endeavour to raise 
funds for a village settlement through shopkeeping was never successfully completed by any 
society, shopkeeping was effectively introduced to the movement as a common practice.45 
With the introduction of shopkeeping and dividends, it became possible to see co-
operation as a form of business, rather than as an experiment in “world-making.”46 
Those who celebrate the Rochdale model of co-operation regard this transition 
positively. Co-operation became more practical and, as a result, more successful. A “stroke 
of practical genius” inspired the Rochdale Pioneers to found their model and to give up 
“the journey towards a better order of society.”47 By contrast, for those who are more critical 
of the co-operative movement, this moment of change was when co-operation ceased to be 
political. For Sidney Pollard, a collectivist historian, “this new model of co-operation, 
centred on the shop and the dividend, indicated that men were motivated by their personal 
                                                     
44 Ibid., 68. 
45 Sidney Pollard, “Nineteenth-Century Co-operation: From Community Building to Shopkeeping,” in eds. 
Asa Briggs and John Saville, Essays in Labour History (London: Macmillan, 1960), 84. 
46 George Jacob Holyoake, The History of Co-operation in England: Its Literature and Its Advocates, 
Volume I (Philadelphia: J.B. Lippincott & Co., 1875), 22. 
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interests rather than grand visions.”48 The dividend, in particular, has been singled out as 
detrimental to the ideals of co-operation. In Pollard’s estimation, “the dividend was a 
practical device, designed to create confidence and attachment among new members, 
without the realisation that the ends were being subtly changed by changing the means.”49 
The dividend “represented the first major breach with Owenism, and one that proved fatal 
to its ultimate ideal.”50 While dividends in co-operatives function differently from those in 
companies, this practice seemed to make co-operatives dangerously similar to joint stock 
companies, in their pursuit of profit for shareholders.51 
This change in practices, coupled with the consolidation of industrial capitalism, 
and the spread of prosperity, in some degree, to the working classes, is thought to have led 
to the demise of any kind of transformative potential within the co-operative movement.52 
The co-operative movement, in these accounts, had lost its vision. “Nothing is more 
striking,” we are told, “than the contrast between the firm outlines of [Owen’s] New Moral 
World and the shapeless yearnings of the latter-day co-operators, whether inspired by 
religion or not, as soon as they leave the firm ground of shopkeeping.”53 In this movement 
away from more communitarian and idealistic forms of organisation, as well as from more 
direct forms of antagonism with the existing order of society, the movement is thought to 
have entered a period of reformism. This view of the co-operative movement carries on in 
                                                     
48 As Pollard explains, “[t]o describe, at that time, storekeeping as a co-operative end would have been as 
justifiable as making a raffle for church funds the occasion of describing the running of a lottery as one of 
the aims of the church: both were thought of as convenient ways of providing funds for higher purposes.” 
Pollard, “Nineteenth Century Co-operation,” 83.  
49 Ibid., 97. 
50 Ibid., 95. 
51 Dividends within a co-operative are not profits, but rather surpluses on trading with the members 
themselves. Thus the dividend serves as a way of returning money to members who have effectively 
overpaid. As such the introduction of dividends to the co-operative model does not necessarily indicate a 
turn toward a focus on profit generation, even though some societies were founded as or eventually became 
joint-stock companies, in some cases abandoning the co-operative project. See E.V. Neale, The Distinction 
Between Joint-Stockism and Co-operation (Manchester: Co-operative Printing Society, 18--).  
52 Ibid., 106.  
53 Ibid., 102.  
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Marxist histories of nineteenth century working class politics, in which co-operation is part 
of a broader “drift to reformism,” that characterised much of working-class politics during 
this time.54 As Eric Hobsbawm notes,  
…the Chartist and Owenite leaders of the new movements—whether Engineers or 
Rochdale co-operators — in no sense intended to abandon their long-term aims. It 
was simply that the content of the old slogans changed in a new economic context; 
until for lack of a clear socialist theory, they became increasingly devoid of 
meaning.55 
 
While the drift is read as being relatively benign, it is nonetheless the product of a “lack of 
a clear socialist theory.”56 This implication of co-operation in the “drift to reformism” 
reflects an overall marginalisation of co-operation in accounts of labour history.57 
The effect of these diverse readings of co-operative history and the history of the 
co-operative movement is to organise it into three discrete phases which are determined 
more or less explicitly by their relationship to the political. The earliest societies are pre-
political and characterised by their perceived remove from formal political structures and 
coherent ideologies. The Owenite period is political par excellence, when co-operation is 
most closely associated with early socialism. Both for those who celebrate and those who 
critique the co-operative movement, this is co-operation’s political phase. Likewise, the 
Rochdale or modern period of co-operation is unpolitical, having moved away, for better 
or for worse, from socialism and Chartism. 
 While this narrative has been influential, it is also problematic and in some respects 
simply inaccurate.  This periodisation obscures elements of both continuity and plurality 
                                                     
54 Hobsbawm, Labouring Men, 341.  
55 Ibid., 319, n4. Moreover, the co-operative movement at this time in particular is considered to be part of 
the labour aristocracy as “…only workers with substantial resources could — individually, or through bodies 
like the co-ops—get access to the only consumer goods of a good range and quality, which were at middle-
class price-levels.” (319). See also H. F Moorhouse, “The Marxist Theory of the Labour Aristocracy,” 
Social History 3, no. 1 (1978): 61–82.  
56 Ibid. 
57 Ibid., 341.  
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in the history of co-operation. Contrary to the dominant narratives, there is no clear break 
between the Owenite period and the Rochdale period. While a number of historians 
suggest that there is a ten-year gap between them, there was actually continuous activity 
during this time.58 Not only were a range of societies in operation during this period, but 
co-operation was used as a strategy amongst Chartists.59 In addition, Rochdale did not 
inaugurate a new or unheard of model of co-operation. It is not the origin of the dividend, 
and shopkeeping long preceded the Rochdale Society, even if their success helped to 
popularise it as a model.  Moreover, the Rochdale Society did not simply appear out of 
nowhere; Rochdale had long been a “centre of co-operative activity.”60 As Fairbairn notes, 
“even the Rochdale Pioneers, whose success in retrospect seems almost magical, were the 
result of decades of hard work, failures, and disappointments.”61  
Politics and Periodisation 
 Peter Gurney suggests that some of the main oversights and generalisations in 
dominant co-operative historiography can be attributed to a tendency to view the movement 
through “middle class spectacles.” 62  Co-operation was an important site of ideological 
conflict in the mid-nineteenth century, and historians have tended to take the terms of those 
struggles as determinative of co-operation as such. As Gurney explains, "[o]ne reason why 
the Co-operative movement has been so grossly misunderstood by historians is that they 
have taken the definitions and representations of middle-class reformers as the truth rather 
than as specific and intentional interventions in a continuing debate."63 While this is true, I 
want to suggest that over and above this reliance on middle class and ‘outsider’ accounts of 
                                                     
58 See Robin Thornes. “Change and Continuity in the Development of Co-Operation, 1827-1844,” in New 
Views of Co-operation, ed. Stephen Yeo (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), 27–51. 
59 Peter Gurney, “Exclusive Dealing in the Chartist Movement,” Labour History Review 74, no. 1 (2009): 
90–110. 
60 Fairbairn, “Meaning of Rochdale,” 3. 
61 Ibid. 
62 Gurney, Co-operative Culture, 2.  
63 Ibid., 148.  
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co-operation, dominant historiographical approaches to the co-operative movement have 
also been shaped by an essentialised notion of the political. This essentialism distributes 
the political in the history of the co-operative movement according to the perceived 
presence or absence of specific practices and theories, which themselves are deemed 
inherently political or not.  Whether the co-operative movement shed its idealism in favour 
of a more pragmatic and workable model, or gave up that idealism in pursuit of groups’ 
own narrow self-interest, these perspectives associate the political with the former, but not 
the latter. In addition, the earliest co-operative societies are thought to exist outside of any 
structure in which they might be conceived as political, whether for lack of participation in 
representative structures of government, or for lack of a coherent ideology.  
 This way of periodising the movement reflects the predominance of the discourse 
of political economy in the mid-nineteenth century, as well as its continuing influence. 
While as a phrase, ‘political economy’ refers to a particular “method of government,” the 
overall discourse of political economy introduces a conceptual framework based on a well-
defined separation between the politics and the economy.64 This distinction, in turn, allows 
certain activities and practices to be clearly discerned and categorised as either political or 
economic. As I will suggest below, the discourse of political economy structured debates 
around the nature and meaning of co-operation in the mid-nineteenth century, and set the 
terms on which we would come to understand co-operation in the present. This section 
explores how these terms came about and shaped perceptions of co-operation, leading to 
the periodisation that dominates most approaches to the history of the co-operative 
movement.  
 The discourse of political economy originates in the late eighteenth century. 
Increasing market stability and regularity (in prices and wages) alongside minimal 
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government intervention allowed for society to be increasingly thought of as operating 
under a series of natural, economic laws which were separate from the political sphere.65 
The construction of the market as “an autonomous realm subject to its own laws” can be 
attributed to Adam Smith; however, as Mitchell Dean observes, for Smith “these laws are 
moral ones with specific political implications.”66 Classical political economy departs from 
Smith’s moral and political premise, positing a market that is regulated by “the laws of 
production and distribution” and which “requires no prior polity for its constitution and 
does not arise from the moral proclivities of individuals or collectivities.”67 Figures such as 
Joseph Townsend and Thomas Malthus observed the operation of these natural laws 
particularly in relation to the question of poverty, in their efforts to argue against the system 
of poor relief (which remained intact until 1834). Townsend noticed, for instance, that 
“[t]hough no law constrained the laborer to serve the farmer, nor the farmer to keep the 
landlord in plenty, laborers and farmers acted as if such compulsion existed.”68 This 
tendency was attributed to man’s biological nature, and to his compulsion to satisfy his own 
needs and wants. As such, no government intervention was required. The operation of 
these natural laws comprised economic society, and the basis of a newly emerging political 
economy. “Economic society,” as Polanyi explains, “had emerged as distinct from the 
political state.”69 In relation to political liberalism, this separation between the political and 
the economic maintains an older conception of right, in which political rights are those held 
against a sovereign; the autonomous sphere of the economy and the dimension of political 
right subsist in a paradoxical relation. As Dean explains, “[a]t the same time that theorists 
and revolutionaries were constructing a sphere of liberty and universal rights, a liberal 
                                                     
65 Polanyi, Great Transformation, 120. 
66 Mitchell Dean, The Constitution of Poverty: Toward a Genealogy of Liberal Governance (London: 
Routledge, 2013), 152. 
67 Ibid., 152.  
68 Ibid. 
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government of poverty was being formed around a particular, patriarchal domain of 
personal responsibility against the claims of a right to subsistence.”70  
 In the mid-nineteenth century, co-operation was a site of intense ideological 
struggle, and it came to be articulated within the discourse of political economy, particularly 
as political economy gained a greater hold in government.71 Middle classes sought to 
appropriate co-operation, in part as a response to the relative success of the Chartist 
movement.72 The demand for political rights for the working classes, represented by the 
vote, was regarded as an incredible threat to the status quo, as well as an expression of the 
genuine dislocation and impoverishment caused by industrialisation. In this context, co-
operation came to be seen by middle class philanthropists as a way of ameliorating tensions 
between capital and labour; instead of political rights, the working classes could be given 
what were effectively regarded as economic rights.73 As will be discussed in more detail in 
chapter 4, enabling working class participation in the market was seen as a way to diffuse 
political radicalism, both by giving working classes a small stake in the economy, but also 
by enabling them to witness the operation of its natural laws.  
 In order for co-operation to be able to perform this disciplinary function, it had to 
be severed from its historical connection to ‘politics’, which included both Chartism and 
Owenism. Much of this ideological work was performed by the Christian Socialists, as well 
as by liberals such as John Stuart Mill, and later, Samuel Smiles. Charles Kingsley, a 
prominent Christian Socialist, provides a good example in his pamphlet Who are the 
                                                     
70 Dean, Constitution, 154-155. 
71 See Geoffrey Russell Searle, Morality and the Market in Victorian Britain (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
1998), 27-47. 
72 While the Chartists ostensibly ‘failed’ in the short term, the latent threat of the struggle for the franchise 
exercised a considerable influence on the imagination of middle classes. As will be discussed in chapter 4, 
John Saville traces the development of Christian Socialism to the 1848 demonstration at Kennington 
Common, which had been feared would lead to revolution. See John Saville, “The Christian Socialists of 
1848,” in ed. John Saville, Democracy and the Labour Movement (London: Lawrence & Wishart Ltd, 
1955), 135-159.  
73 See Loftus, “Capital and Community,” 93–120. This argument will be developed in more detail in 
chapter 4.  
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Friends of Order? [1852], written in response to critics who claimed that the Christian 
Socialists were fomenting a revolutionary spirit amongst the working classes through their 
support of co-operation.74   
…We tell people simply to do their duty in that state of life to which God has called 
them…[the results of our work have been] to make ardent and discontented spirits 
among the working classes more patient and contented; more respectful of those 
institutions of which they have never been taught the value, and of which they have 
too little experienced the benefit; to turn their minds from those frantic and suicidal 
dreams of revolution….75 
 
To this end, as Gurney suggests, the separation between the Owenite and Rochdale periods 
of co-operation was actively manufactured as part of an attempt to appropriate and 
domesticate co-operation. In effect, “the movement’s own historical links with Owenite 
Socialism…had to be severed to make co-operation palatable to members of the SSA 
[Social Science Association].”76 The narrative of success that attends the later co-operative 
movement is in part premised on an understanding that the earlier efforts to develop co-
operation “failed because they ‘were tainted too deeply with the crude socialistic theories 
of Robert Owen’.”77  
 This distinction relied upon the separation between politics and the economy that 
characterised the discourse of political economy, which by the mid-nineteenth century had 
come to form an underlying “consensus.”78 It also entailed both a retrospective 
                                                     
74 Charles Kingsley, Who Are the Friends of Order? A reply to certain observations in a late number of 
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75 Ibid. 
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consolidation of a wide range of activities associated with co-operation under Owenism and 
a determination of those activities as ‘political’. While Owenism is widely regarded as the 
forebear of modern socialism and firmly opposed to the operation of ‘competition’, it is 
worth remembering that in the early nineteenth century, the battle lines were not so clearly 
drawn. Owen himself—at least in his earlier and more influential work—had a disdain for 
‘politics’. As Thompson notes, Owen “…simply had a vacant place in his mind where most 
men have political responses.”79 Owenism emerges as a critique of political economy, but 
one which shares a number of its premises. Owen’s plans for Villages of Co-operation were 
informed by an increasingly technical understanding of the economy as governed by its own 
internal rules, alongside the prevailing concern with what to do with the dislocated poor. 
While Malthus argued that poor relief should be abolished altogether, Owen believed that 
character was a product of environment and thus that the degraded morality of the poor 
was a consequence of the competitive system, not simply an inevitable part of nature.80 
What differentiated Owen from the political economists was that he “insisted upon a just 
reward for the act of labour itself, a reward linked moreover to a conception of exactly 
calculable equal exchange.”81 It is this critique that makes Owen an early socialist.82 As 
Polanyi writes,  
…the characteristic trait in Owenism was that it insisted on the social approach: it 
refused to accept the division of society into an economic and political sphere, and, 
in effect, rejected political action on that account. The acceptance of a separate 
economic sphere would have implied the recognition of the principle of gain and 
profit as the organizing force in society. This Owen refused to do.83 
 
                                                     
see John Host, Victorian Labour History: Experience, Identity, and the Politics of Representation (London: 
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79 Thompson, English Working Class, 861.  
80 Gregory Claeys, Machinery, Money and the Millennium: From Moral Economy to Socialism (Princeton: 
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81 Ibid. For a more detailed account of Owen’s relationship to the moral economy tradition and to the ideas 
of political economy, see 57-66.  
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However, Owen’s paternalism made him an ambiguous figure. He was at once “the ne plus 
ultra of Utilitarianism, planning society as a gigantic industrial panopticon” and at the same 
time a man “who thought a good deal about children, liked to see them happy, and really 
was outraged at their callous exploitation.”84 This orientation toward utilitarianism attracted 
Jeremy Bentham himself as an investor in one of Owen’s settlements. It also garnered 
considerable criticism from more radical political figures. One of Owen’s most vocal critics, 
William Cobbett, suggested that Owen’s villages would be like prisons, “a community of 
vassals.”85 Although demonstrating a genuine affinity for the plight of the working classes, 
Owen’s plans were not ultimately so far removed from the Malthusian workhouse system 
of poor relief just then taking root. That the working class would pursue the creation of 
these co-operative communities “by its own activity and toward its own goals” was not 
something Owen had considered or expected.86 
 This is not to suggest that Owenism should not be regarded as political simply 
because Owen was an ambiguous figure who himself had rejected politics. In his analysis 
of the development of early British socialism, Claeys identifies the views associated with 
Owen an early socialism as a kind of “anti-politics,” which he suggests was no less a theory 
of politics than any other.87 Owen’s views, like those of the radicals, “derived from the belief 
that representative institutions and popular sovereignty were incapable of resolving the 
complex and deeply divisive problems of a market-oriented and industrialising society.”88 
Instead, I want to suggest that it is only from the vantage of the mid-nineteenth century that 
Owen’s views can be clearly separated from those of his contemporaries and identified as 
political. Owenism, in this sense, comes to present a retrospective and constitutive division 
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within political economy, at least insofar as the history of the co-operative movement is 
concerned.  
 As co-operation was being actively appropriated by middle class philanthropists, it 
was also rejected an effective political strategy by Karl Marx, and one of his main followers 
in England, Ernest Jones. Marx’s ultimate rejection of co-operation explains much of the 
tendency to marginalise co-operation in histories of nineteenth century working class social 
movements.89 In his address to the inaugural meeting of the International Working Men’s 
Association, Marx praised co-operation as a “victory over the political economy of 
property,” and called co-operatives “great social experiments” which “by deed instead of 
argument... have shown that production on a large scale, and in accord with the behests of 
modern science, may be carried on without the existence of a class of masters employing a 
class of hands.”90  Yet, despite these laudatory remarks, he did not ultimately see co-
operatives as politically viable or relevant. In the same speech, Marx also claimed that the 
appropriation of the movement by middle classes was inevitable because co-operatives were 
too casual and could not pose a real challenge to the established order. 
At the same time the experience of the period from 1848 to 1864 has proved 
beyond doubt that, however excellent in principle and however useful in practice, 
co-operative labour, if kept within the narrow circle of the casual efforts of private 
workmen, will never be able to arrest the growth in geometrical progression of 
monopoly, to free the masses, nor even to perceptibly lighten the burden of their 
miseries.91  
 
He concluded the address by citing the movement among a number of “incoherent 
efforts.”92 Marx’s solution to the problem of appropriation was that co-operation should be 
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“developed to national dimensions, and, consequently… fostered by national means.”93 Co-
operatives were only viable alongside an effort to “conquer political power” through the 
creation of working men’s parties.94 To this end, the co-operative movement was actively 
juxtaposed to Chartism and the struggle for the franchise.  
 According to Avineri, Marx had very specific if flexible ideas about how politics 
would progress for the English working classes.95 He strongly supported the Chartist efforts 
to attain universal suffrage. This was not meant as an end in itself, but as part of a series of 
actions that would make the state fulfil its claim to universality, the result of which would 
be the sublation of civil society in the state. Through the operation of the dialectic, there 
would cease to be a separate sphere of the state, or the political. As Marx wrote, reflecting 
on the Chartists, 
But Universal Suffrage is the equivalent of political power for the working class of 
England, where the proletariat forms the large majority of the population, where, in 
a long, though underground civil war, it has gained a clear consciousness of its 
position as a class, and where even the rural districts know no longer any peasants, 
but only landlords, industrial capitalists (farmers) and hired labourers. The carrying 
of Universal Suffrage in England would, therefore, be a far more socialistic measure 
than anything which has been honoured with that name on the Continent.96 
 
Marx’s analysis was grounded in a critique of political economy, yet at times that critique 
also reproduced the terms of political economy. As William Clare Roberts suggests, Marx’s 
                                                     
93 Ibid. The clearest expression of this position comes from the Chartist, Ernest Jones, Notes to the People, 
Volume 1 (London: J. Pavey, 1851). Jones makes the case that co-operation can only succeed if developed 
on a national basis. Without a national basis for co-operation, individual societies are isolated and 
vulnerable, often working against each other, in competition. He accuses individual societies of 
profitmongering, merely following in the footsteps of capitalists. Co-operation, in its present form “would be 
a curse to the community” (31). "Why do the rich smile on it? Because they know it will prove in the long 
run harmless as regards them--because they know it has always failed, hitherto, to subvert their power. True 
the attempts often succeed in the beginning--and why?  Because the new idea attracts many sympathisers--
while it is too weak to draw down the opposition of the money lord. Thence co-operators are enabled to 
pick up some of the crumbs that fall from the table of the rich" (ibid.).  
94 Ibid.  
95 Shlomo Avineri, The Social and Political Thought of Karl Marx (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1968), 41-64. 
96 Karl Marx, On Britain (Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1953), 361. Quoted in Avineri, 
Social and Political, 214. 
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critique of political economy can be divided into three interrelated parts.97  The first is a 
critique of particular political economists who, in various ways, had misunderstood the 
operation of political economy. The second concerns a historicisation of political economy 
and capitalism, where Marx “tries to locate capitalism as one mode of production among 
others, with its local laws and locally effective mechanisms.”98 The third aspect of his critique 
sets him thoroughly outside the discourse of political economy. As Roberts describes,  
At a third level, though, Marx’s critique of political economy is the critique of the 
forms of thought proper to capitalism, and to the capitalism that gives rise to them, 
in the name of liberation. It is not just that the categories of political economy are 
valid only within a circumscribed historical setting; they are also the concepts proper 
to a system of domination, a system in which ‘the most complete subjugation of 
individuality under social conditions assuming the form of objective powers’ 
nonetheless appears as a system of ‘individual freedom’.99 
 
It was in part this critique that led Marx to reject worker separatism as well as co-operation 
as viable political strategies. The project of worker separatism simply failed to understand 
how political economy functioned. However, in this dismissal, Marx’s adherence to the 
critique of political economy as a means of determining what would be the most effective 
political strategy had the effect of presupposing the dominance of political economy as 
such. Utopian socialism was simply regarded as an inferior form of socialism.100 In 
                                                     
97 William Clare Roberts, Marx’s Inferno: The Political Theory of Capital (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 2016), 53.  
98 Ibid. 
99 Ibid.  
100 Although he had little, if any direct contact with them, in advocating for his communitarian vision, Owen 
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Routledge, 1969), 35. It is eventually taken up by Marx and Engels, notably as a term of abuse in the 
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Owen, 35). Prior to this period, co-operation was often used as a general term to refer to the ideas that 
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particular, it was thought that utopian socialism developed before the working class had 
been formed as such, while the capitalist mode of production was still consolidating. Thus, 
as Engels summarises, “[t]o the crude conditions of capitalistic production and the crude 
class conditions corresponded crude theories.”101 The working classes were not yet capable 
of “independent political action” thus making them vulnerable to these paternalistic 
schemes.102  
 Dominant historiographical approaches to the co-operative movement, as Gurney 
suggests, have inherited the terms of these debates. The idea of a clear break or separation 
between the ‘Owenite’ and ‘Rochdale’ periods of this history reflects middle class efforts to 
affect that separation, while the marginalization of co-operation in labour history reflects 
Marx’s own rejection of co-operation as an effective political strategy. However, as 
suggested above, it is not only that dominant approaches have received the terms of this 
struggle and taken the views of middle class appropriators as definitive accounts of co-
operation, but that they have adopted the essentialised idea of the political that shaped the 
terms of this struggle. The casting of the ‘modern’ form of co-operation as predominantly 
economic rather than political, and the naturalisation of the economic in this relation, 
reflect the relative success of middle class liberal efforts to appropriate co-operation. This 
success is evidenced in the definition of co-operation provided in the 1877 Encyclopedia 
Britannica.  
                                                     
Saint-Simonians and Fourierians, see H. Deroushe, “Images and Echoes of Owenism in 19th Century 
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View of Mr. Owen,” in Sidney Pollard and John Salt eds., Robert Owen: Prophet of the Poor (Lewisburg: 
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Owen “a niche in the standard histories of British labour and socialism, and Owenism was seen as a link in 
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Co-operation, as technically understood, occupies a middle position between the 
doctrines of the communists and socialists...on the one hand, and the private 
property and freedom of individual labour on the other. It takes its departure from 
communism at a very definite and significant point. While the latter would 
extinguish the motive of individual gain and possession in the sentiment of a 
universal happiness or good, and remodel all the existing rights, laws, and 
arrangements of society on a basis deemed consonant to this end, co-operation 
seeks, in consistence with the fundamental institutes of society as hitherto 
developed, to ameliorate the social condition by a concurrence of increasing 
numbers of associates in a common interest.103 
 
While Marx appreciated the potential significance of co-operative efforts, his ultimate 
rejection of co-operation as an effective political strategy reinforces this largely successful 
appropriation. By attributing the appropriation of co-operation to an inherent failing in co-
operation as an idea and practice, his analysis obscures the fact of that appropriation. It 
makes the assimilation of co-operation to the market appear inevitable and necessary.   
I suggested in the introduction that the contemporary idea of the co-operative often 
takes for granted that co-operatives will function on a market. The success of co-operative 
efforts is measured in terms of capital turnover and membership numbers, while the very 
form of the co-operative itself is often, unquestioningly, assumed to be a meaningful 
alternative. From the above analysis, it is possible to see how this idea has come about in 
part as a product of how the history of co-operation has been told, and of the derivation of 
the terms of this history from the nineteenth century debates over the meaning and 
significance of co-operation. The perception of the conditions of the market or the 
economy as inevitable or natural reflects the ascendancy and dominance of the discourse 
of political economy, and with it, the relative success of middle classes in appropriating co-
operation and subjecting it to this order. In turn, the critique of co-operation from labour 
history, derived from Marx’s own rejection of co-operation as a viable political strategy, has 
inadvertently supported the naturalisation of these terms, by diagnosing the failure of co-
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operation as an inherent flaw or shortcoming both in relation to its connection to early 
socialism and to a mistaken understanding of the ‘true’ operation of political economy, but 
also through what has been subsequently perceived as a disavowal of the political in the 
modern form of co-operation.  
Genealogy and Law  
 The diverse approaches to the history of the co-operative movement recounted 
above have served, paradoxically, to remove co-operation from its history. Whether they 
attribute the depoliticisation of co-operation to a shift in practices, or to an inherent failing 
of the idea of co-operation itself, these histories obscure the ways in which the co-operative 
was constituted as such in the mid-nineteenth century, as well as the mechanisms by which 
this constitution was effected. In this section, I instead propose a genealogy of the co-
operative. As a “history of the present,” genealogy introduces historical contingency into 
the terms that shape present realities and truths.104 In so doing, genealogy both provides a 
critique of dominant approaches to history, exposing their conditions of possibility, and 
offers a means of tracing an altogether different type of history, “two tasks [that] are never 
completely separable.”105  
 Some terms of the constitution of the co-operative have already been explored in 
the foregoing section. In the mid-nineteenth century, co-operation was articulated within a 
discourse of political economy that has subsequently shaped perceptions of both its past 
and its present. Historiographical approaches to the co-operative movement have often 
relied on these terms, reproducing and naturalising the divisions they inaugurated. In the 
present, this has contributed to the understanding of the co-operative as an entity that will 
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function primarily as a business, specifically through the maintenance of a clear, if 
unacknowledged, divide between the political and the economic. This section builds on 
that argument. It suggests that the discourse of political economy not only structures how 
the history of the co-operative has been understood, but also obscures what Foucault 
identifies as the fundamentally productive function of power.  In the process, I argue, it 
conceals the role of law in constituting the co-operative.  
 In his most sustained elaboration of the concept of genealogy, Foucault focuses on 
its relationship to a “search for ‘origins’,” that characterises much historical work.106 
Reflecting on Nietzsche, Foucault describes this search as “an attempt to capture the exact 
essence of things, their purest possibilities, and their carefully protected identities.”107 The 
search for origins “assumes the existence of immobile forms that precede the external world 
of accident and succession.”108 In Nietzsche’s own genealogy of morality, the origin was 
epitomised in God and nature, standing resolutely outside of history. Within such a history, 
everything already has its place in reference to the origin, and history proceeds as “a great 
sequence of events taken up in a hierarchy of determinations.”109 History becomes 
“untouchable,” as the discourses that constitute it become fixed.110  
 Genealogy’s critique and eschewal of origins derives from the observation that 
language and discourse do not have a determinate relationship to the world. This is not to 
suggest that they are completely separable, but rather that language does not simply 
“double” existence.111 As Foucault explains, words are always “fewer in number than the 
                                                     
106 Michel Foucault, “Nietzsche,” 370.  
107 Ibid., 371.   
108 Ibid. 
109 Michel Foucault, “On the Ways of Writing History,” in Essential Works of Foucault, Volume 2: 
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things they designate, and due to this principle of economy must take on meaning.”112 
Origins obscure this insufficiency by positing a moment, a transcendent point of reference, 
from which truths and fixed meanings might be derived.  The origin is taken to lie “at a 
place of inevitable loss, the point where the truth of things is knotted to a truthful discourse, 
the site of a fleeting articulation that discourse has obscured and finally lost.”113 The origin 
creates an immutable reference that establishes the ‘true’ relation between words and 
things.  
 In relation to the history of the co-operative movement, this point of origin is the 
“myth” of the Rochdale Pioneers.114 This society, while real, has been rendered ideal and 
placed outside of history, as a radical break from the past and as the manifestation of a set 
of values that had hitherto struggled to find their expression. However, as shown above, 
this narrative reproduces the discourse of political economy, positing the co-operative as 
always-already what it will become. Other historical accounts suggest that this rendering of 
the history of the co-operative movement is not entirely accurate. They suggest that it 
involves manufacturing a break or rupture, where one cannot, in the complexity of history, 
actually be located. The myth of origin, in this sense, operates in a reciprocal fashion with 
the discourse in which it is articulated. It provides a transcendent reference upon which the 
discourse can both determine a particular truth, and supply an effective essence of co-
operation that, in turn, reinforces the terms of political economy.  
 Yet, as Foucault suggests, "[p]olitics and the economy are not things that exist, or 
errors, or illusions, or ideologies. They are things that do not exist and yet which are 
inscribed in reality and fall under a regime of truth dividing the true and the false."115 There 
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is, in effect, a prior operation that determines this discursive separation and what will be 
understood as ‘political’ and ‘economic’, respectively. As Foucault explains, “the 
inseparability of economics and politics is not due to a relation of functional subordination, 
nor to a formal identity, but to another level which it is clearly necessary to uncover.”116 This 
is where Foucault locates power; operating at the interstice between the discursive and the 
non-discursive, creating the relationship between them and determining what can be 
articulated as ‘true’ or ‘false’. The discourses through which history is constructed are 
neither necessary nor immutable, but discourse is already an effect of power. As Foucault 
explains, “...in every society the production of discourse is at once controlled, selected, 
organised and redistributed by a certain number of procedures whose role it is to ward off 
its power and dangers, to gain mastery over its chance events, to evade its ponderous, 
formidable materiality.”117 The contingency of discourse - the fact that it is not completely 
determinate - makes discourse a tool, as the means through which truths about the world 
are created. Discourse is “…a violence which we do to things, or in any case a practice which 
we impose on them….”118 It is “the power which is to be seized.”119 It is through discourse 
that objects are formed: the articulation of an object in discourse is a constitutive process.  
 Power, for Foucault, is fundamentally productive and constitutive. It is not 
something to be possessed or wielded, rather “it is exercised from innumerable points…”120 
It is “everywhere…because it comes from everywhere.”121 Power, in this sense, is relational: 
                                                     
116 This is a modified translation of this quote, provided by Beatrice Han in Foucault’s Critical Project, 115, 
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it “circulates,” and it is “exercised rather than possessed.”122 Foucault counterposes this idea 
of power to a prevalent conception of power as repressive, operating as a negative force 
upon entities that precede or exist outside of power, and are then subject to it. In particular, 
Foucault identifies models of power in liberalism and Marxism that presuppose this 
negative function of power.  An “economism in the theory of power” forms a “common 
point” between liberal and juridical models of power, on the one hand, and Marxism (“or 
at any rate a certain conception currently held to be Marxist”) on the other.123 In the juridical 
or liberal theory of power, it is “taken to be a right, which one is able to possess like a 
commodity, and which one can in consequence transfer or alienate, either wholly or 
partially, through a legal act or through some act that establishes a right, such as takes place 
through cession or contract.”124 Within Marxism, it is not a juridical model of power that 
dominates, so much as “something which one might term an economic functionality of 
power.”125 In this model,  
power is conceived primarily in terms of the role it plays in the maintenance 
simultaneously of the relations of production and a class of domination which the 
development and specific forms of the forces of production have rendered 
possible…the historical raison d’etre of political power is to be found in the 
economy.126  
 
Yet, as Foucault asks, if power only functioned in this way, negatively and through 
repression, why would we obey it? As he suggests, “[w]hat makes power hold good, what 
makes it accepted, is simply the fact it doesn’t only weigh on us a force that says no, but it 
traverses and produces things, it induces pleasure, forms of knowledge, produces 
discourse.”127  Power is not “superstructural,” operating from “a position of exteriority” but 
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rather completely immanent to these relations, as “the internal conditions of these 
differentiations.”128   
 In this sense, power is not something that one is simply subject to, as the power of 
a sovereign or the dominance of a particular class (which is not to say that these relations 
are without effect).  It does not belong, as such, to “a dominant class” but is also “manifested 
and sometimes extended by the position of those who are dominated.”129 Theories of power 
as negative or repressive share a reliance on the subject as existing independently or outside 
of power. Then, power acts upon the subject, restricting or prohibiting it. Foucault argues, 
by contrast, that power “makes individuals subjects” and that identities are formed through 
power. 130 The objects and subjectivities that are effect of power are thoroughly invested with 
that power, in their very immanence, such that there is no outside of power.131 However, 
this immanence does not mean that it is impossible to effect power relations. Instead, by 
locating power in relation, it becomes possible to understand that every subject has an 
inherent capacity to resist it. Individuals are not “caught within that totality which transcends 
them and trifles with them,”132 but can resist and author their own subjectification, and 
“resist the grip it has on them.”133  
 Thus, when it comes to the co-operative, genealogy as “a form of history which can 
account for the constitution of knowledges, discourses, domains of objects,” would be 
concerned with the constitution of the co-operative as an object about which certain claims 
can be made.134 However, the discourse of political economy, within which the co-operative 
emerges, obscures this question and the constitutive function of power more generally by 
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presupposing the stability and presence of the co-operative as an entity. The co-operative 
persists through history, even as it changes, with economic and political forces determining 
it from a position of exteriority. While in dominant approaches to the history of the co-
operative movement, the co-operative does undergo change, it does so in a way that 
presupposes that there is an object that is capable of such change: it is “transcendental in 
relation to the field of events,” becoming more or less political based on the supposed 
embrace or disavowal of certain practices or ideals, or by being unable to withstand the 
inevitable domination of economic forces.135 By contrast, genealogy “attempts to restore the 
conditions for the appearance of a singularity born out of multiple determining elements 
of which it is not the product, but rather the effect." 136 Within such a project, “[t]here is no 
foundational recourse, no escape within a pure form,” but only a singularity that emerges 
relationally.137  The analysis of discourses “does not reveal the universality of a meaning, but 
brings to light the action of imposed scarcity, with a fundamental power of affirmation.”138  
  As I will argue in this thesis, one of the key mechanisms through which the co-
operative was constituted in the mid-nineteenth century was legal recognition.139 The co-
operative was recognised as a discrete entity and given a replicable model. Law, in this 
sense, helped to give effect to the discourse of political economy. As Gurney describes, the 
“modus vivendi between the English bourgeoisie, the capitalist state and organized labour 
was clearly symbolized by the Industrial and Provident Societies Act of 1852,” the act that 
gave co-operatives their own legal form.140  The relatively successful appropriation of co-
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operation by middle classes was made manifest in law, which “simultaneously conferred 
certain privileges and set certain limitations on co-operative practice.”141  
However, law, as noted above, has not generally received much attention in histories 
of the co-operative movement, because law is seen in an instrumental capacity. Within the 
more celebratory accounts of the movement, legal recognition, when it happened, did not 
add anything other than legitimacy to what co-operatives were already doing. If the 
Rochdale Pioneers had taken up successful market practices, legal recognition enabled 
them to pursue these projects without hindrance. In the Introduction, this view was 
exemplified by the Christian Socialists, who thought that “the Building Society, the Co-
operative Society, is not the creature of Parliament, but the working man’s own creation.”142 
This reflects a more broadly liberal interpretation of the law, in which it is regarded as 
“technically neutral.”143 While the state and sovereignty are the locus of politics, liberalism 
“presumes the legitimacy of a state in which we are guaranteed equality before the law.”144 
As such, rights gained vis à vis the state are understood to be real freedoms. The law, in 
and of itself, is unproblematic, even if particular laws or the denial of legal recognition may 
be repressive.  
There is not much mention of law in more critical accounts of the co-operative 
movement. However, the absence of specific consideration suggests that legal recognition 
is taken as part of the broader play of forces: if co-operatives had already abandoned their 
ideals, legal recognition is only a further indication of this abandonment. Within a more 
simplistic or crude rendering of Marxism, the law is part of the ‘superstructure’, built upon 
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an economic base which is determined by the relations of production.145 As Thompson 
suggests, in a Marxist analysis “… the law is, perhaps more clearly than any other cultural 
or institutional artefact, by definition a part of a ‘superstructure’ adapting itself to the 
necessities of an infrastructure of productive forces and productive relations. As such it is 
clearly an instrument of the de facto ruling class….”146 Whether the law functions to enable 
the market, or is determined by economic forces, law does not make its own contribution 
to the process, but rather supports and entrenches what has already been economically-
determined.  
 In both accounts, the law is regarded primarily as an instrument, and legal 
recognition must be either enabling or illusory and repressive. By contrast, an approach to 
law that regards it as functioning constitutively, according to a model of power that is 
fundamentally productive, avoids the polarity of these positions, while also acknowledging 
the integral role that law plays in constituting the relations it recognises.  Law is, as 
Thompson suggests, “something more than…a pliant medium to be twisted this way and 
that….”147 While law may have mediated and given form to class relations, “this is not the 
same thing as saying that the law was not more than those relations translated into other 
terms.”148 Law has its own history and dominant forms, many of which long precede their 
use in the nineteenth century. Moreover law, like discourse, is “not once and for all 
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subservient to power or raised up against it.”149 Law must also be genuinely responsive, even 
if, as I will argue in the next chapter, there is ultimately a limit to that responsiveness.150  
 However, the history of the co-operative movement, as currently told, does not 
leave much room for a consideration of how law and legal recognition may have mattered 
in the formation of the co-operative. In dominant approaches to this history, there is no 
sense of what may have been at stake in legal recognition. Appropriation could only happen 
because there was something to appropriate. The domesticating discourses of Victorian 
middle class liberals obscure that dependence. The co-operative appears in these histories 
as a fully-formed object, already subsumed within a discourse of political economy. Yet, as 
Gurney suggests, “[m]any bourgeois reformers found the CWS [Co-operative Wholesale 
Society] threatening precisely because this huge, democratically-owned and controlled 
organisation demonstrated in a most blatant and concrete way that large-scale production 
was possible without the intervention of a capitalist class.”151  In order to appreciate how law 
matters in the history of the co-operative movement, there is a need to return to history. As 
Foucault reminds, “[t]he genealogist needs history to dispel the chimeras of the origin….”152 
The next section begins to sketch an alternative account of the history of the co-operative 
movement.  
The ‘Beginnings’ of Co-operation 
 From a contemporary vantage, Marx’s diagnosis of the co-operative movement—
that co-operation would be appropriated by middle classes and that co-operatives would 
not provide a significant challenge to capitalism—seems prophetic. Co-operatives have been 
a largely assimilated to a commercial framework, so much so that it is frequently taken for 
                                                     
149 Foucault, History of Sexuality, 100-101.   
150 On the need for law to be responsive, see Peter Fitzpatrick, Modernism and the Grounds of Law 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 70-73.  
151 Gurney, Co-operative Culture, 153. 
152 Foucault, “Nietzsche,” 373. 
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granted that they will compete on a market. However, this was by no means a necessary 
outcome, the result of an inevitability derived from an inherent failing or virtue in the idea 
of co-operation. Nor is it a totalising one: co-operatives continue to manifest alterity and 
provide a meaningful locus of political organisation, even as they are constrained by their 
subjection to the market. These final two sections argue that in order to appreciate this 
tension in co-operation, and to understand how the co-operative was constituted in the mid-
nineteenth century, it is necessary to explore a history of the co-operative movement that is 
not already determined by the discourse of political economy.  
 In addition to the critique offered above, genealogy offers an alternative approach 
to history. Genealogy returns to history, to “[make] it intelligible but with the clear 
understanding that this does not function according to a principle of closure."153 While 
genealogy rejects the search for origins, “it will not,” as Wendy Brown suggests, “neglect as 
inaccessible the vicissitudes of history and altogether eschew the problem of what Foucault 
significantly renames as ‘beginnings’.”154  Beginnings, by contrast to origins, may have little 
or no resemblance to what they will become:  rather, “[w]hat is found at the historical 
beginning of things is not the inviolable identity of their origin; it is the dissension of other 
things. It is disparity.”155 The origin of the co-operative movement, as suggested in the last 
section, is usually cited as the founding of the Rochdale Society of Equitable Pioneers in 
1844, while the earliest co-operative societies—operating long before they could be called 
‘co-operatives’—are usually relegated to a vague and inchoate past.  As Cole described them, 
they were “isolated experiments” and “no one knows now who inspired most of them.”156   
An approach to the history of the co-operative movement that seeks its ‘beginnings’ rather 
                                                     
153 Foucault, “What is Critique,” 57.  
154 Brown, Politics, 101. 
155 Foucault, “Nietzsche,” 371-372. 
156 Cole, Century, 15. 
 
 
CHAPTER 1 | 72 
 
 
than its ‘origin’, through a “strategy of reversal” would need to take these early societies 
more seriously.157 
 Thompson’s reading of the “moral economy of the crowd” in the eighteenth 
century provides a corrective to this analysis.158  From at least the sixteenth century, riots and 
other forms of popular direct action were relatively commonplace amongst the poor in 
England. Lamenting a tendency amongst historians to read these actions as spasmodic 
reactions to changes in price, Thompson articulated the idea of the moral economy as a 
way of recognizing the framework in which these actions were carried out and legitimized. 
Thompson did not invent the term moral economy, nor, he claims, can he remember 
where he first heard it.159 However, Thompson is nonetheless widely acknowledged to be 
the first to use it in this context, to conceptualise the diverse and meaningful actions of what 
might be thought of broadly as common people.160 The moral economy of the crowd 
stresses the presence and importance of how common people thought and felt, how 
traditions and beliefs shaped their responses in ways that elude the prevailing and often 
pejorative designation of ‘riot’. As Thompson explains, “[t]he food riot in the eighteenth 
century was a highly-complex form of direct popular action, disciplined and with clear 
                                                     
157 Wendy Brown draws out three elements of a “strategy of reversal” (Politics, 98), the last of which is that 
“genealogy also conjures a reversal in the course of history—it challenges the progressive accounts with 
intimations of regression…” (ibid.).  
158 Thompson, “Moral Economy,” 76. For an overview of uses of the term, see William James Booth, “On 
the Idea of the Moral Economy,” The American Political Science Review 88, no. 3 (1994): 653–667. That 
said, Thompson is by no means the only one, nor the first, to articulate a shift of this nature—from a morally 
or socially guided ethic to one based on a natural law of the market. R.H. Tawney, for instance, does so in 
his Religion and the Rise of Capitalism (London and New York: Routledge, 2017), although he would place 
the shift a few centuries earlier. Karl Polanyi suggests that this ‘great transformation’ required the active 
creation of markets through regulation and the removal of old paternalist protections which would have 
prevented ‘free’ markets. For Polanyi the economy had to be disembedded from other forms of relation—
religious, social, political—in order to be conceived of and treated as an autonomous sphere. Polanyi, 
Transformation, 45-58. For an overview of these historiographical approaches see Dean, Constitution, 106-
121.  
159 E.P. Thompson, “The Moral Economy Reviewed,” in Customs in Common (London: Penguin Books, 
1993), 337. He identifies one early usage in a Chartist pamphlet, in which it is explicitly anti-capitalist in its 
orientation. This usage is the one he claims to approximate by his own. 
160 Thompson’s usage precedes James C. Scott’s also well-known The Moral Economy of the Peasant: 
Rebellion and Subsistence in Southeast Asia (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1976). While Scott 
references Thompson’s article several times, he does not attribute the phrase to him.  
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objectives.”161 The common people who participated in these riots, often led by women, 
were not simply motivated by their hunger: they “were informed by the belief that they were 
defending traditional rights or customs; and, in general, that they were supported by the 
wider consensus of the community.”162  The poor in the eighteenth century were still largely 
embedded within a subsistence economy and they were particularly sensitive to changes in 
the price of bread.163 This sensitivity was accompanied by an expectation that the price of 
bread (or wheat or corn) would be fair, and that scarcity and dearth would not be artificially 
induced for the sake of profit. It was widely held that marketing should be as direct as 
possible, while “millers…and bakers were considered as servants of the community, 
working not for a profit but for a fair allowance.”164 As the eighteenth century progressed, 
marketing became increasingly complex and transparency decreased as more 
intermediaries entered the market. Any failure of authorities to enforce these regulations 
sanctioned direct action by the crowd.165  
 This normative framework did not derive only from communities of the poor, but 
was also supported by a paternalistic regulatory order, codified in statute, that Thompson 
traces back to the Elizabethan Book of Orders [1631].166 These collective actions often 
                                                     
161 Thompson, “Moral Economy,” 78. 
162 Ibid. The expression of the moral economy was not confined to food riots but included other forms of 
popular justice, for instance the pelting of a child or wife murderer, the resistance to enclosures, and more 
widespread movements such as Luddism. Thompson explains that at this time, there was an enormous gap 
between formal law and “the unwritten popular code” (English Working Class, 60). Penalties for minor 
criminal offences, those most likely to be committed by the propertyless, were disproportionately harsh. 
The number of capital punishments for crimes against property increased exponentially, with more than 
sixty-three new offences created between 1760 and 1810—“the early years of the Industrial Revolution…took 
place in the shadow of the gallows” (ibid., 61).   
163 As Thomson notes, “[w]hen bread is costly…the poor do not go over to cake” (Moral Economy, 91). 
164 Ibid., 83. 
165 Ibid., 110. 
166 This broader conception of the moral economy can be encapsulated in the values of “fair exchange, just 
price and the right to charity,” which Claeys traces back to Aristotle, for whom there was a strong division 
between the household economy, which should be self-sufficient, and trade. For Aristotle, trade only occurs 
“at the expense of other men” (Millennium, 2). When out of necessity trade occurred, it had to be 
reciprocal. The nature of this reciprocity, whether based on a measure of labour or voluntary mutual 
satisfaction is not clear, but treating money as an end in itself was a reprehensible goal. This idea of 
reciprocal exchange, in turn, informed Christian ideas of the just price, first articulated by Augustine (ibid., 
3); wealth could be acquired or accumulated, “provided these were used for the good of mankind” (ibid.). 
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entailed confronting the particular miller or baker who had undermined the moral 
economy, seizing his goods, and selling them directly at the ‘fair price’. The rioters were 
effectively “taking the law into their own hands,” and often with the implicit support of 
authorities who were known to sometimes welcome the “popular hubbub” against 
forestallers.167 Moreover, the moral economy did not belong to any determined group. 
There are few, if any, named organisations as such—those who endorsed the crowd 
“comprise the articulate and the inarticulate, and include men of education and address.”168 
However, Thompson notes that the crowd and paternalistic authorities had different 
motivations in supporting the moral economy: unlike the authorities, the crowd was not 
interested in maintaining the status quo.169  
 The earliest ‘flour and bread’ societies were formed, often as an extension of the 
activities of rioters, in this context.170 Of the 46 flour and bread societies on record between 
1759 and 1820, more than 80%  “were set up in the years noted for riot when it is likely 
that resentment about the operation of markets was most acute.”171 As Bamfield notes, the 
coincidence of these societies with riots indicates “a further, practical, self-help dimension 
of the 'moral economy' in response to the privations of the late eighteenth century.”172 Far 
from being isolated efforts as Cole had suggested, the early co-operative societies formed 
as part of the moral economy, drawing on the energies and structures of existing 
                                                     
A fundamental sense of entitlement for the poor arises from the idea that God gave the earth to mankind in 
common (which the liberal tradition is ultimately subverted to justify inequality)—charity is not simply a duty 
but a condition of property. This set of ideas, albeit not in any kind of static relation, can be traced 
throughout the centuries leading up to the Industrial Revolution (ibid.). 
167 John Bohstedt, The Politics of Provisions: Food Riots, Moral Economy and Market Transition in 
England, c. 1550-1850 (London: Routledge, 2010), 272; Thomson, “Moral Economy,” 95. 
168 Thompson, “Moral Economy,” 94.   
169 Ibid. 
170 Bamfield, “Consumer-Owned Community,” 16. 
171 Ibid., 20-21. The suggestion of the direct connection between the two is also supported by Martin Purvis, 
Purvis, Martin, “Co-operative Retailing in England, 1835-1850: Developments Beyond Rochdale,” 
Northern History 22, no. 1 (1986): 205.  
172 Bamfield, “Consumer-Owned Community,” 17. However, the societies are also linked to the presence of 
a “labour aristocracy” (shipwrights, masons) indicating that they would be more prevalent amongst a certain 
portion of the working classes, and not necessarily those who were leading the riots (ibid., 30).  
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combinations of workers, including friendly societies, to create more permanent solutions 
to problems the crowd attempted to rectify.173 Thompson refers to this as co-operative direct 
action.  
 These early societies and the moral economy have not figured prominently in 
histories of the co-operative movement. The homogenising tendencies of periodisation 
both relegate the moral economy to the past, while also consolidating plural forms of co-
operation under unitary monikers, such as Owenism. In contrast to the clear shifts and 
discernible periods that structure dominant historiographical approaches to the co-
operative movement, Thompson’s emphasis on the moral economy and co-operative 
direct action exposes a thread of continuity from the earlier societies to the modern form 
of co-operation. Rather than disappearing, or being supplanted by more respectable modes 
of organisation, Thompson notes that in the context of a broader shift from moral to 
political economy, the moral economy persists.  
The breakthrough of the new political economy of the free market was also the 
breakdown of the old moral economy of provision. After the wars all that was left 
of it was charity--and Speenhamland. The moral economy of the crowd took longer 
to die: it is picked up the early co-operative flour mills, by some Owenite socialists, 
and it lingered on for years somewhere in the bowels of the Co-operative Wholesale 
Society.174  
 
This continuity confounds dominant narratives of the history of co-operation, which 
depend on the possibility of creating firm separations between different periods. Dominant 
approaches to the history of the co-operative movement also tend to neglect the fact that, 
in the early nineteenth century, the broad take-up of Owenism relied upon prior 
associations among working classes. Owen’s proposals were met with ideas and practices 
                                                     
173 For an overview of the origin of Friendly Societies, see J.M. Baernreither, English Associations of 
Working Men, trans. Alice Taylor (London: Swan and Sonnenschein & Co., 1889), 155-168. See also 
P.H.J.H. Gosden, The Friendly Societies in England, 1815-1875 (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 
1961). 
174 Thompson, “Moral Economy,” 136. 
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derived from the moral economy, as many Owenite activities were the extension of the 
activities of friendly societies and trade unions.175 Many societies formed completely 
independent of his influence.176 Moreover, as communities took up Owenite ideas, they did 
not simply reproduce Owen’s visions. These societies tended to emphasise economic 
independence and were motivated less by a utopian vision than, as Thompson summarises, 
by “the simple question: Why not?”177 
 The tendency to marginalise and downplay the moral economy in histories of the 
co-operative movement is in part a consequence of the discourse of political economy in 
which this history has been told, and of the propensity to view the moral economy 
retrospectively through its terms.  As Thompson writes, “[o]ne symptom of [the moral 
economy’s] final demise is that we have been able to accept for so long an abbreviated and 
'economistic' picture of the food riot, as a direct, spasmodic, irrational response to hunger 
--a picture which is itself a product of a political economy which diminished human 
reciprocities to the wages-nexus."178 The maintenance of the integral separation between the 
political and the economic within the discourse of political economy, through which the 
modern co-operative has been cast as a predominantly commercial entity, has meant that 
forms of activity that do not conform neatly to it are either mischaracterised, or are simply 
disregarded and relegated to the past.  
                                                     
175 Thompson, English Working Class, 869.  
176 See Durr, “William King,” 13, 19-20.  
177 Thompson, English Working Class, 874. In Brighton, for instance, where a well-known middle class 
Owenite reformer Dr. William King was active, the co-operative activities he supported preceded him. As 
Durr recounts, “The Brighton co-operatives were born out of the working-class trades societies, the failure 
of the Mechanics' Institute, and the friendly societies, rather than through the vision of a professional such 
as Dr. King" (Durr, “William King,” 13). And further "[i]n Brighton the co-operators were not standing still 
but setting up producer cooperatives. These were based on ideas long preceding Owen's concept of 
Utopian communities and nearer to eighteenth-century isolated co-operative ventures at Hull, Oldham, 
Woolwich, Chatham, Sheerness, and so on, where co-operative bakeries and mills had been formed" (ibid., 
19-20). 
178 Thompson, “Moral Economy,” 136. 
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 One key example of this is the attitude toward the distribution of dividends in the 
‘modern’ form of co-operation. Within dominant approaches to the history of the co-
operative movement, the dividend has been regarded either as an indication of the 
discovery of a successful business model, or more critically, as part of the 
“embourgeoisment” of co-operation.179 This analysis suggests that the distribution of 
dividends was a thoroughly ‘economic’ practice within the narrow terms of political 
economy. However, for many co-operative societies, the distribution of dividends was a 
way of undermining and preventing certain form of organisational hierarchy, as rather than 
accumulating profits centrally, they would be immediately redistributed for the benefit of 
members. The dividend, as Gurney describes, “was part of the ‘practical knowledge’ used 
by working people to cope with and simultaneously reconstruct capitalist social relations.”180 
He further speculates that the dividend was an indication of the abdication, moral and 
material, of profit-seeking. The dividend, in keeping with the moral economy tradition, was 
a direct way to “put food in bellies and clothes on backs.”181 As Cole explains, “…the great 
merit of the dividend has been that it has made it possible for Co-operators both to eat their 
cake and to have it.”182  
However, it is not read as an ‘ideal’ because of an “assumed separation of ideals and 
material interests, of heads from bodies.”183 And despite being taken retrospectively as an 
example of “embourgeoisment” and depoliticisation, the dividend also did not fit into the 
virtuous model of working class savings and investment advocated by the Christian 
Socialists. The Christian Socialists actively derided this aspect of co-operation. Though they 
were at pains to dissociate co-operation from its connection to Owenism, they also wanted 
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co-operation to foster certain moral values. This manifested in a critique of the dividend, 184 
which the Christian Socialists referred to as “The Gut’s Gospel.”185 They accused the 
consumers’ co-operative movement of having “no faith in co-operation (or anything else) 
that ‘goes down deeper than their dinner’.”186 
 If practices such as the distribution of dividends, and the emphasis on subsistence 
(and ultimately consumption in general), as well as what Thompson described as “the 
simple question: Why not?”, derived from the moral economy, persisted throughout later 
periods, this continuity calls the periodisation itself into question.187 In particular, as I will 
suggest in the next section, this continuity confounds narratives of a straightforward 
depoliticisation. The modern form of co-operation, in dominant histories, was founded on 
a disavowal of the political, and on the embrace of practices associated with business. 
However, as the temporal divisions on which these political distinctions rely prove 
untenable and manufactured, so too does the concept of the political itself. At the very least, 
                                                     
184 Some accounts of the dividend suggest that the way in which co-operative societies divided surplus each 
year was a form of resistance to more totalising associational structures. See Marc Brodie, “‘You Could Not 
Get Any Person to Be Trusted except the State’: Poorer Workers’ Loss of Faith in Voluntarism in Late 
19th Century Britain,” Journal of Social History 47, no. 4 (2014): 1071–1095. This becomes clearer in 
relation to friendly societies which worked alongside although often separately from co-operatives. Amongst 
them there was a division between those friendly societies which ‘accumulated’ their profit and those which 
‘divided’ (distributed dividends) annually. As a result of the relative autonomy afforded to Friendly Societies 
through the privilege of arbitration—having the power to decide their own disputes internally—members had 
little or no recourse if their claims were rejected. Poorer members who had not always been able to keep up 
with their payments were increasingly denied benefits when they became too ill or old to work, thus losing 
any contributions they had made. Thus many preferred ‘dividing societies’—although they were illegal until 
1875—which would redistribute any funds leftover at the end of the year to members, preventing 
accumulation. In this narrative, the dividend acted as a check on hierarchy and profit-seeking within 
voluntary associations. Brodie compares the ethic of these dividing societies to that of co-operatives, as both 
were broadly anti-statist forms of working class association. While faith in voluntarism and friendly societies 
diminished as working classes came to look toward the state for the provision of social services, this was not 
the case with co-operatives. They were able to “continue to represent working-class voluntarist virtue” (ibid., 
1085). Further, many local co-operatives were known for taking care of their members when they were ill or 
in difficulty. 
185 This phrase, “The Gut’s Gospel,” can be traced back to Thomas Hughes and it is originally quoted by 
Holyoake, History of Co-operation Volume II, 620.  
186 Thomas Hughes, quoted in Philip N. Backstrom, Christian Socialism and Co-operation in Victorian 
England: Edward Vansittart Neale and the Co-operative Movement (London: Croom Helm, 1974), 211. 
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this narrative of depoliticisation holds true only insofar as history conforms to the discourse 
of political economy. 
 From a genealogical perspective, locating the ‘beginnings’ of co-operation in the 
disparate practices and beliefs that comprised the moral economy, begs the question of 
how the co-operative came about as a specific organisational form; as well as how the fact 
of this constitution was suppressed. While the term, as noted above, emerged in the 1830s, 
I argue that the co-operative was constituted as an entity that is thought to function primarily 
as a business through a process of legal recognition. While even the earliest flour and bread 
societies did not exist completely outside the law, and the moral economy more generally 
existed in a complex relationship with legal structures, the riots and early societies 
(generally) existed without any specific form of authorisation, and could easily be 
repressed.188 In the nineteenth century there was a shift in the relationship between state 
and associational life, “from overt repression to control through regulation,” that will be 
discussed in more detail in the next chapter. 189 Chapter 3 will consider how, as part of this 
shift, law both constituted the co-operative through the creation of a distinct legal form, and 
how that form came to be regarded as a reflection of the real unity of the association itself. 
This analysis will be extended in chapter 4 through an analysis of the body corporate form 
itself, and its role in the construction of the ‘free’ market in the mid-nineteenth century. 
The Possibility of the Political 
 This thesis argues that legal recognition was depoliticising for the co-operative, not 
in the narrow terms afforded by political economy, but by virtue the constitution of the co-
operative as such. Dominant approaches to the history of the co-operative movement 
                                                     
188 See Bamfield, “Consumer-Owned Community,” 22-24. See also John Walter, “Grain Riots and Popular 
Attitudes to the Law: Maldon and the Crisis of 1629,” in eds. John Brewer and John Styles, An 
Ungovernable People: The English and their Law in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries (New 
Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1980), 47-84.  
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suggest that the modern form of co-operation was founded on the basis of a disavowal of 
the political, through the adoption of the practices of shopkeeping and the distribution of 
dividends, as well as the abandonment of socialist ideology. If the political is associated not 
with a set of discrete practices or commitment to a particular ideology, but with the very 
possibility of alterity, then depoliticisation happens precisely as the co-operative becomes 
fixed within the system to which it would be ‘alternative’, and its subordination to the state 
and subjection to the market are taken for granted.  This final section presents an alternative 
account of the political as the possibility of alterity; a possibility that inheres fundamentally 
in our sociality.  Through this conception, it becomes possible to regard the moral economy 
and co-operative direct action as political.  This not only allows for a greater significance to 
be afforded to those actions and their various manifestations in later forms of co-operation, 
but also helps to conceptualise what was potentially at stake in legal recognition. 
 It matters whether or not co-operation is considered to be political. Claude Lefort 
suggests that the political is fundamentally concerned with the “shaping [mise en forme] of 
human co-existence.”190 The question of whether or not co-operation is political thus 
concerns the extent to which it has any bearing on this shaping. However, when the political 
is restricted to a particular domain within society or a discrete set of activities, as it is within 
the discourse of political economy, it takes for granted the existence of the very system that 
would be put into question by the political. As Lefort suggests, “it is simply because the very 
notion of society already contains within it a reference to its political definition that it proves 
impossible… to localize the political in society.”191 The discourse of political economy, as 
described above, operates on the basis of a firm divide between the ‘political’ and the 
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‘economic’. The political is generally restricted to a narrow field of activity, usually 
associated with the state.  
 Within such a division, the activities associated with the moral economy and co-
operative direct action cannot be regarded as properly ‘political’ and have even been 
defined by this absence of any connection to politics. As one recent history comments 
regarding the moral economy and the early societies, “[w]ithout political representation 
they sought redress for their grievances through violent disorder: rioting.”192  Their actions 
are defined primarily by their violence, and in this capacity, they are dissociated from later 
forms of co-operation, while also being cast as exterior to ‘political’ mechanisms of 
engagement. Even Thompson, while giving much greater significance to food riots and early 
co-operative societies through the framework of the moral economy, struggled to call the 
moral economy ‘political’.  
While this moral economy cannot be described as 'political' in any advanced sense, 
nevertheless it cannot be described as unpolitical either, since it supposed definite, 
and passionately held, notions of the common weal -- notions which, indeed, found 
some support in the paternalist tradition of the authorities; notions which the people 
re-echoed so loudly in their turn that the authorities were, in some measure, the 
prisoners of the people.193 
 
However, in a later clarification of his idea of the moral economy, he expresses a certain 
dissatisfaction with the inability to call the moral economy political. In a response to his 
critics written several years after the publication of his seminal essay on the moral economy, 
Thompson qualifies these comments somewhat, or at least indicates a more complicated 
relationship between the moral economy and ‘the political’. On being challenged for using 
the word ‘moral’ he indicates that he would have preferred to refer to it as a ‘political 
economy’ had that phrase not been so overused and abused for what he deems to be 
misguided purposes. As he explains,  
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I could have perhaps called this 'a sociological economy', and an economy in its 
original meaning (oeconomy) as the due organisation of a household, in which each 
part is related to the whole and each member acknowledges her/his several duties 
and obligations. That, indeed, is as much, or more, 'political' than is 'political 
economy', but by usage the classical economists have carried off the term.194  
 
This struggle to identify the moral economy as political reflects the narrow, restricted 
conception of the political designated by the discourse of political economy.  
 The co-operative movement itself long ascribed to a principle of ‘political 
neutrality’, further demonstrating the inability of dominant conceptions of the political to 
account for co-operation. This neutrality expressed a commitment to transcending political 
divisions among the working class. As Cole states, “[p]olitical neutrality meant in practice 
neutrality between the rival factions which were then appealing for working class support.”195 
This was not intended to signal a lack of commitment to co-operative ideals or vision of 
change. As Yeo claims, “‘political neutrality’ was not invented by the Rochdale Pioneers so 
that they might be left alone to become respectable grocers. It was worked out, in part 
during the Congresses of 1829-33, as a critique, by working people, of reformism.”196 
However, one consequence of this inability to conceptualise co-operation as political is that 
the sense in which it may actually manifest alterity is obscured. The commitment to 
‘political neutrality’ within the co-operative movement may have removed co-operation 
from the fray of state-centred forms of politics and indicated a higher aspiration, but within 
a limited discursive framework ‘political neutrality’ also reinforces the sense that co-
operatives are primarily economic entities. That the co-operative movement is taken to 
have moved away from its commitment to political neutrality only with the formation of the 
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Co-operative Party in 1917 further illustrates this restricted discourse of the political, by 
associating the political with advocating co-operative interests in Parliament.197 
 Nancy and Lacoue-Labarthe refer to this tendency to restrict the political to a 
predetermined sphere as “the closure of the political.”198 This closure can be traced back 
as far as Aristotle and the designation of the polis as a discrete sphere of political relation, 
but has become more severe with the rise of the discourse of political economy.199 Politics, 
they suggest, has been largely replaced by a socio-technical discourse, reduced to questions 
of management and population, and the distribution of resources.200 Overcoming this 
tendency requires something more than just a different form of politics. Some have 
suggested, for instance, that the moral economy presents a kind of ‘informal politics’. As 
Bohstedt describes,  
Struggles over food were political in the sense that they involved the distribution of 
goods ('who gets what?'), under widely-held though contested public norms, within 
a system of rules and authorities, sanctioned ultimately on both sides by physical 
force: the power of crowds vs. the power of muskets and gallows.... The everyday 
dynamics of power--extra-institutional politics sometimes called 'informal politics' 
to distinguish it from both partisan contest and radical movements.201 
                                                     
197 Advocating for the formation of a co-operative political party, William Maxwell, then president of the 
Scottish Co-operative Wholesale Society suggested that "I do not seek to introduce politics into co-
operation, but I am most anxious to see co-operation introduced more into politics." William Maxwell, 
quoted in Rachael Vorberg-Rugh and Angela Whitecross, The Co-operative Party: An Alternative Vision of 
Social Ownership, in eds. Peter Ackers and Alastair J. Reid, Alternatives to State-Socialism in Britain: 
Other Worlds of Labour in the Twentieth Century (Cham: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016), 63. See also Alfred 
Barnes, The Political Aspect of Co-operation (Manchester: Co-operative Union Ltd., 1926). 
198 Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe and Jean-Luc Nancy, “Opening Address to the Centre for Philosophical 
Research on the Political,” in ed. Simon Sparks, Retreating the Political (London: Routledge, 1997), 112.  
199 Ibid., 110. 
200 The distinction has a long history in Western political thought, which has been thoroughly explored by 
Oliver Marchart, Post-Foundational Political Thought: Political Difference in Nancy, Lefort, Badiou and 
Laclau (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2007), 35-60. The distinction was introduced by Lacoue-
Labarthe and Nancy who were themselves reflecting on Jacques Derrida’s “The Ends of Man” [in Margins 
of Philosophy (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982), 109-136]. It has been subsequently quite widely 
taken up. Chantal Mouffe, for instance, describes her own use of this distinction: "by 'the political' I mean 
the dimension of antagonism which I take to be constitutive of human societies, while by 'politics' I mean 
the set of practices and institutions through which an order is created, organizing human co-existence in the 
context of conflictuality provided by the political." Chantal Mouffe, On the Political (Abingdon: Routledge, 
2005), 9. 
201 Bohstedt, Provisions, 6. 
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While creating a means through which to understand the moral economy as political, such 
definitions still maintain the centrality and dominance of ‘closed’ conceptions of the 
political, not least because they simply expand that definition, making it more inclusive, but 
not fundamentally altering it.  
 Instead of just expanding the prevailing definitions of the political, Lacoue-Labarthe 
and Nancy argue for a ‘retreat’ of the political that would allow for the withdrawal of the 
political (le politique), from instituted forms of politics (la politique).202 This retreat, as they 
suggest, is “necessary in order to render possible a questioning which refuses to confine 
itself to the categories ordinarily grouped under ‘the political’.”203  If particular forms of 
politics cause the “closure of the political,” the retreat of the political asks “on the basis of 
what, or along what, does this closure trace itself?”204 It is a question of finding  “the essence 
of the political—drawn back from the total completion of the political in the techno-
social.”205 If, as Lefort suggests, most forms of determined politics take for granted the 
presence of the very system that would be put into question by the political, the retreat of 
the political suggests the possibility, and the necessity, of stepping back from that system 
and the determination of the political within any particular discourse.  
 This essence of the political (le politique) retreated from politics (la politique) is the 
question of relation, which must always be maintained as a question.206   It is not an empirical 
positivity, but rather a “philosophical fact.” 207 Nancy elaborates this concept in his later work 
as the fact of an “originary or ontological ‘sociality’,” or the idea that we are always-already 
                                                     
202 For an explanation of the distinction between le politique and la politique as a deconstructive gesture, see 
Stella Gaon, “Communities in Question: Sociality and Solidarity in Nancy and Blanchot,” Journal for 
Cultural Research 9, no. 4 (2005): 391 
203 Lacoue-Labarthe and Nancy, “Opening Address,” 112.  
204 Lacoue-Labarthe and Nancy, “Retreat,” 132. 
205 Ibid. In this sense, what Lacoue-Labarthe and Nancy pursue with this distinction differs from the 
otherwise closely related projects of Hannah Arendt and Carl Schmitt, both of which pursue a retreat, but 
in order to arrive at the autonomy of the political. See Marchart, Post-Foundational, 36.  
206 Lacoue-Labarthe and Nancy, “Opening Address,” 118.  
207 Lacoue-Labarthe and Nancy, “Retreat,” 134.  
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in common with one another, prior to and co-extensive with all other forms of sociality.208 
This sociality is in one sense a form of community, but not a community of individuals who 
come together incidentally for a cause or specific purpose, nor is it a preconceived unity, 
such as the nation. It is rather the inescapable community of a shared finitude—a birth and 
death that can only be experienced for us by others, in community. As Nancy explains, 
“only the community can present me my birth, and along with it the impossibility of my 
reliving it, as well as the impossibility of my crossing over into my death.”209 We do not 
experience our own birth or death; rather, it is experienced in and through community, 
always by others. Or as Maurice Blanchot suggests, ‘[t]his is what founds community. There 
could not be a community without the sharing of that first and last event which in everyone 
ceases to be able to be just that (birth, death).’210 It is an inoperative or an unavowable 
community, in which being is always “being-in-common.”211  
 The political is “the place of community,” where sociality is always exceeding its 
instituted forms.212 The political, in this sense, is not a characteristic or quality that can serve 
in an evaluative capacity; it is not “the organization of society” but rather “the disposition of 
                                                     
208 Jean-Luc Nancy, Inoperative Community (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1991), 28. Of 
course, the notion of community itself, which forms the ontological basis of Nancy’s conception of the 
political in particular, is incredibly fraught. While the idea of community, whether Nancy’s or otherwise, is 
not itself at issue in this thesis, it nonetheless intersects with questions of politics and the political, as well as 
the tendency to mythologise, romanticise or naturalise social forms like co-operatives. The attachments that 
many scholars, and particularly feminists, have argued attend notions and ideals of community are clearly 
replicated in the attachments given to co-operation and co-operatives (Iris Marion Young, “The Ideal of 
Community and the Politics of Difference,” Social Theory and Practice 12, no. 1 [1986]: 1-26).  Nancy, 
Lacoue-Labarthe and Blanchot’s approaches to community and sociality, as well as the political, do risk 
reproducing a romanticisation of community, while also potentially vacating community of any meaning 
through the gesture of retreat, as Miranda Joseph has suggested. See Miranda Joseph, Against the Romance 
of Community (Minnesota: University of Minnesota Press, 2002). However, in contrast to Joseph’s reading, 
here Nancy and Lacoue-Labarthe are not taken to advocate passivity, but rather to offer sociality or 
community as a form of excess, and a generative resource – one that raises the question of how we come 
together as the very essence of the political, but without necessarily positing a politics to accompany it. For 
the purposes of the historical and genealogical analysis of the moral economy, this lack of ‘naming’ of the 
politics – as feminist, prefigurative (see note 221), or otherwise – while also opening the space to think of 
the moral economy as political, seems prudent.     
209 Ibid., 15.  
210 Maurice Blanchot, The Unavowable Community (Barrytown: Station Hill Press, 1988), 9. 
211 Nancy, Inoperative, xxxvii.  
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community as such.” 213 It is not a question of power relations in a field constituted by 
political economy, but rather “the place where community as such is brought into play.”214 
The political is the exposure of originary sociality or inoperative community as that which 
exceeds, opens and undermines determined communities. Indeed, as Nancy suggests, 
“…there would be no power relations, nor would there be such a specific unleashing 
power…if the political were not the place of community.”215 The terms of our “relation,” as 
Nancy and Lacoue-Labarthe describe, would already be settled; and there would be no 
scope to question them.216  
 This implies that “everything is political,” but not such that the political becomes 
meaningless; rather, as Nancy qualifies, “everything is political” only “insofar as the 
‘everything’ can neither be total nor totalized in any way.”217 Everything is political because 
every moment of relation “presupposes that we are brought into the world, each and every 
one of us, according to a dimension of ‘in-common’ that is in no way ‘added onto’ the 
dimension of ‘being-self’, but that is rather co-originary and coextensive with it.”218 In other 
words, the political, retreated from politics, is not a question of a given set of relations that 
are then determined to have political significance within the confines of particular order; 
rather, the political is already imminent in relationality as such.  Foucault echoes this when 
he suggests that “the political is not something which determines in the last analysis (or over-
determines) relations that are elementary and by nature 'neutral'. Every relation of force 
implies at each moment a relation of power (which is in a sense its momentary expression) 
and every power relation makes a reference, as its effect but also as its condition of 
                                                     
213 Ibid., 40.  
214 Ibid., xxxvii. 
215 Ibid. 
216 Lacoue-Labarthe and Nancy, “Retreat,” 133. 
217  Jean-Luc Nancy, The Truth of Democracy, trans. Pascale-Anne Brault and Michael Naas (New York: 
Fordham University Press, 2010), 51. 
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possibility, to a political field of which it forms a part.” The idea that “everything is 
political…affirms[s] this ubiquity of relations of force and their immanence in a political 
field….”219 They comprise an “indefinite knot” to which there is no end or ultimate 
resolution.220  
 The retreat of the political thus allows, at a minimum, a way to understand the 
moral economy and co-operative direct action as political without immediately reproducing 
the terms of political economy, and without reference to a predetermined field of activity 
associated with the state.221 It is possible to think of the food riots and early co-operative 
societies as ‘political’, even though they did not engage directly with questions of political 
right. Politics, as Nancy suggests, does not need to “have history as its career, sovereignty as 
its emblem, and sacrifice as its access.”222 This is not to suggest that the forms of politics 
                                                     
219 Michel Foucault, “History of Sexuality,” in Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings, 
1972-1977, ed. Colin Gordon, trans. Colin Gordon et al (New York: Pantheon Books, 1980), 189. 
220 Ibid. 
221 This critique of dominant models of ‘politics’ and the search for an alternative conception of the political 
to some extent follows the gesture of the New Left and the idea of “prefigurative” politics. See Carl Boggs, 
“Marxism,” 99-122. Indeed, co-operatives are often included amongst a range of organizational forms that 
are considered to be part of a prefigurative process of social change. The rise of the prefigurative came from 
"the failure of Marxism to spell out the process of transition," and the subsequent emphasis on 
parliamentary and bureaucratic conceptions of politics (100). The prefigurative creates the possibility of 
seeing practices which had been dismissed as apolitical as politically legitimate. As Boggs explains, “[i]n the 
broadest sense, prefigurative structures can be viewed as a new source of political legitimacy, as a nucleus of 
a future socialist state. They would create an entirely new kind of politics, breaking down the division of 
labour between everyday life and political activity” (105). Since its broader take up in the late sixties, 
prefigurative politics has come to describe “counterhegemonic institutions and modes of interaction that 
embody the desired transformation,” particularly in organizations that are ‘horizontal’ and consensus-based, 
emphasizing participatory democracy [Darcy K. Leach, “Prefigurative Politics,” in eds. David A Snow, 
Donatella della Porta, Bert Klanderman and Doug McAdam, The Wiley-Blackwell Encyclopedia of Social 
and Political Movements (Hoboken: Blackwell Publishing Ltd., 2013), 1]. While co-operatives may be 
rightly described as prefigurative, I will largely avoid that characterization for the simple reason that it is a 
product of the 1960s and does not necessarily suffice to describe early co-operative societies and the 
movement more generally. While the resonances are clear and many involved in contemporary efforts to 
build co-operation would use such a terminology, I want to avoid imposing such a designation on the past, 
at least for the purposes of this project.  However, this project can still be seen as contributing to a wider 
conversation about prefigurative politics. Francesca Polletta points to a dilemma in prefigurative politics, 
that “they wanted to effect political change without reproducing the structure that they opposed” [Francesca 
Polletta, Freedom is an Endless Meeting: Democracy in American Social Movements (Chicago: University 
of Chicago Press, 2002), 6]. She emphasizes that this was a dilemma rather than a mistake or folly. Insofar 
as this analysis supports the overall project of a ‘prefigurative politics’, it might be seen as contributing to an 
understanding of these dilemmas. 
222 Jean-Luc Nancy, Sense of the World, trans. Jeffrey S. Librett (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota 
Press, 1997), 89. 
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associated with political economy are not important or relevant, or that we should abandon 
the struggles that have been waged in those terms, as “these are the givens of epoch and of 
the domination of the political and technology or of the domination of political economy.” 
223 It is a question, rather, of  “no longer subjugating these struggles, in their finality, to this 
domination.”224 As shown in relation to the history of the co-operative movement, these 
terms can become totalising in their own right, and preclude or marginalise other forms of 
relation or struggle. As Lacoue-Labarthe and Nancy suggest, sociality or the question of 
relation is taken for granted in restricted or ‘closed’ conceptions of the political, as though 
only some relations, rather than others, would be political. These conceptions of politics 
tend to presuppose the relation of subjects, already individuated: it is “the absolute 
presupposition of the relation of subjects…alone allows the ordering of the political as 
telos.”225 Whether it is individuals coming together to form a social contract and to create a 
sovereign state, or the reduction of politics to the relation of economic forces and 
predetermined classes, these result in a closure of the political. As Nancy suggests, the 
Western tradition, including Marx, “ended up giving us only various programs for the 
realization of an essence of community,” the consequence of which is to reduce or restrain 
the possibility of alterity inherent in sociality.226  
 The retreat of the political is thus concerned with revealing or exposing the possibility 
of alterity. It is, as Ian James suggests, a question of “releasing the possible unthought from 
that which has traditionally or already been thought, releasing future possibilities from the 
limit points of what we think we know about the past and the present.”227 While the “essence 
of the political” is not itself another form of politics, it makes it possible to reconceive 
                                                     
223 Lacoue-Labarthe and Nancy, “Opening Address,” 117. 
224 Ibid. 
225 Ibid.. Original emphasis. 
226 Nancy, Inoperative, xxxviii.  
227 Ian James, The Fragmentary Demand: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Jean-Luc Nancy (Palo Alto: 
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politics.228 Following the retreat of the political, it is necessary to return to questions of 
politics: if there is an imperative that arises from the retreat of the political, it is to seek 
modalities of politics that “[do] not stem from the will to realize an essence.”229 Blanchot 
similarly directs us to seek out ‘new relationships, always threatened, always hoped for, 
between what we call work, oeuvre, and what we call unworking, désoeuvrement.’230 This 
means, in short, finding modes of politics that would remain open to the political, that 
would remain open to their own unworking, that would “inscribe the sharing of 
community.”231  A politics that is open to the exposure of community or the political, “must 
order [ordonner] – in all senses of the word – in such a way that the passage towards the 
beyond of its order remains free of obstacles.”232  In one instance, Nancy refers to such a 
politics, following the retreat of the political, as a kind of gesture: “[p]olitics would 
henceforth be neither a substance nor a form but, first of all, a gesture: the very gesture of 
the tying and enchainment of each to each….”233  
 It is this political gesture that, I suggest, is given by the idea of co-operative direct 
action and associated with the moral economy.234 Ascribing this gesture to co-operative 
                                                     
228 Thus, they stress, “in speaking of the political we fully intend not to designate politics.” Lacoue-Labarthe 
and Nancy, “Retreat,” 125. It is worth noting that Lacoue-Labarthe and Nancy, as well as poststructuralism 
more generally, have frequently been accused as offering nothing, and even detracting from, political 
struggle. For all the effort they put into drawing the political back from politics, “…they stop short of 
embracing any normative political conclusions,” as Nancy Fraser laments. Nancy Fraser, “The French 
Derrideans: Politicizing Deconstruction or Deconstructing the Political?” New German Critique 33 (1984), 
149. Those who would suggest that deconstruction and its affiliates are not political and are even actively 
depoliticizing seem to miss this necessary return to politics that happens following the retreat of the political.  
229 Nancy, Inoperative, xl. 
230 Blanchot, Unavowable, 56. 
231 Nancy, Inoperative, 41. 
232 Jean-Luc Nancy, “The Political and/or Politics,” Lecture, Frankfurt, March 14, 2012, 
http://www.bbk.ac.uk/bih/nancy-jean-luc-the-political-and-or-politics-frankfurt-2012.pdf (Accessed 4 July 
2017). 
233 Nancy, Sense, 112.  
234 Constituent power, and particularly the idea of an ‘open’ constituent power, resonates strongly with the 
idea of the political engaged here. While acknowledging the complementarity of these ideas, I have 
intentionally chosen not to use the framework of constituent power. This is for several reasons. Firstly, it is 
closely bound to an analysis of constitutionalism and the ‘constituted’ power of the state; as such the 
framework did not seem readily appropriate for an analysis of associations that would be considered 
subordinate to the state. In the next chapter I will show how the distinction between state and lessor 
associations is a constructed one, however, there would be considerable work required to bring the idea of 
constituent power along. Secondly, the idea of ‘open’ constituent power marks only the gesture of going 
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direct action stops short of retrospectively attributing a particular political programme to 
the moral economy. It is instead an attempt to conceptualise the actions themselves, and 
the ways in which they manifest alterity. Like the food riots, the early co-operatives drew 
their power from the possibility of coming together to assert a rebalancing of the moral 
economy, or to create new structures that would better adhere to the moral economy. The 
collective brought the moral economy into being, rather than the moral economy being a 
totality from which the collective would arise and take its identity and direction. The riots 
and early societies relied on prior relationships, but also created new ones. As Bohstedt 
describes, “…collective action required previously existing memberships and shared 
expectations among crowds” but also “rioters created community, they enacted it, realized 
a community in potential.”235  
 While they would sometimes be founded with permission from local authorities, 
they did not require explicit authorization from an entity such as the state which would be 
superior to them (and under which they would be subsumed); nor were they themselves 
fixed or closed—they overlapped considerably with other forms of organisation, and did not 
have a determinate or exclusive identity. Through their own self-authorisation, they 
revealed that the conditions which had been set were not immutable, but could be called 
out and checked, and that it was possible for people to come together, not only to disrupt 
egregious practices, but also to form something new. In this sense, co-operation, as 
                                                     
outside the constituted order. As Illan Wall argues, all such attempts to sustain an ‘open’ constituent power 
inevitably fail, as they are folded back into constituted modalities of power. Illan Wall, Human Rights and 
Constituent Power: Without Model or Warranty (Abingdon: Routledge, 2012), 112. In contrast, the 
political (le politique) as the exposure of community as being-in-common also shows how constituted and 
constituent forms of power are not simply opposed to one another (nor completely separable) — it is only 
the persistence of being-in-common that keeps sovereignty from realizing itself in the world. With the 
political (le politique), the question then becomes (as it does for Nancy) not one of avoiding constituted 
forms per se, as though there were the possibility of remaining always in the excess of the outside, but of 
finding more open structures that allow for the possibility of alterity. This is what Nancy appears to be 
suggesting when he writes that “Politics must order [ordonner] – in all senses of the word – in such a way 
that the passage towards the beyond of its order remains free of obstacles.” Nancy, “Politics/ Political,” 5.  
235 John Bohstedt, Riots and Community Politics in England and Wales 1790-1810 (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 1983), 276. 
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Holyoake described, had been an experiment in “world-making.” 236 However, this is not to 
suggest that the early flour and bread societies were a pure expression of the interests of the 
poor. They were often, as Bamfield notes, funded by businessmen. Subscription fees at 
many of the early societies would also have been prohibitive for many of the poorest, and 
they were not necessarily democratic.237  
 Calling co-operative direct action political is not about identifying a model of 
perfection: it is enough to suggest that, at a minimum, the politics of the moral economy 
did not follow the model of sovereignty, and did not attempt to “realize the essence of 
community.”238 As such, co-operative direct action can be read as a form of politics which 
does not obscure or efface the political, but rather “gives form and visibility to the possibility 
of living together.” Not, as Nancy explains “one particular determination of living but the 
constitutive determination for human life.”239 The political, according to Lacoue-Labarthe 
and Nancy, is the exposure of community (or sociality) and the unworking of the excess 
shown by that sociality. The gesture by which co-operatives show that the present order is 
not fixed or necessary, and demonstrate the possibility of other, less determinative 
modalities of being together, offers just such an exposure. This politics allowed for the 
opening and consideration of the question of community—it was predicated on just such a 
possibility.  
 I have suggested that the legal recognition of the co-operative in the mid-nineteenth 
century was depoliticising. This is not the result of the adoption or abandonment of specific 
practices, or the disavowal of utopian ideals, but the closure of the political that happens as 
a consequence of the constitution of the co-operative as such, particularly insofar as the fact 
of this constitution is taken for granted. This is what Lacoue-Labarthe and Nancy refer to 
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as “immanentism” or “totalitarianism.”240 In particular they identify a “new totalitarianism” 
which “would itself proceed from the dissolution of transcendence, and, henceforth, come 
to penetrate all spheres of life now devoid of any alterity.”241 The legal recognition of co-
operatives as bodies corporate in the mid-nineteenth century, as I will argue, subordinates 
them to the state and subjects them to the market. In particular, the legal form of the body 
corporate constitutes the co-operative as a discrete unity. Despite the origins of this form in 
a transcendent, theological metaphysical structure, this form comes to be seen as a 
reflection of the natural unity of the group itself.   The closure of the political, or 
depoliticisation, occurs as a consequence of the immanentisation and normalisation of this 
metaphysical structure, and the subsequent naturalisation of this legally-constituted 
conception of the co-operative. 
As Nancy suggests, “economic ties, technological operations, and political fusion 
(into a body or under a leader) represent or rather present, expose, and realize this essence 
necessarily in themselves. Essence is set to work in them; through them, it becomes its own 
work.” 242 They evoke “the total immanence or the total immanentisation of the political in 
the social” which dramatically reduces and obscures the possibility of alterity. 243 The co-
operative itself becomes “devoid of alterity” on the presumption of its own presence as an 
object. 
 It is important to differentiate this closure of the political and loss of alterity from 
what Nancy describes as a longing for a lost community; this is not an argument for a return 
to an ideal past or pre-market mode of relation. This kind of characterization is not 
uncommon when it comes to co-operation, which has sometimes been described as 
                                                     
240 Lacoue-Labarthe and Nancy, “Opening Address,” 115; Nancy, Inoperative, 3.  
241 Ibid., 129. 
242 Nancy, Inoperative, 3. 
243 Lacoue-Labarthe and Nancy, “Opening Address,” 115 
 
 
CHAPTER 1 | 93 
 
 
manifesting a “spirit of association.”244 As Webb writes, [t]he Co-operative Movement is but 
a modern development of that spirit of association which may be traced all through our 
social history, as is seen in many features of the life of the early English village communities 
in Saxon and Norman times.”245 Webb’s  “spirit of association” attributes co-operation with 
an ancient and timeless quality, serving to legitimate the co-operative movement and to 
demonstrate its importance with reference to the past, and all in a rhetoric that implicitly 
conveys the authenticity of these modes of relation. As Tann recounts, the older flour and 
bread societies which survived into the mid-nineteenth century became part of “the full 
flowering of co-operative production of the 1860s,” proving, according to one speaker at a 
Co-operative Congress in the 1880s, that "the independent productive societies which we 
find now scattered over the whole of Great Britain are representatives of a very ancient 
race.”246 Moreover, Tann suggests that 
[t]he co-operative milling societies of the Napoleonic period, with their classic co-
operative features of no credit, no debt, and fixed interest rates, should not be 
viewed as forerunners of the Owenite ideal, nor was there any obvious link with 
political activity. They were a spirited, rational, but only partial solution to a 
problem that affected all ranks of society, but particularly the lower orders.247 
 
In this account, which skips over fifty years of history, the early co-operative societies are 
not political. This is both because they are not connected to Owenism and because they 
are only a ‘partial’ solution. Casting the early societies as unpolitical helps to construct the 
narrative of the modern co-operative movement as also being unpolitical, while 
simultaneously contributing to the construction of an origin story for the co-operative 
movement.  
This plays into a wider narrative, in which co-operatives would be an exception to 
a more general loss of these forms of association and community; a sense of loss that Nancy 
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suggests is constitutive of modernity. As Nancy explains, “[t]he consciousness of this ordeal 
belongs to Rousseau, who figured a society that experienced or acknowledged the loss or 
degradation of a communitarian (and a communicative) intimacy…Until this day history has 
been thought on the basis of a lost community.”248 Politics is then often figured as attempting 
to make up for this loss through other forms of order (society) or working toward the 
realization of these lost communities as a political goal, as a desire for communion. Yet, as 
Nancy reminds, “[o]ne associates or assembles individuals. The individual is a product or 
a secondary, limited, temporary effect, which occurs intermittently amid the discontinuous 
structure of the “with”. That structure is nothing other than the structure of being.”249 Instead 
of a timeless spirit of association, co-operatives have demonstrated the possibility of alterity 
in association that is at the heart of the political, as Blanchot writes, “the heart or the law.”250 
It is a question of its exposure, rather than its retrieval.  
Conclusion 
 This chapter has argued that dominant approaches to the history of the co-operative 
movement have been shaped by a discourse of political economy, derived in part from 
mid-nineteenth century conflicts over the meaning of co-operation. These histories tend to 
remove co-operation from its history and take the co-operative for granted as an object, 
precluding a consideration of how the co-operative was constituted in the first place. Law, 
if it figured at all in these histories, tended to be marginalized and treated in an instrumental 
capacity. Drawing on the insights of Foucault’s genealogy, it was suggested that one reason 
for the marginalization of law in these histories is the more general obfuscation of the 
productive and constitutive function of power that happens within the discourse of political 
economy. In order to appreciate the role of law in the history of the co-operative 
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movement, it was necessary to articulate a history of the co-operative movement that is not 
already determined by the discourse of political economy. The disparate ‘beginnings’ of 
co-operation, rather than a mythic origin, were sought in the moral economy of the 
eighteenth century. The framework of the moral economy showed how the earliest co-
operative societies were not isolated efforts but rather reflected a broader system of beliefs 
and customs, as well as networks of relation and association. This framework, in turn, raised 
the question of how these disparate practices and forms of association were consolidated 
in a discrete organizational form, the co-operative.  
 It is to this question that this thesis will now turn, examining the function of legal 
recognition in the mid-nineteenth century as well as the particular form, the body corporate, 
given to co-operatives. The next chapter will take up the relationship between state and 
association, arguing that the state must subordinate potentially competing forms of 
association in order to constitute itself as the state, in an attempt to manifest its claim to an 
impossible sovereignty. Legal recognition of the co-operative movement occurred in the 
context of a broader shift between state and association, from one of tacit consent and 
tolerance to the provision of legal forms and direct regulation. As Martin Purvis suggests, 
“the retreat to a series of institutions with prescribed and restricted functions constrained 
popular initiatives.”251  
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Chapter 2: Co-operation and the Laws of Ordering 
"Impossible, yet there it is!”1 
Introduction 
The last chapter argued that law does not figure prominently in histories of the co-
operative movement because these histories have been told within a discourse of political 
economy. The law, in terms of this discourse, served in a predominantly instrumental 
capacity, whether that was to enable and legitimate the co-operative as a working-class form 
of organisation, or to reinforce the appropriation of co-operation that had already been 
determined by economic forces. In contrast to these narratives, I will argue that the law 
played an integral role in transforming the disparate practices associated with the moral 
economy into a discrete organisational form that would function primarily as a business. 
To this end, the next two chapters will offer interrelated theoretical arguments about legal 
recognition. First, that legal recognition functions as a means by which the state constitutes 
itself; and second, that legal recognition also constitutes that which it recognises. The 
historical shift from moral economy to co-operative is not a matter of “bringing within” 
from “outside,” as the Christian Socialists suggested,2 but a more complex constitutive 
dynamic that reflects shifting modalities of governance and power in the development of 
the modern state.  
  This chapter begins with a discussion of the relationship between law and sociality, 
starting from the concept and theoretical framework of legal pluralism. Legal pluralism has 
been a relatively common means of approaching both the moral economy and co-
                                                     
1 Georges Bataille, The Accursed Share, Volumes II and III, trans. Robert Hurley (New York: Zone 
Books, 1991), 243.  
2 J.M. Ludlow and Lloyd Jones, Progress of the Working Class 1832-1867 (London: Alexander Strahan, 
1867), 96. 
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operatives. The basic contention of legal pluralism is that law is not exclusive to the state. 
As Eugen Ehrlich wrote, “all law is social law,” meaning that wherever there is association, 
there is also law. 3 In this reading, law is not simply an instrument, but a form of ordering 
that is integrally related to our sociality. However, there has also been a tendency within 
legal pluralism, and socio-legal studies more generally, to implicitly presuppose the 
influence and centrality of state law—what Marianne Constable refers to as “socio-legal 
positivism.”4 The moral economy, for instance, is thought to manifest a form of traditional 
or customary law, a framing and terminology which implies a relationship of autonomy 
from, but also inferiority to, the state.5 Co-operatives, in turn, have been regarded as a 
means of maintaining these traditional forms of relation and legality within state law, while 
taking for granted the ways in which the co-operative may already be the product of a 
relationship with the state.6  
Despite their insights, these readings of the moral economy and co-operatives 
implicitly instrumentalise the law, even as they pluralise it, specifically by regarding law as 
the entirely dependent on association—be it the state, society or another form of 
association.7 Peter Fitzpatrick suggests that this persistent instrumentalism is a consequence 
of how concepts such as the state, society, and in turn law, are understood in the first place.8 
In an ostensibly secular modernity, Fitzpatrick argues, the state and society function as 
“deific substitutes,” taking the place once occupied by a transcendent god.9 The state is 
                                                     
3 Eugen Ehrlich, Fundamental Principles of the Sociology of Law, trans. Walter L. Moll (New Brunswick: 
Transaction Publishers, 2002), 44. 
4 Marianne Constable, Just Silences: The Limits and Possibilities of Modern Law (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 2005), 10. 
5 See for instance Harry Arthurs, “Review: Customs in Common: Studies in Traditional Popular Culture,” 
University of Toronto Law Journal 43 (1993): 289. 
6 See Stuart Henry, Private Justice: Towards Integrated Theorising in the Sociology of Law (London: 
Routledge & Kegan Paul plc, 1983), 92-96. 
7 Peter Fitzpatrick, “Being Social in Socio-Legal Studies,” Journal of Law and Society 22, no. 1 (1995): 106. 
8 Peter Fitzpatrick, “Being Social in Law and Society,” in Tara Mulqueen and Daniel Matthews, eds., Being 
Social: Ontology, Law, Politics (London: Counterpress, 2015), 38. 
9 Peter Fitzpatrick, “What are the Gods to Us Now?: Secular Theology and the Modernity of Law,” 
Theoretical Inquiries in Law 8, no. 1 (2007): 162. See also Fitzpatrick, “Law and Society,” 36.  
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taken to be something which exists “unto itself,” with law flowing from it 10 They participate 
in what Claude Lefort describes as “an illusion…that the institution of the social can account 
for itself."11 Sociological explanations easily become “sociological reduction[s],” which risk 
eliding the rhetorical production of the state with its material manifestations.12 Yet they are 
resolutely impossible, and unable to fully account for themselves. To this end, as Timothy 
Mitchell suggests, “we should examine it not as an actual structure but as the powerful, 
apparently metaphysical effect of practices that make such structures appear to exist.’13 
Inverting the usual relationship, Fitzpatrick argues that it is actually “law which 
renders society possible.”14 The idea of a fundamental sociality, discussed in the previous 
chapter in relation to the concept of the political, appears here again, this time as law. The 
“law of community,” or the “law of an originary sociability,” is that we are always-already in 
common with one another.15 It is only on the basis of this prior sociality that exceeds any 
determined form of association that any particular association, state or otherwise, can 
attempt to delimit itself in the first place. Law also helps to constitute the state by providing 
a form of “enforceable positive determination” for it, making it manifest in the world.16 This 
                                                     
10 Michael Taussig, The Nervous System (New York: Routledge, 1992), 112. 
11 Claude Lefort, The Political Forms of Modern Society: Bureaucracy, Democracy, Totalitarianism, ed. 
John B. Thompson (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1986), 201. Quoted in Fitzpatrick, “Socio-Legal Studies,” 
107.  
12 Philip Abrams, “Notes on the Difficulty of Studying the State (1977),” Journal of Historical Sociology 1, 
no. 1 (1988): 64. 
13 Timothy Mitchell, ‘Society, Economy, and State Effect’ in Aradhana Sharma and Akhil Gupta eds. The 
Anthropology of the State: A Reader (Blackwell Publishing Ltd., 2006), 169, n180. As Otto von Gierke 
elegantly expressed it, "We see a regiment marching to ringing music; we notice voters who cast their votes 
into the urn; at a public demonstration we are roughly pushed back by a squad of policemen;--and we know 
immediately by this and a hundred other sensual impressions that things are happening which have to do 
with the continuation of the life of the state.” Otto von Gierke, “The Nature of Human Associations,” in 
The Genossenschaft-Theory of Otto von Gierke, ed. John D. Lewis, 139–157 (Madison: University of 
Wisconsin, 1935), 146. 
14 Fitzpatrick, “Socio-Legal Studies,” 106. 
15 Jean-Luc Nancy, Inoperative Community, trans. Peter Connor, Lisa Garbus, Michael Holland and 
Simona Sawhney (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1991), 28; and Jacques Derrida, The 
Politics of Friendship, trans. George Collins (London: Verso, 2005), 231. 
16 Fitzpatrick, “Law and Society,” 41.  
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inversion gives way to a more complex constitutive dynamic between the moral economy, 
the co-operative and the state.  
 In the remainder of the chapter, this constitutive dynamic is explored in more detail 
through a reading of the relationship between state and association in an unlikely source, 
Thomas Hobbes’ Leviathan.17 For Hobbes, “the originator of modern sovereignty,”18 the 
sovereign is no less than a “Mortal God.”19 However, this chapter approaches Hobbes not 
as the author of a totalising sovereignty but, following James Martel, as one “who helps us 
to understand how sovereignty is not so much an actual font of authority, but a rhetorical 
production.”20 Notionally, Hobbes argues that all associational life must be subordinate to 
the commonwealth, and he has often been read as such.21 Yet this very claim to authority 
and an inherent supremacy over other associations, as I will argue, gives the lie to modern 
forms of sovereignty.  
 Notwithstanding this constitutive function of legal recognition, the vast majority of 
associational life in the commonwealth exists by virtue of the sovereign’s silence and tacit 
consent, in a way that betrays not only the impossibility of sovereignty, but also the state’s 
tenuous and carefully negotiated grasp on authority. The final section of this chapter will 
consider the role of this silence and tacit consent in Hobbes’ approach to riots, and then 
situate this approach in the historical context of the early modern state. This, in turn, allows 
                                                     
17 Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008). 
18 Fitzpatrick, “What are the Gods,” 168.  
19 Hobbes, Leviathan, 114.  
20 James R. Martel, Subverting the Leviathan: Reading Thomas Hobbes as a Radical Democrat (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 2007), 239.  
21 It is a key facet of the modern state that there can be no intermediate forms of association between 
individual and state; all must be “subordinate and dependent powers.” Baron de Montesquieu, The Spirit 
of the Laws, trans. Thomas Nugent (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), 17. The idea finds its 
most severe expression in social contract theory, within which even the “intermediate ranks” must be 
abolished (ibid., 18). As Jean-Jacques Rousseau writes in The Social Contract, “[i]t is important, then, to 
have a clear declaration of the general will, that there should be no factions in the state, and that every 
citizen should express only his own option.” (“The Social Contract,” in ed., Susan Dunn The Social 
Contract and The First and Second Discourses (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2002), 173. And, 
notably, The Declaration of the Rights of Man and Citizen holds as its third edict that “[t]he principle of all 
sovereignty resides essentially in the nation. No body nor individual may exercise any authority which does 
not proceed directly from the nation.”  
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for a reconsideration of the relationship between the moral economy, co-operatives and 
the state. This relationship is not so much one of competing legal orders, as it is the 
outcome of different modes of relation with the state: the moral economy and the co-
operative emerge from and reflect particular modalities of power and relations of 
governance, albeit without being completely determined by those relations. Instead of being 
a form of ‘traditional’ or ‘customary law’ that exists outside of the state, the moral economy 
can be seen as emerging in part from a particular relationship with the state, and a 
predominantly negative and paternalistic form of power that Foucault would associate with 
early modern sovereignty.22 The legal recognition of the co-operative in the nineteenth 
century, in turn, reflects a shift in this modality of power, to one of discipline and 
biopolitics.23  
Law and Sociality 
 While law has not figured prominently in histories of the co-operative movement 
in England, co-operatives have been a source of interest for the sociology of law, particularly 
within the interrelated traditions of legal and political pluralism. Legal pluralism, broadly 
speaking, refers simply to “the presence in a social field of more than one legal order.”24 
The co-operative, particularly in the early texts of sociology of law, tends to be seen as an 
example of this plurality. The co-operative may be a one of a diversity of “particular 
groups,” comprising an “inclusive society.” 25 Or the co-operative, as it does for the 
nineteenth century German jurist Otto von Gierke, may have a distinctive legal personality 
                                                     
22 Michel Foucault, “Two Lectures,” in Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings, 1972-
1977, ed. Colin Gordon, trans. Colin Gordon et al (New York: Pantheon Books, 1980), 94. 
23 Ibid., 105. See also Michel Foucault, The History of Sexuality, Volume 1: An Introduction, trans. Robert 
Hurley (New York: Vintage Books, 1990), 144.  
24 John Griffiths, “What is Legal Pluralism?” in The Journal of Legal Pluralism and Unofficial Law 1, no. 1 
(1986): 2. Sally Engle Merry, writing some years later, defined it similarly as “a situation in which two or 
more legal systems coexist in the same social field.” Sally Engle Merry, “Legal Pluralism,” Law and Society 
Review 22, no. 5 (1988): 870. 
25 Georges Gurvitch, Sociology of Law (London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner & Co., Ltd., 1947), 49.  
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of its own that is not derived from that of the state. For Gierke, the producers’ co-operative 
in particular is “the highest form of personal economic fellowship.”26 For those he 
influenced, amongst them G.D.H. Cole, whose history of the co-operative movement in 
England featured in the last chapter, the state should be built from a pluralistic arrangement 
of such associations.27 However, as I will argue in this section, the pluralist approach not 
only to the co-operative, but also to the linked notion of the moral economy, are built on a 
view of law that ultimately obscures how they are already bound up with the state.  
Legal pluralism is often defined in contrast to “legal centralism,” which is regarded 
as an ideology that accompanies legal positivism.28 This ideology, as it is described, identifies 
law as only the law of the state, in relation to which other forms of order are subordinate. 
Legal pluralism, in contrast, suggests that multiple legal orders may exist that have no 
connection to the state, and may have little resemblance to state law.29 This basic claim of 
                                                     
26 Otto von Gierke, Community in Historical Perspective: A translation of selections from Das deutsche 
Genossenschaftsrecht (The German Law of Fellowship), ed. Antony Black, trans. Mary Fischer 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 223. , Gierke uses ‘fellowship’ to mean “the company of 
brothers, linked by the right hand of fellowship, and knit together by a spirit of fraternity, who pursued the 
common interest of the group (whether based on profession, or occupation, or the simple foundation of 
voluntary association), and vindicated its common honour with a common ardour.” George Heiman, 
introduction to Associations and Law: The Classical and Early Christian Stages, by Otto von Gierke, ed. 
George Heiman (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1977), 18. He is quoting Ernst Barker, 
introduction to Natural Law and the Theory of Society 1500-1800, by Otto von Gierke, trans. Ernst Barker 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1958), lviii. 
27 See for instance G.D.H. Cole, "The State and Inclusive Association," in ed., Paul Hirst, The Pluralist 
Theory of the State: The Selected Writings of G.D.H. Cole, J.N. Figgis and H.J. Laski (London: 
Routledge, 1989), 69-82. G.D.H. Cole is included amongst a fairly disparate group of thinkers referred to as 
the English pluralists. English pluralism refers to the ideas of a diverse set of thinkers and a current of 
thought which were prominent in the early 20th century, represented by writers such as G.D.H. Cole, John 
Neville Figgis Harold Laski, as well as Frederic Maitland, whose reading and translation of the work of 
German jurist Otto von Gierke were very influential for English pluralism. For overviews of English 
pluralism, see Paul Q. Hirst, ed. The Pluralist Theory of the State: The Selected Writings of G.D.H. Cole, 
J.N. Figgis and H.J. Laski (London: Routledge, 1989), David Nicholls, The Pluralist State (London: The 
Macmillan Press Ltd., 1975) and David Runciman, Pluralism and the Personality of the State (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1997). The English pluralists were motivated in part by what was conceived of 
as an English cultural tradition of working class associationalism, focused on values of mutual aid. There is a 
romanticisation of ‘voluntary association’ found in the work of the pluralists, when they invoke the idea of 
the association, they have in mind the particular history of associational life in England, including friendly 
societies, co-operatives, and trade unions, as well as companies and trusts. For an overview of the “cultural 
tradition” of English pluralism, see Julia Stapleton, “English Pluralism as Cultural Definition: The Social 
and Political Thought of George Unwin,” Journal of the History of Ideas 52, no. 4 (1991): 665-684. 
28 Griffiths, “Legal Pluralism,” 1.  
29 Ibid., 3. 
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legal pluralism suggests that law must be something more than just an instrument. For 
instance, Eugen Ehrlich, who is often taken to be a foundational source for the sociology 
of law and legal pluralism, argued that “all law is social law,” and within this category of 
social law, official state law is narrowly circumscribed.30 There is no requirement that to call 
something law, it must be connected to the state. Law, he tells us, is simply an “ordering.”31  
[I]t is not an essential element of the concept of law that it be created by the state, 
nor that it constitute the basis for the decisions of the courts or other tribunals, nor 
that it be the basis of a legal compulsion consequent upon such a decision. A forth 
element remains, and that will have to be a point of departure, i.e. the law is an 
ordering.32  
 
As an ordering, law is ubiquitous. As he explains, “[j]ust as we find the ordered community 
wherever we follow its traces…so we also find law everywhere, ordering and upholding every 
human association.”33 Thus, for Ehrlich, wherever there is association there is also law. And 
in whatever form one finds it, Ehrlich observes that the force of law derives from “the fact 
that the individual is never actually an isolated individual he is enrolled, placed, embedded, 
wedged, into so many associations that existence outside of these would be unendurable, 
often even impossible, to him.”34 Law’s efficacy comes from the very fact of our association, 
from its inevitability, and from our utter dependency on social relations. 
                                                     
30 Ehrlich, Fundamental Principles, 42. "Gierke contrasts the law of the state and of the corporations of 
public and private law, which he styles as social law, with the entire remaining private law, which he styles 
individual law. But this antithesis is unwarranted. There is no individual law. All law is social law." For an 
overview of Ehrlich’s continuing relevance see David Nelken, “Ehrlich’s Legacies: Back to the Future in the 
Sociology of Law” in Living Law: Reconsidering Eugen Ehrlich, ed. Marc Hertogh (Oxford: Hart 
Publishing, 2009), 237-272. His work was largely ignored until the 1970s, as part of the more general 
reticence “to recognise legal pluralism at home” (Engle Merry, “Legal Pluralism,” 874).  
31 Ehrlich, Fundamental Principles, 24.  
32 Ibid. Ehrlich further elaborates this notion of ordering by suggesting that “within the scope of the concept 
of the association, the law is an organization, that is to say, a rule which assigns to each and every member of 
the association his position in the community, whether it be of domination or of subjection, and his duties; 
and that it is now quite impossible to assume that law exists within these associations chiefly for the purpose 
of deciding controversies that arise out of the communal relation. The legal norm according to which legal 
disputes are being decided, the norm for decision, is merely a species of legal norm with limited functions 
and purposes" (ibid., 24-25). This law organises people as well as things.  
33 Ibid., 25. 
34 Ibid., 62. 
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These basic insights about the nature of law have been subject to vastly different 
interpretations in the historical development of legal pluralism. Engle Merry identifies two 
broad phases in this development, a ‘classical legal pluralism’ and a ‘new legal pluralism.’35 
In its classical form, legal pluralism emerged as an “analysis of the intersections of 
indigenous and European law,” a way to conceptualise the relationship between coloniser 
and colonised.36 A ‘new’ form of legal pluralism emerged in the 1970s that, as Engle Merry 
describes, applied the pluralism that had been externalised to colonial territories to groups 
within and to the histories of western industrial countries.37 One key development in this 
shift was an expanded claim that “plural normative orders are found in virtually all 
societies.”38 This transition mirrors a distinction that Griffiths draws between strong and 
weak legal pluralism. The weak variety of legal pluralism is completely compatible with 
legal centralism. It involves only the recognition within state law of forms of order that do 
not necessarily originate with the state. Often these would be forms of customary or 
religious law, which are made law for particular portions of society by virtue of their 
elevation to this status by the state. This ‘weak’ form of legal pluralism can be traced back, 
according to Griffiths, to at least 1772, in an order made by the East India Company, though 
it is likely much older.39 Strong pluralism, by contrast, refers “to a sort of situation in which 
not all law is state law nor administered by a single set of state legal institutions, and in which 
law is therefore neither systematic nor uniform.”40 Strong forms of legal pluralism assert 
that “[l]egal pluralism is the fact. Legal centralism is a myth, an ideal, a claim, an illusion.”41  
                                                     
35 Engle Merry, “Legal Pluralism,” 872.  
36 Ibid. 
37 Ibid. This also involved a return to some of the foundational texts of the sociology of law.  
38 Ibid., 873.  
39 Griffiths, “Legal Pluralism,” 5.  
40 Ibid. 
41 Ibid., 4. 
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Notwithstanding the evolution and expansion of the concept of legal pluralism—
whether from classical to new, or weak to strong—legal pluralism has had to contend with 
the pervasive influence of legal centralism. This manifests in a variety of ways, but most 
commonly in the definition of law itself. As Griffiths observes, there is a continual tendency 
within legal pluralism to confuse “what law is” with “a particular idea about what it ought to 
be.”42 In other words, conceptions of law even when approached pluralistically, are not 
neutral, but are derived from particular histories. They inevitably come with a set of 
assumptions about what law should be. As Simon Roberts argues, 
[t]he problem of invoking law as a category of analysis is that it stands out in terms of 
both its provenance and its confident self-definition when we use it to gain purchase 
on adjacent forms of ordering. So much of our sense of what law ‘is’, is bound up 
with, and has been created through, law’s association with a particular history – early 
on, the emergence of secular government in Europe; later, the management of 
colonial expansion.43 
 
These concerns over how law is defined structured debates in legal pluralism in the 1980s 
and 1990s, and the question of what “can and cannot be called law,” continues to be 
relevant, not least because it has proven difficult to trace the often subtle influence of legal 
centralism.44 The problem takes a more insidious form in relation to socio-legal studies 
more broadly, manifesting as what Constable calls “socio-legal positivism,” a concept which 
suggests that sociological approaches to law are “not conceptually plural at all.”45 “Socio-
legal positivism,” as Constable explains, “in effect maintains that any so-called law that 
precedes a given legal positivist system was itself socially powerful in the manner of positive 
                                                     
42 Ibid., 3. Emphasis in original.  
43 Simon Roberts, “Against Legal Pluralism,” Journal of Legal Pluralism and Unofficial Law 30, no. 42 (1998): 
98.  
44 Engle Merry, “Legal Pluralism,” 879. See also Brian Z. Tamanaha, "The Folly of the 'Social Scientific' 
Concept of Legal Pluralism," Journal of Law and Society 20, no. 2 (1993): 192-217; Franz von Benda-
Beckmann, “Who’s Afraid of Legal Pluralism?” Journal of Legal Pluralism and Unofficial Law 34, no. 47 
(2002): 37-83. For a more recent overview of these issues see Christopher Tomlins, “Bucking the Party 
Line: Calavita’s Invitation to Law & Society (In Which the Author Is Invited to a Party Where He 
Encounters Many Old and Familiar Faces, Becomes Argumentative, Stays Up Too Late, and Finally 
Departs in Search of New Adventures),” Law & Social Inquiry 39, no. 1 (2014): 226-233.  
45 Tomlins, “Bucking the Party Line,” 231. 
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law or was not really law at all….”46 Fitzpatrick has also observed that “[j]urisprudence is 
littered with isolated and opposed notions about law but the field retains a unity of 
engagement with law.”47 These notions tend to reinforce law’s “singular character” and 
assume a unified content to law, a content which tends to be Western and takes for granted 
law’s effectiveness, by virtue of its self-appointed status as law.48  
 There is no consensus as to whether this tendency can, or indeed should, be 
overcome. Roberts, for instance, suggests that legal pluralism and the attempt “to fix a 
conception of law going beyond the robust self-definitions of state law” is “inevitably 
problematic.”49 Instead, other forms of ordering should be understood “in their own 
terms.”50 Similarly, Engle Merry worries that, even without the influence of legal centralism, 
“calling all forms of ordering that are not state law by the term law confounds the analysis,” 
and suggests that there should be a “clearly demarcated boundary between normative 
orders that can and cannot be called law.”51 By contrast, Margaret Davies has recently 
argued that we should “set aside…anxiety over where law stops and social normativity 
starts.”52 As she suggests, “[t]his concern unduly limits legal theory to questions of definition, 
and prevents an expansive and experimental approach to understanding law’s 
multiplicity.”53 Either way, there is no simple solution to the problem, not least because the 
assumptions that often underlie the designation of plural legal orders are not overcome 
simply by abandoning the terminology.54  
                                                     
46 Constable, Just Silences, 10. 
47 Peter Fitzpatrick, The Mythology of Modern Law (London: Routledge, 1992), 2-3. 
48 Ibid., 7. 
49 Roberts, “Against Legal Pluralism,” 105. It is for this reason that scholars such as Sally Falk Moore opted 
instead to use different terms for non-state legal orders, while also rejecting legal centralism. Sally Falk 
Moore, Law as Process: An Anthropological Approach (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1978), 18.  
50 Ibid.  
51 Engle Merry, “Legal Pluralism,” 878-879. 
52 Margaret Davies, Law Unlimited: Materialism, Pluralism, and Legal Theory (Abingdon: Routledge, 2017), 
76.  
53 Ibid. 
54 Here, for instance, Sally Falk Moore’s approach in Law as Process provides an illustrative example. She 
introduces the term “reglementation” to refer to the “enforceable and binding rules of all durable, 
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 These debates are particularly relevant for a history of the co-operative movement 
in England, especially when that history is taken to include the moral economy. In a 
flattering review of E.P. Thompson’s Customs in Common,55 Harry Arthurs specifically 
praises the significance of this work for broadening conceptions of law. As he writes,  
[w]e modern lawyers are used to thinking of law as something explicit and 
purposive, emanating from the state, enforced by the state, virtually constitutive of 
the state. But there is another view of law. Many people who are not modern lawyers 
–not modern, not lawyers – think of law as something explicit and circumstantial, 
as a pervasive presence in everyday life. In this view, not only the state, but all 
communities, all organized and recurring relationships, are understood to generate 
law and to be defined by law.56  
 
Arthurs suggests that through the idea of the moral economy “Thompson gives us…a 
picture of two very different notions of law – of different provenance, under different 
auspices – co-existing and clashing, and characterizing and resolving the same human 
concerns in very different ways.”57 As such, Arthurs concludes that “the ‘moral economy’ 
of the crowd—its normative system and the means by which that system achieved practical 
results – can with considerable justification be called ‘law’, although it is not the law of the 
state, and indeed was perceived by state law in a hostile and repressive way.”58 While 
emphasizing the multiplicity of sites and forms of law, and observing in the moral economy 
a kind of law that bears little, if any resemblance to state law, Arthurs nonetheless 
reproduces the presumption of legal centralism by describing the moral economy as a form 
of “customary right.”59 The very idea of customary law, as many have argued, already 
                                                     
organized social units” reserving law to refer to those rules that are “potentially enforceable by government” 
(16-17). Yet even the criteria of “enforceable and binding” and “organized social units,” which she refers to 
as “corporate groups,” betrays the influence of a Western conception of law, as will be discussed in more 
detail below.  
55 E.P. Thompson, Customs in Common (Pontypool: The Merlin Press, 2010). 
56 Arthurs, “Review,” 289.  
57 Ibid. 
58 Ibid. 
59 Ibid., 290. ‘Customary right’ in this sense, would be distinguished from the broader tradition of the 
common law.  
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presumes a subordinate position in relation to state law.60 As Falk Moore notes, customary 
law is always presented in contrast to the law of the state, only emerging in the context of 
this opposition. Unlike state law, “customary laws were not thought of as having been 
imposed from above, but rather as having emerged from popular practice.”61 With this, it 
is presumed that “such law was part of an immemorial traditional order, largely immutable 
and closely linked to the rest of the cultural ‘system’.”62 It then becomes possible to 
“differentiate with exaggerated sharpness between the customs of such ‘early’ societies and 
the statutes of self-conscious modern states.”63 
 This reading of customary law, as something distinguished from state law and 
located in traditional culture, becomes entrenched as co-operatives are regarded as a means 
of recognition for indigenous and customary forms of society.64 Particularly in colonial and 
post-colonial contexts, as Johnston Birchall explains, co-operatives have been seen as “a 
bridge between traditional and modern societies, and it was felt that contractual co-
operation could be grafted on to the traditional forms.”65 Similarly, even without being 
connected to a traditional or customary form of society, co-operatives have also been seen 
as a site of “private justice” and a form of normative ordering that is distinct from that of 
                                                     
60 See for instance Francis G. Snyder, "Colonialism and Legal Form: The Creation of 'Customary Law' in 
Senegal," Journal of Legal Pluralism 19 (1981): 49-90. Peter Fitzpatrick, "Traditionalism and Traditional 
Law," Journal of African Law 28, nos. 1 & 2 (1984): 20-27.  
61 Falk Moore, Law as Process, 13.  
62 Ibid. 
63 Ibid., 14.  
64 For a specific example see Peter Fitzpatrick, “A New Law for Cooperatives,” Annals of Public and Co-
operative Economy 46, no. 3 (1975), 278. For a recent and particularly unreconstructed, but nonetheless 
informative, account of the relationship between co-operation and colonialism, see Rita Rhodes, Empire 
and Co-operation: How the British Empire Used Co-operatives in Its Development Strategies 1900-1970 
(Edinburgh: John Donald, 2012). See also "Co-operation in the Colonies," A Report from a Special 
Committee to the Fabian Colonial Bureau (London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1945), 17-25. (is this a 
book, please check) 
65 Johnston Birchall, The International Co-operative Movement (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 
1997), 133. Birchall also quotes Margaret Digby who suggests that "the value of co-operation is that it 
provides for a transition from the primitive to the modern economic and social worlds, which involves no 
violent disruption, [and] prevents the exploitation of the less advanced by individuals or groups" (ibid., 
133).  
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the state.66 Like the early sociology of law, within Engle Merry’s “new legal pluralism,” 
associational forms such as trade unions and co-operatives offer the possibility of multiple 
and overlapping forms of law and self-regulation within society.67 “Co-operatives,” as Stuart 
Henry suggests, “develop their own normative orders, which are partially rooted in their 
own social forms and, to this extent, tend to be organized along different lines than state 
law.”68 However, within this approach, there is a tendency to presume the autonomy of the 
legal form in relation to state law. While in Henry’s account, the co-operative may be 
undermined “from below” by individual actions and decisions that rely on frameworks 
derived from the state, the form itself retains an unquestioned integrity. This is in spite of 
its inclusion within (and ultimately, creation by) the state.69 Here, socio-legal positivism 
appears not by presupposing the inferiority of the form, as in the case of customary right, 
but by disregarding the influence of state law.  
In these pluralist perspectives on the moral economy and co-operatives, there is a 
persistent thread of socio-legal positivism that influences not only how the moral economy 
and co-operatives are respectively conceived, but also the passage between these two forms. 
In a reading that is ultimately not so unlike that of the Christian Socialists, the customary is 
regarded as being ‘outside’ the law and then maintains this exteriority even as it is ‘brought 
within’ in the form of the co-operative. This form then retains its integrity in relation to its 
origin outside the law of the state. In the last chapter, the reading of legal recognition was 
attributed to a form of instrumentalism and a limited conception of power in which it 
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functions only negatively, particularly in relation to the discourse of political economy. I 
suggested that it is important for the legal recognition of the co-operative not be regarded 
as simply giving form to a practice that had existed outside of law (thereby assuming the 
technical neutrality of law), or to assume the appropriation of co-operation as a foregone 
conclusion. Legal pluralism goes some way toward this, by showing how other legal orders 
may exist beyond that of the state, such that the encounter between state law and forms that 
exist within it is not a simple “bringing within” but may also involve opposition and conflict 
between competing systems.70 However, as shown above, an enduring socio-legal positivism 
and influence of legal centralism lead to the reproduction of a similar set of assumptions 
within legal pluralism. The terms of analysis may implicitly or explicitly presuppose a 
relationship between state law and other forms of order, while also taking for granted the 
influence of state law on ostensibly plural structures, both in how they are conceptualised 
and how they are constituted in practice. 
The Laws of Ordering 
 The instrumentalism of ‘law and society’ and ‘sociology of law’ is not just incidental, 
but, as Fitzpatrick argues, an underlying assumption of these approaches, in which “law is 
often conceived of as the entirely dependent offspring of society.”71 Not only society, but 
also the state, and by extension groups deemed to be in possession of law, are thought to 
be discrete, coherent entities, capable of containing and commanding their respective laws, 
however those forms of law may be conceptualised. Fitzpatrick suggests that this 
presumption is in part a consequence of the fact that the concept of the social has not 
received much examination, “especially for a field that often took oppositional identity as 
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social--that is, an identity in contraposition to positive, or merely posited, law."72 However, 
there is also a more fundamental reason than just lack of attention. As Fitzpatrick explains, 
“[t]he failure to grasp 'society' is…indicative of the impossibility of society as a self-generating 
entity."73 The persistent instrumentalisation of law is in part a consequence of the 
unexamined presumption of the ontological presence of entities such as the state and 
society, a presumption that obscures their fundamental impossibility. The state and society 
participate in "the modern claim to ontological completeness," while at the same time being 
unable to fully account for themselves.74 
This impossibility, for Fitzpatrick, is evidenced in part by the contradictory 
existences of society in modernity. Society is a delimited and determined entity, managed 
and controlled by forces beyond it. At the same time, it must serve as the source of those 
very forces, illimitable and always able to “absorb” them.75 In maintaining these mutually 
exclusive positions, it occupies the empty place that once belonged to the transcendent 
figure of God, before the advent of an ostensibly secular modernity. Drawing on Friedrich 
Nietzsche’s aphorisms on the death of God, Fitzpatrick suggests while God may have been 
killed, “deific substitutes” such as the state and society reproduce the same transcendent 
metaphysical structure.76 “State and society” are “two players of the sacred game, two deific 
substitutes asserting a transcendent competence by absorbing the illimitable into its 
determinate or determining being—a competence of a markedly monotheistic kind.”77 At 
the same time, however, the state and society cannot directly or straightforwardly occupy 
this transcendent position, as the modern “supposedly secular world” demands immanence 
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and “cannot explicitly accommodate” them 78 So, this transcendence is achieved not through 
reference to somewhere beyond the earthly confines of the world, but through negation—
specifically what Fitzpatrick refers to as the “negative universal reference.”79 Put simply, 
society and the state are defined by what they are not, and in this negation take on a 
transcendent universality. This, in turn, allows society and the state to straddle the divide 
between limitable and illimitable without immediately betraying their fundamentally 
“unmodern” transcendence.80 The negative universal reference is “a reference which does 
not itself, in itself, take on positive, explicate content but, rather derives its content 
negatively.”81 It is formed through “the elevation of an absence voiding enquiry.”82 There 
are many examples of this in modernity and “numerous routes” by which this is 
accomplished.83 In relation to society, Fitzpatrick has drawn on Foucault to demonstrate 
the constitution of society through a specifically racialized negation.84 How this constitution 
through negation takes place more specifically in relation to the state will be explored in 
the next section of the chapter. This section will conclude by considering the implications 
of the impossibility of state and society for an understanding of law, and drawing out some 
initial implications for a reading of the moral economy and co-operatives.   
In relation to this transcendence and impossibility, law takes on a very different role 
and meaning than it would if it were entirely dependent on some determined entity. 
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Inverting the usual relationship, Fitzpatrick argues that it is actually “law which renders 
society possible.” 85 Law is “appropriated” by society and “effects the possibility of society 
in a complex of compensations for its impossibility.”86 This happens broadly in two ways, 
which reflect two interrelated dimensions of law. Law constitutes society both by providing 
a form of “enforceable positive determination” for it and also being a form of “pure” 
transcendence that can take on an “autonomous distinctness” from society and stand apart 
from it.87 This inversion suggests that law must be more than what would be narrowly 
restricted to the category of ‘state law’ and its derivations within the literature on legal 
pluralism, while nonetheless still encompassing those same forms of determined law. To 
this end, Fitzpatrick suggests, turning to Jacques Derrida, that law is much more like 
sociality itself. For Derrida, there is a “law of originary sociability.”88 This law exists “…prior 
to all organized socius, all politeia, all determined 'government', before all ‘law’.”89 This law, 
he suggests, may even be “the very essence of law.”90 Similarly, Jean-Luc Nancy would 
conceive of the inoperative community, discussed in chapter 1, as also being a law. He, too, 
refers to an “originary or ontological ‘sociality’ that in its principle extends far beyond the 
simple theme of man as a social being (the zoon politikon is secondary to this 
community).”91 This is the “law of community,”, or “community as law.”92 Within 
poststructuralist thought, law is not only the determined law of the state or of a given social 
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formation, but is also conceived of as law “in general,” and as the condition of possibility 
for determined law.93 Law, as sociality, does not merely accompany association, it is the very 
fact of sociality and the condition of possibility for determination.  
 Such a notion goes beyond, but does not contradict, Ehrlich’s assertion that there 
is law wherever there is association. But where for Ehrlich, law was incidental to the 
association, in this account there is something utterly unavoidable about this law, that it 
precedes any determined form of association. This law of an originary sociality or law of 
fraternity, like Ehrlich’s social law, also orders: “[t]he law gives nothing; it orders.”94 
However, in contrast to Ehrlich, this order is a command. This order is, as Nancy describes, 
a “categorical imperative” which “constitutes the absolute law of being,” by commanding 
presence.95 Nancy likens this law to a voice which  
…constitutes the law, to the extent that it orders; and, to that extent, the law is the 
voice. What this voice utters, however, perhaps can no longer be described as the 
command of an action to be carried out or as the injunction of a provision to be 
observed. Perhaps this order says, in some strange way, ecce homo. It is not a 
prescriptive, but a constative, as a linguist would say. Nevertheless, here the 
constative would be heard as a prescription.96 
 
This law is the unrelenting command that there be law, that there be order. Both Nancy 
and Blanchot refer to this law in the idiom of abandonment: this is an “absolute, solemn 
order, which prescribes nothing but abandonment.”97 Abandonment is “the ultimate form 
of the communitarian experience,” which Blanchot recounts through an anecdote about 
Bataille.98  
If it is true that Georges Bataille had the feeling (especially before the war) of being 
abandoned by his friends, if, later, during a few months (Le Petit), illness forced 
him to remain aloof, if, in a way, he lives solitude all the more deeply in that he is 
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unable to bear it, he knows all the better that the community is not destined to heal 
or protect him from it, but that it is the way in which it exposes him to it, not by 
chance, but as the heart of fraternity; the heart or the law.”99 
 
This abandonment, as Blanchot suggests, exposes us to community: it is in moments when 
we are most alone that this sense of abandonment to community is most acute.  
 Crucially, what being is abandoned to is precisely ordering, in a sense that is much 
closer to Ehrlich’s use of the term: “[o]ne abandons to a law.”100 Nancy explains that “[t]o 
abandon is to remit, entrust, or turn over to such a sovereign power, and to remit, entrust, 
or turn over to its ban, that is, to its proclaiming, to its convening, and to its sentencing.”101 
That is, we always find ourselves within an order; while the order is our abandonment, we 
are also abandoned to an order. “The law of abandonment is the other of the law, which 
constitutes the law.”102 Law as ordering is something which we can never avoid, it is this 
condition to which we are abandoned. This idea is echoed by Foucault when he claims in 
“The Thought from the Outside” that “[a]nyone who attempts to oppose the law in order 
to found a new order, to organize a second police force, to institute a new state, will only 
encounter the silent and infinitely accommodating welcome of the law.”103 There is no true 
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‘outside’ to this law, or an outside to ordering of some kind. The law of abandonment 
prescribes that we are always abandoned to an order: there is always law. 
 These are thus, as Fitzpatrick suggests, two distinct dimensions of law which are 
integrally bound to one another. The first, the law of “originary sociability,” or the law of 
abandonment, makes the other, law as ordering, possible. As Fitzpatrick explains, “[t]here 
is a continuate coming together inextricably of these two elements in and as legal 
determination….”104 In an infinitely reproducible and inherently provisional gesture, these 
two laws create the possibility of legal determination. And any given “[d]etermination then 
may seem ‘positively’ to set what law is.”105 This leads to a pluralism that is not the diffusion 
of a juridical and positivistic law throughout society, but one that sees a kind of law in all 
forms of sociality, in all orders. While this may “confound the analysis,” as Engle Merry 
warns,106 it also potentially enables a more specific analysis of what law is, in its most basic 
gesture. This approach embraces “the total trivialization of law” that Boaventura de Sousa 
Santos seeks to avoid in his approach to legal pluralism.107  
 While such determinations are inherently provisional and only ever “for the time 
being,” Fitzpatrick also warns that they can also be “conspicuously enduring.”108 Amongst 
these, state law, particularly insofar as it shapes what we imagine law to be in the first place, 
is perhaps the most conspicuous. Legal pluralists, and their critics, for instance Brian 
Tamanaha, have warned against attributing too much significance to state law. Tamanaha 
argues in a critique of the very notion of legal centralism that "...it should not be assumed 
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that law is always functional.”109 The role of state law, he points out, “is often relatively 
marginal.”110 However, Tamanaha overlooks that while state law may not always be effective, 
it is an underlying and constitutive claim of state law that it should be. As Fitzpatrick 
suggests, law in its relation to the state, “severs the connection between other authority and 
any order, natural or sacred, that could compete with it.”111 Instead of presupposing or 
denying this dominance, it is necessary to interrogate how it is produced and negotiated, 
whether or not it is entirely successful.  
 The next section turns to a more specific account of the state as a deific substitute, 
and how law serves as both a form of “enforceable positive determination” for the state, 
particularly through processes of legal recognition, while also exceeding it, and 
undermining its claim to sovereignty.112 This, in turn, will enable a different approach to the 
relationship between moral economy, co-operatives and the state. However, some initial 
implications for the overall argument can be drawn out here. In relation to the moral 
economy, this more expansive reading of law suggests that it is not necessary to saddle the 
moral economy with the weight of tradition or custom in order to conceptualise it as a form 
of law. To this end, Thompson’s own reluctance to use the term ‘custom’ to describe the 
moral economy is informative. He criticises the idea of seeing these customs and folklore 
as “survivals,” and as inherently subordinate or inferior structures.113 As he writes, “some 
‘customs’ were of recent invention and were in truth claims to new ‘rights’.”114 Instead of 
being fixed or tied to the past, the discourse of custom “was the rhetoric of legitimation for 
almost any usage, practice, or demanded right.” As such it “was in continual flux” and 
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supported “conflicting claims.”115 For Thompson, when customs are understood as 
“discrete survivals,” a broader sense of custom is lost, as “sui generis – as ambiance, 
mentalite, and as a whole vocabulary of discourse, of legitimation and of expectation.”116 
Moreover, the fact that this ‘law’ of the moral economy traversed popular and institutional 
contexts also suggests a more complex relationship with state authority than is conveyed by 
the notion of custom.  
 Turning to the co-operative, if the state appropriates law in order to compensate for 
its impossibility, then mechanisms such as legal recognition, as a form of “enforceable 
positive determination,” might be seen to serve a constitutive function for the state.117 That 
is, acts of legal recognition, such as the Industrial and Provident Societies Act 1852, are not 
so much a “bringing within,” as the Christian Socialists imagined, but a means by which the 
state manifests itself in the first place.118 As Fitzpatrick argues, “…in the constitution and 
maintenance of its identity, state law stands in opposition to and in asserted domination 
over social forms that support it.”119 Co-operatives may, as Henry suggests, have “their own 
normative order,” but this appearance of opposition obscures the fact that it has already 
been circumscribed by state law through the very form of the co-operative itself. They are 
not just “permeated by influences of the larger system” and undermined by the pervasive 
influence of the broader society, but they are constituted within it.120  
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The State as Deific Substitute 
 In the foregoing section, society and the state were described as “deific 
substitutes.”121 In the transition to an ostensibly secular modernity, the transcendent 
metaphysical structure of medieval political theology was not lost, but rather maintained 
through the construction of a “pantheon” of “new idols.”122 These new idols, unable to 
constitute themselves with direct reference to a transcendent beyond, internalized that 
transcendence, becoming at once determinate and illimitable, and, in Fitzpatrick’s terms, 
decidedly impossible. In relation to the state, this modern theological inheritance appears 
most overtly in the figure of Hobbes’ Leviathan, who was no less than a “Mortal God.”123 
As “the originator of modern sovereignty” Hobbes provides an opportunity to examine the 
intimate constitution of the modern state, at a key historical moment when state authority 
is at least notionally divorced from reliance on anything greater than itself.124 This section 
will offer a close reading of the Leviathan, particularly focused on the status of associations 
in the commonwealth, in order to demonstrate both how legal recognition serves as a means 
of “enforceable positive determination” through which the state is constituted, and how this 
same relation betrays the impossibility of the state and sovereignty.125  
 The Leviathan was written in the midst of the English Civil War, when King and 
Parliament fought for control of the country. While Hobbes was sympathetic to the 
monarchy, he also recognised the significance of the threat of popular sovereignty. He 
“sought the means of order” in the context of revolution.126 He did this by navigating a 
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careful path between the competing theories of popular sovereignty and absolute 
monarchy, creating a synthesis between the two by constructing the state as an artificial 
person. Many, including Hobbes himself, regard this as a decisive break from medieval 
theories of the state, even if he constructed his ideas from a range of tools that were already 
at his disposal.127 While the concept of artificial personality had been applied to 
corporations (universitas) since at least the thirteenth century, Hobbes was the first to apply 
it to the state.128 As Hobbes writes, "...a corporation being declared to be one person in law, 
yet the same hath not been taken notice of in the body of a commonwealth or city, nor 
have any of those innumerable writers of politics, observed any such union."129 The 
significance of this, and how Hobbes’ Leviathan is more than just theological inheritance, 
is best appreciated in the context of the theories that preceded it, and particularly the 
relationship between theological conceptions of the church and the early secular state. The 
seminal work of Ernst Kantorowicz in The King’s Two Bodies provides a useful overview.130  
 Throughout much of the early history of the state, it was not thought of as an 
artificial person, but as a whole composed of parts, or a head and body. This model of 
personality was derived more or less directly from the medieval church and a secularised 
idea of the corpus mysticum, or the mystical body of Christ.131 Within the church, the term 
corpus mysticum originally referred to the Eucharist, but it gradually came to have a 
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“sociological” meaning that could be applied to the earthly collectivity of the church itself.132 
As Kantorowicz explains, “[t]he individual body natural of Christ was understood as an 
organism acquiring social and corporational functions: it served with head and limbs, as the 
prototype and individuation of a super-individual collective, the Church as corpus 
mysticum.”133 In effect, the unity of the church was derived from the unity of Christ in 
heaven. Over time, the Church gradually “became a mystical body in its own right” through 
the further adaptation of the term to corpus Ecclesiae mysticum.”134 This, for Kantorowicz, 
was a pivotal moment of secularization, when the idea of the church becomes “almost 
juristic.”135 The corpus mysticum allowed the Church to retain a distinct connection to the 
mystical and the liturgical, while also designating the Church as a body politic, “on a level 
with the secular bodies politic which were then beginning to assert themselves as self-
sufficient entities.”136 The corpus mysticum eventually lost its mystical overtones, becoming 
more or less equivalent to the idea of a body politic. Once secularized in this manner, the 
idea was easily transferred to the secular state. The concept, as Kantorowicz explains, “fell 
prey to the world of thought of statesmen, jurists, and scholars who were developing new 
ideologies for the nascent territorial and secular states.”137 In the use of the term corpus 
republicae mysticum “...the jurist transferred to the Prince and the state the most social, 
organic, and corporational elements normally serving to explain the relations between 
Christ and the Church.”138  
 However, the organological model, while providing a kind of structural unity for the 
state, did not transfer seamlessly from the theological to the secular context. The 
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organological model worked on a largely ad hoc basis and did not guarantee the immortality 
which has come to be associated with corporations. This had not been a problem for the 
church, because Christ himself was immortal. As Kantorowicz explains, “[t]he head of the 
mystical body of the Church was eternal, since Christ was both God and man. His own 
eternity, therefore, bestowed upon his mystical body likewise the value of eternity or rather 
timelessness. Contrariwise, the king as the head of the body politic was a common 
mortal.”139 This was resolved, in part, by the turn to a fictional or artificial person, which 
had long been applied to collectivities that were subordinate within the church. This 
artificial person came to be endowed by the scholastics with a form of immortality derived 
from a secular appropriation of angelic time. For the scholastics, angels occupied their own 
temporal sphere between God and man. God’s time was eternal and could not be 
periodized, while the time of man was finite. Like man, angels were created by God, and 
thus had a definite beginning, but they were also eternal and did not die. With these 
characteristics, Kantorowicz asserts that there is a clear connection to the fictitious person 
of the jurists: "[l]ittle wonder then that finally the personified collectivities of the jurists, 
which were juristically immortal species, displayed all the features otherwise attributed to 
angels; for the legal 'fictitious persons' were, in fact, pure actualizations and thus appeared 
like the next of kin of the angelic fictions.”140 However, to the extent that these concepts and 
particularly the idea of universitas came to be applied to the body politic, the head and the 
body remained separate, if interdependent entities.  
 Thus, notwithstanding the growing influence of the theory of fictitious personality, 
the organological metaphor persisted into the sixteenth century. 141 As Kantorowicz explains, 
“[a]ll by itself, however, the corporational doctrine, so long as it was primarily organologic, 
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did not necessarily result in that complete identification of the limbs with the head, nor did 
it actually in mediaeval England.”142 The two “depended mutually on each other” and either 
the head or body might claim supremacy.143 In practice, this was articulated as a division 
between the monarch or ruler, on the one hand, and the people, on the other. As Gierke 
explains, “[b]etween them there is a conflict as to which has the higher and completer right; 
but they are thought of as two distinct Subjects each with rights of a contractual kind valid 
against the other and with duties of a contractual kind owed to the other; and in their 
connexion consists the Body Politic.”144 These theories eventually culminate in the Tudor 
doctrine of the king’s two bodies, in which the King was regarded as having both a natural 
body and a mystical or political body. The people, in this configuration, “possessed a 
separate personality.”145 This personality was often conceived of as corporate, but in a 
flexible way tended more toward a notion of partnership rather than corporate unity. As 
Gierke explains, while “they borrowed from the theory of the Corporation, they borrowed 
only those principles which fitted into this tendency.”146  
 This configuration structured the conflict between popular sovereignty and absolute 
monarchy in the English civil war, as Parliament, armed with the seal of the King’s body 
politic, could resist the King’s natural body. It is precisely this “absurdity of the underlying 
fiction of the continuous presence of the king in Parliament” that Hobbes decries.147 
Hobbes thus “launches a scathing attack on the belief that sovereign power must originally 
have been possessed by the body of the people.”148 For Hobbes, there is no justification for 
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the argument that the sovereignty of the monarch would be less than that of the “body of 
the people” because there is no such thing as the body of the people prior to sovereignty—
the people come into being as a unified collectivity in and through the sovereign, and not 
before.149 While never completely abandoning the metaphor of the organic body, Hobbes 
transfers the notion of artificial personality to the state, which emerges as a coherent entity 
only through a process of representation. The head and the body are no longer of 
independent origin, rather the commonwealth emerges by virtue of its representation by 
the sovereign.  
 The basic structure of the constitution of the commonwealth in the Leviathan is 
well known. Hobbes begins from a state of nature in which each man is at war with every 
other, even if this only amounts to a lack of assurance of peace.150 In this state of nature, 
“the life of man” is “solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short.”151 Men can only make 
agreements through contracts that ultimately have very limited binding force (only that 
which one person could enforce against another). These covenants are easily made and just 
as easily broken. To create a more enduring order, as men will be predisposed to do by 
virtue of their reason and desire, they must create a “common power, to keep them in awe, 
and to direct their actions to the common benefit.”152 The only way to create such a power 
is for men to 
…confer all of their power and strength upon one man, or upon one assembly of 
men, that may reduce all their wills, by plurality of voices, unto one will: which is as 
much to say, to appoint one man, or assembly of men, to bear their person […]. 
This is more than consent, or concord, it is a real unity of them all, in one and the 
same person, make by covenant of every man with every man….153 
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The person created in this union of the multitude is the commonwealth or Civitas. It is no 
less than a “Mortal God,” to which man is closely bound.154 All authority within the 
commonwealth derives from the sovereign; thus, once the commonwealth has been 
instituted no one can “lawfully make a new covenant, amongst themselves, to be obedient 
to any other, in anything whatsoever, without his permission.”155 In this remarkably simple 
gesture, Hobbes accomplishes what no theorist before him had done: he “dealt a death-
blow to the idea that the People possessed a separate personality,” by creating a single “State 
personality.”156  
 This single personality also becomes, in Fitzpatrick’s terms, a “deific substitute.”157 
While even the earliest conceptions of the state were fundamentally theological, the 
commonwealth is more than just another form of theological inheritance. In particular, 
Hobbes managed to wrest the sovereign from any immediate dependence on a 
transcendent god while at the same time vesting it with god-like power. As Fitzpatrick 
observes, "[h]is sovereign Leviathan is both the worldly creation of freely covenanting ‘men’ 
and a manifestation of God’s tremendous power….”158 “Hobbes,” as Fitzpatrick explains, 
“sets the domain of this mortal god distinctly and self-sufficiently apart from the religious, 
with the ostensible exception of the laws of nature….”159 While Hobbes does not do away 
with God entirely, he argues that we exist “in an in-between time (between the two kingdoms 
of God).”160 In this context, the sovereign becomes the “only alternative social chaos and 
collapse.”161   
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  Without any immediate reliance on a transcendent god, the Leviathan must be able 
to account entirely for itself. As Fitzpatrick explains,  
[l]ike any competent monotheistic deity, this god would have marvellously to 
combine being determinate with an illimitable efficacy. Unlike the ‘Immortal God’, 
however, the sovereign Leviathan has to do this without recourse to a transcendent 
reference fusing these contrary dimensions of its being.162  
 
However, this is precisely what Hobbes is unable to do: “Hobbes offers no resolvable way 
in which the being-in-the-world of this mortal God could be comprehended.”163 There is a 
“threshold, and classic, problem” in Hobbes account of the Leviathan, that will be explored 
in more detail below, in which it is impossible for Hobbes to account for the binding force 
of the original covenant that creates the sovereign, in the absence of any prior civil 
authority.164 Moreover, on closer examination, the Leviathan appears not to be as totalizing 
as its initial description, and many interpretations, would suggest. As Fitzpatrick points out, 
the Leviathan is equally bound by the civil laws which are “fastened at one end, to the lips 
of that man, or assembly, to whom they have given the sovereign power; and at the other 
end to their own ears” as well as by the laws of nature.165 Not only that, but subjects retain 
certain rights against the sovereign that are not derived from him—in particular, the right 
not to incriminate or punish oneself. As Fitzpatrick explains, “[w]ith this accounting for the 
sovereign condition an irresolution seems to remain between the condition in which 
Hobbes leaves the subjects of Leviathan and the comprehensiveness of the commitment 
that Hobbes ascribes to them.”166 Not only is the sovereign not such a totalising figure, it is 
also not clear that Hobbes ever intended for it to be understood as one. As Martel suggests, 
the sovereign in Hobbes is an idolatrous figure, “something that purports to stand in for 
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but actually supplants what it represents.”167 It is a “separated essence” and an ultimately 
arbitrary form of authority.168 The Leviathan is not meant to be read “too literally” or taken 
to have “an actual meaning instead of a rhetorical one.”169 The Leviathan may be an 
idolatrous figure and ultimately an arbitrary form of authority for Hobbes,; nonetheless, it 
goes on, as Fitzpatrick suggests, to create “sovereign affect.”170 One of the key ways in which 
this is done is through the subordination of other associations to its authority. While all 
associational life within the commonwealth is nominally subordinate to the sovereign, the 
precise manner in which the state relates to other associations reveals some of the limits of 
this sovereignty, particularly in the early modern period, and the insurmountable gap 
between the rhetorical production of sovereignty and its material manifestation. The 
commonwealth is produced through law—in particular, through a precarious combination 
of determination and a sociality that exceeds and undermines it.  
Levelling the Leviathan 
 Gierke reads Hobbes intervention as a decisive break from medieval conceptions 
of political life. He laments the end of the organological model and, with it, what he regards 
as the inherent pluralism of medieval configurations of power. The organological model 
had allowed groups, at least to some extent, to create their own ‘personality’ independent 
of any sovereign authority. Even though “smaller communities contained in the State were 
never allowed to appear as having a birthright in Natural Law,” it was at least believed that 
the state had been formed “through an ascending series of other associations.”171 Moreover, 
there was no sense that the creation of a government entailed the “surrender of every 
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political right,” as it appears to for Hobbes.172 In Hobbes theory, there is no possibility of 
group life outside of the state. As Gierke laments, on the basis of a single state personality,  
…it became impossible to regard any intermediate groups, of any description, as 
natural ‘group-steps’ standing between the Individual and the State […]. They could 
only come into existence with the State, after it had been created.173 
 
To this end, Hobbes has been regarded, particularly by the English pluralists, as “the prince 
of monist thinkers.”174 There is certainly some basis for this reading in the Leviathan; 
however, as I will demonstrate below, the moment when Hobbes’ circumscription of 
associations within the commonwealth seems most acute is the same moment that exposes 
the impossibility of sovereignty.  
While Hobbes does not ultimately devote much attention to the status of 
associations within the commonwealth, he does make clear that any such associations must 
be subordinate to the sovereign. In Chapter XXII, Hobbes offers a careful delineation of 
“systems subject” within the commonwealth, with systems defined as “any numbers of men 
joined together in one interest, or one business.”175 The permitted associations are first 
categorized as ‘regular’ and ‘irregular’. The regular are those in which “one man, or 
assembly of men, is constituted representative of the whole number.”176 Amongst these, 
only commonwealths are “absolute and independent.”177 The regular are then further 
divided between the political and the private. Bodies politic are directly authorized by the 
sovereign—predominantly, chartered corporations. Private may be lawful or unlawful. The 
lawful are “those that are constituted without letters, or other written authority, saving the 
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laws common to all other subjects.”178 However, the only example Hobbes provides of such 
a system is the family, which, like the body politic, is modelled after the commonwealth. 
Private, but unlawful, regular systems  
are those that unite themselves into one person representative, without any public 
authority at all, such as are the corporations of beggars, thieves and gipsies, the better 
to order their trade of begging and stealing, and the corporations of men, that by 
authority from any foreign person, unity themselves in another's dominion, for the 
easier propagation of doctrines, and for making a party, against the power of the 
commonwealth.179  
 
Amongst private and irregular systems (leagues and crowds) some may exist so long as they 
are not explicitly forbidden, while others are unlawful if their purpose is ‘evil’, or potentially 
even if their purpose is unknown.180  
 There is thus no unaccounted for associational life within the commonwealth: if an 
association is to function lawfully within the commonwealth, it must have the consent of the 
sovereign, whether that consent takes the form of an express authorization, or it is merely 
tacit. However, as Gierke also observes, the fact that Hobbes does not allow associations to 
form without the consent of the sovereign does not mean that they are prevented from 
existing as such. In particular, Gierke suggests that it is clear that bodies politic do not lack 
the capacity to create their own personality; it is only the authority to do so that they do not 
have.181 If they did not have this capacity, the “corporations of beggars, thieves and gipsies” 
which form “without any public authority at all” could never pose a threat to the state.182 
Even bodies politic that have been created by the direct authorization of the sovereign must 
also have this capacity, as they can come to threaten the state, should they grow too 
numerous. Hobbes catalogues among “the infirmit[ies] of a commonwealth…the great 
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number of corporations, which are as it were many lesser commonwealths in the bowels of 
a greater, like worms in the entrails of a natural man.”183 As David Runciman argues,  
[b]y allowing that illegal associations do exist, even if their existence is to be curtailed 
wherever possible, Hobbes seems to accept that subjects can replicate the 
conditions of group personality without invoking the mechanism of legal 
recognition. Moreover, his later identification of corporations as the 'wormes' of 
state presupposes just this possibility—after all, were all corporate activity strictly 
controlled by the terms of association drawn up by the sovereign, no corporation 
could ever constitute a threat to the state.184   
 
Hobbes’ claim is thus far narrower than it may first appear. The “life” of these associations, 
even though they are subordinate to the authority of the state, “is not a derivative life, which 
proceeds exclusively from the State.”185  
 The fact that associations can create their own personality independently of the 
sovereign reveals not only the limitations of sovereign authority, but it also exposes a tension 
in the constitution of the commonwealth itself. This is the “threshold, and classic, 
problem,” alluded to earlier, and it concerns how the commonwealth arises in the absence 
of civil law.186 The unity of the commonwealth, as discussed above, is a derivative unity—it 
is a consequence of the unity of the sovereign representative. This distinct representational 
relationship is the central mechanism by which the commonwealth is created.187 As Hobbes 
writes, the multitude  
are made one person, when they are by one man, or one person, represented; so 
that it be done with the consent of every one of that multitude in particular. For it 
is the unity of the representer, not the unity of the represented, that maketh the 
person one.188  
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And further we find that “the commonwealth is no person, nor has the capacity to do 
anything, but by the representative.”189 It is absolutely crucial for Hobbes that there can be 
no prior unity in the multitude before its representation by the sovereign, otherwise there 
would be no need for the sovereign at all, thereby precluding the entire argument.  
This account of the creation of the commonwealth accords with Hobbes’ broader 
theory of personation and representation, albeit with one crucial deviation. The theory, 
which comes at the very end of the first part of the Leviathan, concerning ‘Man’ and 
provides the fundamental link between the state of nature and the commonwealth, offers 
an account of the nature of persons and how they may be represented.190 A person, for 
Hobbes, is defined as he “whose words or actions are considered, either as his own, or as 
representing the words or actions of another man, or of any other thing to whom they are 
attributed, whether truly or by fiction.”191 This broad definition effectively counts as a person 
anything that is capable of being represented.192 There are, as Hobbes writes, “few things, 
that are incapable of being represented by fiction.”193 And, as Skinner clarifies, Hobbes does 
not provide any ready examples of what could not be so represented. Thus, an inanimate 
object may be a person, as well as a multitude. Persons may be either natural—when their 
words or actions are their own—or, artificial—when they are not capable of immediately 
speaking for themselves.194  
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 The relationship between persons and their representatives is described as one of 
authority and attribution. The person representing the inanimate object is an ‘actor’ and 
the one who owns the words and actions is the ‘author’ — thus “the actor acteth by 
authority.”195 Natural persons are capable of authorizing their own representatives. Artificial 
(or fictional) persons are not. While they may be personated, this authority must come 
from elsewhere. As Hobbes explains, “things inanimate, cannot be authors, nor therefore 
give authority to their actors: yet the actors may have authority to procure their 
maintenance, given them by those that are owners, or governors of those things.”196 It follows 
that this kind of personation can only happen when there are already civil laws that create 
a recognised system of ownership.197 The laws supply the content of the personality that is 
created when the owner authorizes a representative to personate the object. In the case of 
a bridge, presuming that civil society has already been established, the bridge may have an 
owner—or someone with dominion over it—and that owner may authorise an artificial 
person to represent it. However, in so doing, a fictitious person is also created in the bridge. 
As Runciman explains, “because the act of personation is predicated on the personality of 
whatever is to be personated, this is not possible unless the bridge itself is concerned as a 
person. So it has become a person by fiction, assuming the guise of an author but 
represented by an actor whose authority is derived from elsewhere.”198 Skinner offers a 
slightly different interpretation and suggests that the relationship between the object 
personated and the actor is not one of fiction, although the person so created is artificial: 
assuming the act of authorisation is valid, then the words and actions of the actor must 
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“‘truly’ be attributed to them.”199 This would seem to hold even if such persons are not 
actually capable of taking responsibility for these actions. 
 The reason Skinner labours this distinction is because it is potentially consequential 
for Hobbes’ account of how the commonwealth emerges from the multitude. Hobbes 
includes multitudes alongside bridges, children and madmen as something that is capable 
of being personated, but not capable of authorising its own personation. There is no prior 
unity, as noted above, that could be said to author the representation. Once the 
commonwealth has been established, this is not a problem—the bodies politic that exist 
within the commonwealth receive their authorisation directly from the sovereign. 200 But for 
the commonwealth itself, there is no such law, as it emerges directly from the state of nature. 
There is no ‘owner’ of the multitude that could grant this authority. Instead, this authority 
arises from the consent of each natural person who participates in it.  
And because the multitude naturally is not one, but many; they cannot be 
understood for one; but many authors, of every thing their representative saith, or 
doth in their name; every man giving their common representer, authority from 
himself in particular….201  
 
They are in turn “made one person” through their representation by the sovereign.202 The 
commonwealth is thus a unique case in which individuals who are otherwise a multitude 
may collectively, through their individual acts of authorisation, make one artificial person 
their representative.  
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 Notwithstanding Hobbes’ explanation, there is a persistent ambiguity in the 
movement from multitude to unity in the absence of civil laws. As Runciman explains, “for 
though the sovereign is authorised by the multitude, he does not bear a multitude of persons 
but only one, a person distinct from his own and also from those of his many natural 
authors.”203 Precisely how many individuals can authorise one person as their representative 
remains obscure. The only answer for Runciman is that the commonwealth must be self-
authorising: the act of representation itself, by the sovereign, is “sufficient to create of that 
group the supposition or presence of its own personality.”204 There is no other way to 
account for the moral personality of the commonwealth than that “it must arise out of the 
understanding that groups come to have of themselves.”205 This further reinforces the point 
that associations must be able to exist outside of the commonwealth, while also 
demonstrating that there is no inherent difference between the state and other associations. 
As Gierke suggests, “there is no intrinsic difference between the personality of the State 
and that of other groups except such that arises from the subjection of the latter to the 
power of the former.”206 On this account, the state is constituted through the regulation of 
other associations. The dominance that it has is not the result of any essential 
characteristic—it has dominance because it has asserted that dominance.207 In this sense, the 
legal recognition of bodies politic by the sovereign acts as a form of “enforceable positive 
determination” for the state—it is an “appropriation” of law through which the state 
manifests itself.208 It is also an act of negation through which the state constitutes itself, but 
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without needing to supply any positive content for itself: it is only that which is “absolute 
and independent,” which in this context only means that it is not subordinate.209  
Outside of such configurations of sovereignty, man is not isolated, but rather deeply 
embedded in relations of sociality. “[O]ne can find in Hobbes,” as Fitzpatrick suggests, 
“forces formative of a people that connect generatively to, and qualify, the power of the 
sovereign Leviathan.”210 The capacity that associations have to form without the 
authorisation of the sovereign, according to Gierke, flows from a “natural power of 
association.”211 Their “existence,” Gierke stresses, “proceed[s] from a force which is 
inherent in its members.” 212 This force, or “sap of vitality,” as Gierke refers to it, cannot be 
effaced by “positive law,” as without it the state itself could not exist. 213 Like Derrida’s “law 
of originary sociability,” or Nancy’s “law of community,” this sociality both makes the state 
possible, while also undermining its claim to sovereignty.214 Thus the Leviathan can be seen 
as constituting itself by drawing together the two dimensions of law described earlier: a 
determinate and subordinate law through which it recognises and regulates other 
associations, and thereby differentiates itself from them, but also an indeterminate law of 
sociality or sociability that makes this possible in the first place. The intersection of the two 
accounts for its now clearly tenuous, but “conspicuously enduring” existence.215  
However, it is not simply through an act of self-authorisation that the sovereign is 
constituted. This would require a prior ‘self’ to issue the authorisation. As we have seen, 
for Hobbes there is no prior unity in the multitude that could authorise the sovereign in 
this way, nor is there a sovereign at all before the act of representation. This persistent 
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ambiguity has led some scholars, with considerable justification, to argue that the method 
of representation that creates the sovereign is not “a controlled, economic exchange 
between author and actor” but rather one that derives from a kind of “theatrical force.”216 
While Hobbes does not directly attribute the creation of the commonwealth to this 
theatrical force, his use of the concept persona, as well as his own account of theatre, 
demonstrate the link. In his introduction of the concept of the person, he draws on its Latin 
and Greek roots, and specifically its dual use in theatrical and juridical contexts.  
The word person is Latin: instead, whereof the Greeks have πρόσωπον [prosopon] 
which signifies the face, as persona, in Latin signifies the disguise, or outward 
appearance, of a man., counterfeited on the stage; and sometimes more particularly 
that part of it, which disguiseth the face, as a mask or vizard [visor]: and from the stage, 
hath been translated to any representer of speech and action, as well in tribunals, as 
theatres. So that a person is the same that an actor is, both on the stage and in common 
conversation; and to personate, is to act, or represent himself, or another….217  
 
The theatrical connotations of persona suggest that the person, whether natural or artificial, 
is always a kind of performance. "The insight he evidently wished to capture” as Skinner 
explains, “is that there is a sense in which all the world is a stage."218 And, as in the theatre, 
it is a “single performative gesture” by which the artificial person of the sovereign “leaps out 
of the state of nature.”219 The “virtue,” as Pye argues, of using the theatrical metaphor “is 
that it allows Hobbes to transfer agency.”220 The representational relationship between 
sovereign and subject is not simply one in which the sovereign is bound to represent the 
interests of the subject as the author of its actions, but one which also gives the sovereign 
“the right to act.”221 However, in so doing, the individual who authorises the sovereign, by 
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making him an actor, “also makes himself subject to the actor’s words and actions.”222 The 
subject is bound to the sovereign after the initial performance of authorisation through a 
“coincidence of identity.”223 For Skinner, the category of the actor on the stage is ultimately 
a narrow one that is not to be taken as analogous to that of the state. In the instance of the 
stage actor, Skinner explains, the actor is both a purely artificial person and their words and 
actions are attributed to the character they represent by fiction.224 While their actions will 
be attributed to the character, this attribution is fictional. There is no question for Skinner 
of where the authority for the actor’s personation comes from: it comes from the state, 
through the compulsory licensing of theatres that would have been common when Hobbes 
wrote. Yet what Skinner seems to overlook is that the more important authority comes 
from the audience, who must believe the performance, or least suspend their disbelief.225 
As Runciman argues, "[t]he state can be a person, but only if its members are already 
prepared to believe in the personality of the state."226 Crucially for Hobbes, it is only “as if 
every man should say to every man” that they give up their authority to that of the sovereign, 
suggesting that there is a fiction at the very heart of sovereignty.227  
In the absence of civil authority and property, this "baffling exchange" happens 
through a form of representation "in which origin and agency are confounded."228 As Pye 
demonstrates, the place where Hobbes elaborates this peculiar form of representation is in 
relation to theatrical performance. Specifically, Hobbes discusses a performance of 
Andromeda in which the audience, overtaken by an extreme heat, become feverish and 
                                                     
222 Ibid., 92. Skinner also emphasizes this point. "The action counts as theirs, and is called their action, not 
because they actually perform it, but because they are under an obligation to take responsibility for its 
occurrence." Skinner, “Purely Artificial Person,” 10. 
223 Turner, Corporate Commonwealth, 222.  
224 Skinner, “Purely Artificial Person,” 15.  
225 Ibid.. 
226 Runciman, Pluralism, 32.  
227 Hobbes, Leviathan, 114. Emphasis added.  
228 Pye, “The Sovereign,” 92.  
 
 
CHAPTER 2 | 137 
 
 
begin to believe that the play is real and begin to speak only in lines from the play.229 Pye 
likens this account of the madness of the audience to Hobbes treatment of daemonology. 
The "pagan daemonologist" in Hobbes' account "mistook inward for outward forms."230 
They mistook the phantasms of their mind as having a corporeal presence. This belief in 
turn inspires a terror in the daemonologist, and ultimately a form of worship that amounts 
to idolatry. “Idolatry,” as Martel explains, “is a misreading of representation, a practice of 
reading signs to literally, of assuming they have an actual meaning rather than a rhetorical 
one.”231 At the same time, the perception reoccupies the subject inwardly, as "he recognizes 
that the lingering and originless fantasms do indeed reflect him."232 In relation to Hobbes 
account of sense perception, in which the image formed in the mind has no intrinsic 
connection to objects in the world, this highlights the necessary separation between such 
sense perceptions and outward forms, not only for phantasms, but also for sovereignty. 
Thus, as Pye argues, "Hobbes's godly sovereign is as much a threshold figure as the pagan's 
ghost."233  
The sovereign’s status as an image, and specifically as an image of God, is one that 
Martel also emphasizes.234 The sovereign rules as a “visible power to keep them in awe,” 
rather than a substantial presence.235 The success of the sovereign is dependent on how well 
this image can be maintained. However, the relationship between the image of sovereignty 
and its ‘reality’ or its material manifestations is neither consistent, nor straightforward. 
While, as Turner suggests, the performance entails “the transformation of something 
unreal to something real” and it “creates a real relationship out of a purely imaginary idea,” 
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the means by which this is accomplished vary considerably, and success is hardly 
guaranteed.236 To this end, as I will demonstrate in the next section, the state is constituted 
as much by explicit acts of recognition and subordination, as it is by not acting, in order to 
maintain the image of sovereignty.  
 
The Sovereign’s Silence 
  In Gierke’s reading, Hobbes theory is mistaken and ultimately dangerous because 
he precludes the possibility that associations within the commonwealth could generate their 
own personality. However, there is at least one indication that the Leviathan may not have 
been as totalising as Gierke and the pluralists wanted to believe. While Hobbes very 
carefully circumscribes the creation of and powers afforded to bodies politic in the 
commonwealth, there remains ample space for other forms of association that do not seek 
to create their own personality. Most other forms of association in the commonwealth 
hardly warrant any notice from Hobbes. There is a potentially vast associational life beyond 
the forms prescribed by the state, which, so long as they do not attempt to create their own 
personality, do not immediately register in Hobbes scheme of organisation. These 
associations surely exist, yet they do not require any form of explicit authorisation from the 
sovereign. Focusing only on the dynamic between the state and those associations that 
create their own personality, with or without the authority of the sovereign, obscures an 
important gap between the rhetorical production of sovereignty and its material 
manifestation. This final section will consider the nature of the sovereign’s silence, or the 
tacit consent that Hobbes affords to other forms of association in the commonwealth, and 
more specifically to the crowd or the riot.  
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     Bodies politic, as described in the previous section, were considered by Hobbes to 
be “systems regular,” and defined as those associations that appoint one person to be their 
representative. Most of these are public, and Hobbes spends the majority of this chapter 
discussing joint stock companies, that would have been authorised by Royal Charter. There 
is also a private version of the regular system, the family. All other forms of association thus 
figure within Hobbes’ schema as “irregular systems.”237 “Irregular systems” as Hobbes 
understands them, 
are those which having no representative, consist only in concourse of people; 
which if not forbidden by the commonwealth, nor made on evil design, (such as are 
the conflux of people to markets, or shows, or any other harmless end,) are lawful. 
But when the intention is evil, or (if the number is considerable) unknown, they are 
unlawful. 238 
 
These associations may be “without union to any particular design” and “proceed only from 
a similitude of wills and inclinations.”239 They are allowed to exist by virtue of the sovereign’s 
silence: they are lawful so long as they have not been made unlawful. Or, as Hobbes 
elaborates toward the end of the chapter, they “become lawful, or unlawful, according to 
the lawfulness, or unlawfulness of every particular man’s design therein.”240 This design, 
rather than being an inward manifestation of intent, “is to be understood by the occasion.” 
241 
     This approach to irregular associations is, in part, a continuation of the medieval 
tendency to treat such associations as just so long as their cause was just.242 As Walter Ullman 
explains in his account of medieval approaches to illegal associations, they relied on “a 
metajuristic tenet, namely, that all law is the true manifestation, the concrete embodiment 
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and the external expression of the ethical virtue of justice.243 As a result of this, medieval 
jurists “were driven to consider all human associations as legal, once the promotion of 
justice was shown to be the bond holding the members together. All human conduct bore 
the mark of legality, if it satisfied the demands made by the virtue of justice.”244 Even for 
Pope Innocent IV, who created the strict doctrine of persona ficta for corporate bodies—
whereby corporations only obtain their personality from an explicitly authorised legal 
fiction—these other associations “derived their legal character directly from the law.”245 
These collegia could also easily cross over into illegality, “as soon as its members engaged 
themselves in activities which did not conform to their professed aim.”246 
     Hobbes’ approach in the Leviathan shifts this dynamic only slightly, but nonetheless 
significantly, by making the source of lawfulness of these associations not law in general, or 
natural law as such, but the sovereign’s tacit consent. This becomes apparent in part through 
his discussion of the liberty of subjects in the commonwealth. This liberty is based on the 
fact that they have already subjected themselves to the civil laws of the commonwealth. 
Aside from the limited natural rights or ‘true liberties’ that subjects retain even after the 
institution of the commonwealth, all liberties are to be understood as arising from the 
sovereign’s silence, and to derive from “the absence of opposition.”247 Thus, the liberty 
enjoyed by a subject of the Leviathan is that which arises from the absence of specific laws: 
the liberty of a subject, lieth therefore only in those things, which in regulating their 
actions, the sovereign hath praetermitted: such as the liberty to buy, and sell, and 
otherwise contract with one another; to choose their own abode, their own diet, 
their own trade of life, and institute their children as they themselves think fit; and 
the like.248 
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These liberties “depend on the silence of the law” and may be expanded or contracted 
“according as they that have the sovereignty shall think most convenient.”249 Hobbes is 
careful to ensure that this silence does not diminish the “power of life, and death,” that the 
sovereign wields. The sovereign may intervene at any time.250 
     This conception of freedom in the commonwealth has often been read as a form 
of private liberty, and a negative freedom that accompanies modern liberal democracy.251 
However, Hobbes also remarks that “there is no commonwealth in the world, wherein 
there be rules enough set down, for the regulating of all the actions, and words of men; (as 
being a thing impossible).”252 This reference to impossibility suggests that there may be more 
to Hobbes’ conception of freedom than a limited form of negative liberty. The sovereign’s 
silence may be indicative of a gap between the symbolic or rhetorical production of 
sovereignty—whereby all authority derives from the sovereign—and its material reality, in 
which it is not possible for the sovereign to exercise authority over all activity in the 
commonwealth. This is not just for lack of power, but a constitutive condition of 
sovereignty, which must always be undermined by a sociality that exceeds it. The silence 
and pretence of tacit consent enables the state to maintain a formal priority over the liberty 
of subjects, without needing to have established it in practice. 
     That the sovereign’s silence functions as a means of negotiating an ultimately 
tenuous and impossible sovereignty plays out more specifically in Hobbes’ approach to 
riots, as a form of association or ‘system’. While the category of irregular systems functions 
as a catch-all for Hobbes, he devotes particular attention to the “concourse of people,” 
which could be as innocuous as the crowd of people attending a market, or as potentially 
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volatile as a riot.253 While his approach initially appears strict, on closer examination it is 
strikingly ambivalent, and very closely reflects how riots were dealt with in practice in the 
early modern period. He illustrates his approach to riots in the commonwealth through the 
biblical story of St. Paul in Ephesus.254 On the way to Jerusalem, St. Paul encountered “no 
little disturbance,” a riot, in Ephesus.255 There, a silversmith called Demetritus made figures 
of Artemis, as the city of Ephesius was a guardian of the temple to Artemis. On hearing of 
St. Paul, Demetritus called all of the other craftsmen together to warn them that he might 
be a threat to their city and to their industry. “And there is a danger not only that this trade 
of ours may come into disrepute but also that the temple of the great goddess Artemis will 
be scorned….”256 These words incited the riot, and “[t]he city was filled with the confusion; 
and people rushed together to the theatre, dragging with them Gaius and Aristarchus, 
Macedonians who were Paul’s travel companions.”257 The confusion was so great that “some 
were shouting one thing, some another…and most of them did not know why they had 
come together.”258 The city clerk eventually calmed the mob, advising them that since the 
law of the city was in their favour, they had no need to riot. 
If therefore Demetrius and the artisans with him have a complaint against anyone, 
the cours are open, and there are proconsuls; let them bring charges there against 
one another. If there is anything further you want to know, it must be settled in the 
regular assembly. For we are in danger of being charged with rioting today, since 
there is no cause we can give to justify this commotion.259 
 
In his brief account of this story, Hobbes focuses on two elements in particular that would 
make such assemblies unlawful. Firstly, for Hobbes, the fact that they assembled in order 
to make an accusation, while there is already a law to this effect, constitutes a form of 
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sedition. Thus, even though their cause might be just and lawful, the assembly was unlawful 
because it does not fall to the crowd to enforce the law. Second, and more importantly for 
my purposes, Hobbes focuses on the fact that many of the men could not give an account 
of why they were there. Thus Hobbes writes “[w]here he calleth an assembly, whereof men 
can give no just account, a sedition, and such as they could not answer for.”260 
     If subjects are at liberty to do what they choose so long as it is not unlawful, then 
Hobbes account of riots is not as restrictive as it may first appear: although never officially 
sanctioned, there remains the possibility of a distinction between a lawful and an unlawful 
riot. While there may be some occasions of riot when “men can give no just account” of 
their participation, this implies that there may be instances when they can give this 
account.261 Hobbes also suggests that “it is not a set number that makes the assembly 
unlawful, but such a number, as the present officers are not able to suppress, and bring to 
justice.”262 This implies that there is a moving threshold of legality for these assemblies, and 
the distinction between lawful and unlawful will greatly depend on the context. 
     This approach coincides with that taken to riots by authorities in the early modern 
period. It also reveals the tenuous limits of sovereignty—the impossibility that necessarily 
shapes the maintenance of state authority. Both food riots and enclosure riots were a 
relatively common occurrence in early modern England.263 In spite of the existence of 
considerable penalties for sedition and riot, rioters were seldom punished, at least before 
the eighteenth century.264 There would have been, at the time of Hobbes writing a "sliding 
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scale of riot offences."265 The “gravity” of riots would have been measured by how many 
participated, the intentions of those who participated, whether or not they had defied any 
direct order, as well as its duration and “seriousness.”266 The main statute governing riots 
offences in the early modern period was passed in 1549. Where a riot became a felony was 
determined by this act with incredible specificity: "if 40 or more people gathered to break 
enclosures for two or more hours in defiance of a magisterial order to depart, they were 
deemed guilty of treason."267 Even though riot had been made a capital felony, “[t]he vast 
majority of cases of crowd disturbances that came before law courts were punished with 
financial penalties, brief imprisonment or with whipping.”268 The legislation, “allowed 
magistrates to discriminate between small-scale riots and more threatening disturbances.”269 
After the statute lapsed, the common law approach was taken until the passage of the Riot 
Act 1715. As Wood explains , "[a]ccording to common law principles, a riot was considered 
to have occurred where three or more persons assembled in a violent and tumultuous 
fashion, under their own authority, with the mutual intent of committing a breach of the 
peace."270 However, these terms were interpreted “loosely” and meant that many riots could 
be treated as simple misdemeanours.271 Observing a similar leniency in the eighteenth 
century, Shelton suggests that this “was tantamount to sanction,” given that mobs usually 
could have been contained in their earlier stages.272  
     This leniency reflects a more complex relationship between authority and popular 
disorder than the law itself suggests. With some exceptions, "early modern rulers could not 
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simply string lower-class dissidents up from the nearest tree."273 Enforcement of the laws, as 
flexible as they might be, nonetheless “risked local order.”274 As John Walter observes, the 
response of authorities to the relatively frequent popular riots of the time, “was more subtle 
and less clear-cut than might otherwise have been predicted.”275 It was important for 
authorities “to respond (and be seen to respond) to the popular grievances that had 
prompted the disorder.”276 The laws regarding riot and sedition, as Wood explains, 
coincided with the passage of a number of paternalistic statutes, which significantly 
regulated industry, restricted enclosures and protected the rights of cottagers, and provided 
for charity. 
This combination of paternalism with a sparingly used repressive apparatus is a 
consequence, in part, of the limitations of the early modern state which lacked, amongst 
other things, a standing army until the 1640s. It also demonstrates how sovereignty was 
carefully negotiated with popular disorder. As Walter writes, “English monarchs and their 
councils, all too aware of the limited forces of repression at their disposal, sought to regulate 
social and economic change in order to minimize the threat of popular disorder.”277 It was 
important that the state be 'seen' to be exercising authority.278 “The intention,” as Wood 
explains, was “to prevent 'mutinies' amongst the poor by demonstrating an ostentatious, 
proactive concern for the supply of food."279 Simultaneously this served as a means of 
garnering “popular consent to their rule.”280 In addition, rioters would carefully negotiate 
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the possibility of punishment, taking a strategic approach to law and using both publicity 
and discipline to evade repercussions.281 Publicity, presumably, would help to establish that 
they had a just cause. They were careful not to commit theft and often inquired about the 
legality of their actions in advance. Thus, unlike the mob in Ephesus, early modern rioters 
likely could have accounted for their actions in precise terms that relied heavily on existing 
legal frameworks.282 
     Hobbes’ approach to riots, particularly when considered in context, demonstrates 
that the sovereign’s silence serves as a mechanism by which a tenuous claim to authority is 
maintained, as much as recognition does. The sovereign’s silence is a manifestation of the 
impossibility of sovereignty, and it betrays an entirely negotiable threshold of state authority. 
Silence and a contrived tacit consent are the sovereign’s response to the many forces that 
are beyond its control; and, as in the case of the riot, where attempting to control it would 
betray precisely a lack of authority. “The sovereign,” recalling Martel’s analysis above, “is a 
kind of image.”283 The image must be maintained, even—and especially—if it is not a 
reflection of life. As Douglas Hay writes about state authority in the eighteenth century, 
[t]he façade of power had to be kept undamaged. The gentry were acutely aware 
that their security depended on belief—belief in the justice of their rule, and in its 
adamantine strength. Hence, punishment at times had to be waived or mitigated to 
meet popular ideas of justice, and to prevent popular outrage from going too far 
and thereby realizing its own strength. The aim above all was to avoid exposing the 
law and authority either to ridicule or to too close scrutiny.284 
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The Commonwealth itself has no substantial person, only that which is borne figuratively 
by the sovereign as its representative ,and it “haunt[s] the pages of Leviathan like a ghost.”285 
And, as Runciman aptly observes, “[l]ike a ghost, the person of the commonwealth 
disappears if approached too closely.”286 The only ‘reality’ of the state may be, as Turner 
describes, “that it creates a real relationship out of a purely imaginary idea.”287  
Conclusion  
This chapter began with a consideration of the approach to the moral economy and 
co-operatives taken from the sociology of law and legal pluralism. The concept of legal 
pluralism offers an account of law as integral to social relations. However, the approach to 
the moral economy and to co-operatives that emerges from legal pluralism instrumentalises 
the law in a way not dissimilar from the discourse of political economy, as described in the 
first chapter. The moral economy and co-operatives, in this reading, have their own forms 
of law, which may compete or conflict with that of the state. However, this view takes for 
granted the ways in which both the moral economy and co-operatives are already shaped 
by particular relationships with the state. This is in part because of how such theories 
conceptualise both law and the state in the first place. Law is not simply the product of 
some determined entity, such as the state or society, or any other form of association—as 
set of rules or a form of ordering—but also the very fact of our sociality as such. Law as 
sociality serves as the condition of possibility for the state, or any form of association, for 
that matter. The state’s inherently precarious existence emerges from the combination of 
determined law with this law of sociality that is always exceeding it and undermining its 
claim to presence. This was demonstrated through Hobbes’ approach to associations in the 
commonwealth.  
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The problem of these approaches can be explained through Martel’s reading of 
Hobbes. The spectacle of sovereignty, “take[s] something that belongs to the people…and 
give[s] it back to them in an altered and alienated form.”288 What is most commonly referred 
to as ‘the state’ is precisely this “altered and alienated form.”289 Yet “[t]he crux of authority,” 
as Martel explains, “lies in our reading of it.”290 To this end, it is important not to take the 
alienated form of the state as a given, and participate in a form of idolatry that grants it a 
form a presence that it does not have, but instead to interrogate how this ‘image’ of presence 
is produced. The state “has no basis for authority other than its own act of symbolization,” 
which is not to say that the effects of this act are not real, but that they are, precisely, effects.291 
To repeat Mitchell’s argument, “we should examine it not as an actual structure but as the 
powerful, apparently metaphysical effect of practices that make such structures appear to 
exist.’292 
This approach to law and the state provides for a much different reading of the 
moral economy and co-operatives. The moral economy and the co-operative, insofar as 
they are historically linked, appear, not as potentially competing legal orders that are 
autonomous from the state—whether that autonomy is located in ‘tradition’ or in an 
alternative normative order—but as particular forms of order that emerge already in relation 
to the state, not least because this relation is also constitutive of the state as such. The notion 
of customary law or right described in the beginning of this chapter, and used to interpret 
the moral economy of the crowd, implicitly presupposed both its autonomy from as well 
as its marginalisation to the state. In contrast, the approach outlined here attempts to 
contend with how even the moral economy is already implicated in a particular form of 
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relation with the state. The expectations that structured the moral economy of the crowd 
and were often shared with authorities and drew on a more recent history of paternalistic 
forms of governance and intervention. “The moral economy of markets,” as Hay reminds 
us, “was critically, if contentiously, dependent on state law.”293 Thus, while food riots might 
sometimes be violently repressed, they could also be tolerated and even quietly supported 
by the authorities, through a form of tacit consent. More specifically in the eighteenth 
century, the moral economy of the crowd was articulated in the midst of a discernible shift 
from the paternalism of the early modern state, characterised by the Elizabethan Book of 
Orders, to one that was increasingly influenced by political economy. The law oscillated 
between these two frameworks in the second half of the eighteenth century. Hay attributes 
the prevalence of food riots during this period to “the discrepancy between the 
unwillingness to enforce the law, and the continuing belief in the reasonableness of the 
law.”294  
From this perspective, the idea that the legal recognition of the co-operative is a 
question of 'bringing within' from 'outside' is completely incoherent, not least because the 
moral economy of the crowd, from which the co-operative derives, was dependent on and 
articulated in relation to state law. This dynamic reflects the predominance of a modality 
of power that Michel Foucault would characterise as ‘sovereign’, and primarily negative.295 
As Foucault writes, reflecting particularly on Hobbes, “[t]he sovereign is the person who 
can say no to any individual’s desire, the problem being how to legitimize this ‘no’ opposed 
to individuals’ desire and found it on the will of these same individuals.”296 Whether this 
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was in the form of the many economic regulations of the Tudors, or the prosecution of 
rioters, the primary exercise of power was predominantly a negative one. While the 
relationship between state authority and the moral economy of the crowd is a complex one, 
particularly in the eighteenth century, but it can be seen as functioning broadly within this 
dynamic of tacit consent and repression. However, it also took place in a space that was not 
completely determined by or in relation to state law; state law did not, as Thompson 
explains “inform a view of life.”297 
In the nineteenth century, with the increasing influence of political economy, this 
dynamic shifted considerably, from a ‘sovereign’ and predominantly negative modality of 
power to one of biopolitics and discipline. For the purposes of this thesis, one of the most 
important expressions of this form of power was a shift from tacit consent and repression, 
to more explicit forms of recognition, such as that provided by the Industrial and Provident 
Societies Act 1852, reflecting what Nikolas Rose refers to as a "governmentalization of the 
state."298 Eventually the co-operative was also given the form of the body corporate, and a 
legal personality of its own: the state, as Fitzpatrick argues, “transforms the elements…it 
appropriates into its own image and likeness.” 299 The next chapter will explore this dynamic 
in more detail through an examination of how legal recognition, particularly through the 
form of the body corporate, functions constitutively in the context of biopolitical 
governmentality.  
 
 
  
                                                     
297 Thompson, “Introduction,” 9. 
298 Nikolas Rose, Powers of Freedom: Reframing Political Thought (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2004), 149.  
299 Fitzpatrick, “Law and Societies,” 122. 
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Chapter 3: Co-operation and Incorporation  
For to understand and evaluate that part of law which serves to organize the life of 
associations one must attempt to discover what it really is that enters the 
realm of law at this point and gets its organization from law.1 
 
Introduction 
 The previous chapter explored how legal recognition could be said to constitute the 
state, and in particular, how the state constitutes itself through a process of negation and 
differentiation from other associations. This chapter turns to how legal recognition 
constitutes that which it recognises. Legal recognition, as argued in the last chapter, entails 
that the co-operative is bound up with the creation and maintenance of the identity of the 
state; however, the mere fact of recognition does not, as Otto von Gierke puts it, tell us 
“what it really is that enters the realm of law at this point and gets its organization from 
law.”2 While there is much within the contemporary idea of the co-operative that is not 
immediately derived from law, it has been constituted by law in at least one particularly 
significant way. The specific form that co-operatives were given in the mid-nineteenth 
century was the body corporate.3 As a legal form that has a long history deriving from 
Roman law and the medieval church, this is most certainly not “the working man’s own 
creation,” but instead reflects the particular manner in which the state sought to regulate 
co-operatives.4 This chapter will claim that the corporate form, and its constitutive effects 
in relation to co-operatives, can only be understood in relation to its history, which reveals 
                                                     
1 Otto von Gierke, “The Nature of Human Associations,” in The Genossenschaft-Theory of Otto von 
Gierke, ed. John D. Lewis (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1935), 140.  
2 Ibid.  
3 Industrial and Provident Societies Act 1862.  
4 J.M. Ludlow and Lloyd Jones, Progress of the Working Class 1832-1867 (London: Alexander Strahan, 
1867), 96. 
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not only its irrevocable connection to sovereignty, but also how the form comes to be 
‘normalised’ in the mid-nineteenth century.  
  This chapter takes up the history of the body corporate as a legal form and situates 
this history in relation to Michel Foucault’s genealogies of power in order to understand 
how, in spite of its history, it could be understood so unproblematically in the legal 
recognition of co-operatives. The body corporate is not an invention of the nineteenth 
century. The conception of corporate personhood adopted in English law derives from 
early interactions with church property, importing a metaphysical concept of fictitious 
personality from the medieval church. In the early modern period, incorporation was a 
narrow privilege available only by Royal Charter or, later, an Act of Parliament. 
Corporations served as a means of extending the state’s reach into all manner of life, as 
creations and extensions of the state. This restrictive dynamic only shifted in the nineteenth 
century, with the introduction of incorporation by registration by the Joint Stock 
Companies Act of 1844. At this point, incorporation comes to be seen as a right and a form 
of commercial freedom.  
 Drawing on Foucault, I will argue that in the shift from incorporation by charter to 
incorporation by registration, the corporate form was normalised. In Foucault’s broader 
genealogies of power, he suggests that in the transition from a predominantly sovereign 
modality of power based on prohibition and sanction, to one of discipline and biopolitics, 
law comes to function “more and more as a norm.”5 While this has been subject to different 
interpretations, in relation to the corporate form normalisation will be taken to mean that 
while legal recognition through the corporate form entails a subjection to the state, this is 
read as a right and a freedom, obscuring its function as a mode of subjugation. 
                                                     
5 Foucault, History of Sexuality, Volume 1: An Introduction, trans. Robert Hurley (New York: Vintage 
Books, 1990), 144.  
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This allows the form to function in a way that is disciplinary, particularly for working class 
co-operative societies. In the context of political economy and liberal governmentality, the 
normalised form of the body corporate allows the government to meet the demands of 
‘laissez-faire’, providing ways of ‘facilitating’ the market instead of intervening directly in it.6 
At the same time, however, the normalisation of incorporation ‘immanentised’ the 
transcendent metaphysical structure of the body corporate, imposing a form of unity that 
Jean-Luc Nancy would identify as essentialising and “totalitarian.”7 This transcendent unity 
is ultimately at odds with and serves to discipline the mutuality of co-operative societies, as 
will be discussed in the next chapter.  
 The first section of this chapter will review dominant jurisprudential debates on the 
nature of corporate personality and demonstrate how a lack of attention to the historicity 
of the legal form of the body corporate results in its naturalisation, or a collapse in the 
distinction between law and life. In different ways, the debates over whether incorporation 
reflects the reality of group life or imposes a fiction and attempts to transcend this debate 
have obscured the history of the legal form itself. In contrast to these approaches, I will 
argue for a constitutive theory of law, drawing primarily on Foucault, that pays attention to 
both the historicity of the legal form and the particular historical context in which it is being 
used. The next section of the chapter will introduce the early history of the body corporate, 
with a particular emphasis on the ‘metaphysicalisation’ of the corporate form in the 
medieval church and the integration of this form into English law. The chapter will then 
turn to how the corporate form has been used from the early modern period to the mid-
nineteenth century, emphasizing its relationship to different forms of governmentality. 
Finally, the chapter will return to Foucault to argue that the body corporate form has been 
                                                     
6 Michel Foucault, The Birth of Biopolitics: Lectures at the College de France 1978-1979, ed. Michael 
Sellenart, trans. Graham Burchell (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), 282. 
7 Jean-Luc Nancy, Inoperative Community, trans. Peter Connor, Lisa Garbus, Michael Holland and 
Simona Sawhney (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1991), 3. 
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normalised, ultimately obscuring its connection to sovereignty through its conceptualisation 
as a right.  
Law, Life and Corporate Personality  
 The history of the corporate form itself has often been overlooked in debates about 
the nature of corporate personality. The nineteenth century debate over the ‘real’ and 
‘fictitious’ personality of groups, which has implicitly if not directly shaped most subsequent 
debates on the subject, was concerned with determining whether corporate legal personality 
reflects and gives form to life, or whether it is a pure fiction of law. As I will argue, both of 
these perspectives assume a problematic identity between law and life and obviate the 
question of the relation between the two. Further attempts to transcend the terms of this 
debate, by pragmatists as well as H.L.A. Hart, have only managed to reinscribe the ‘reality’ 
and ‘fiction’ divide, reproducing this identity between law and life, and obfuscating the 
effects of legal recognition. These accounts, as I will show, already participate in what 
Foucault calls the normalisation of law, precisely by removing both the historicity of the 
form itself and disregarding the particular historical context in which legal recognition 
occurs.  
The nineteenth century debate over the real personality of groups has its origin in 
the work of Otto von Gierke and Friedrich Karl von Savigny.8 They were both part of the 
German historical school of legal theory, which arose in opposition to efforts to codify the 
law in Germany, as had been done earlier in France. Law, according to those within the 
school, is not simply the product of reason, but is “determined by the whole past of the 
                                                     
8 While varieties of the fiction theory exist in England from the 17th century, ‘real entity theory’ is a German 
import. See Ron Harris, “The Transplantation of the Legal Discourse on Corporate Personality Theories: 
From German Codification to British Political Pluralism and American Big Business,” Washington and 
Lee Law Review 63, no. 4 (2006): 1421. In addition, while Gierke provides the most elaborate theory of 
real personality, he did not invent it as such. Harris cites Gierke’s teacher and mentor, Georg Beseler (ibid., 
1418).  
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nation, and therefore cannot be changed arbitrarily.”9 Law is derived from a particular 
Volksgeist [spirit of the people]. However, the school was divided in their views on which 
history should be the true source of law in Germany. The Romanists, and Savigny foremost, 
believed that Roman law was the true source. In contrast, for the Germanists who split from 
the Romanists in the 1840s, the true source of German law was German history.10 
 Their competing perspectives on the personality of groups derive from their readings 
of these historical sources. In his reading of Roman law, Savigny advocated the doctrine of 
persona ficta, or the idea that collective unity could only be a legal fiction.11 The only 
naturally occurring jurally capable person is the “individual Man.”12 Under positive law, this 
inherent jural capacity can be denied for any number of reasons, and it may also be 
extended to “artificially created” persons.13 This extension of personality is a “pure fiction” 
and the juridical person so created is “a Person who is assumed to be so for purely juristical 
purposes,” having no personality other than that generated by the fiction.14 Savigny also 
advocated the concession theory: not only was the legal personality of associations a fiction, 
it could also only be acquired when explicitly granted by a sovereign authority. While he 
distinguishes between associations which occur naturally and those which occur arbitrarily, 
no association can claim a unified, corporate personality without the authorisation of the 
sovereign. This was a particularly severe reading of Roman law that had been ‘cleansed’ of 
any compromises with other systems, and specifically irregularities arising under 
                                                     
9 Hermann Kantorowicz, “Savigny and the Historical School of Law,” Law Quarterly Review 53, no. 3 
(1937): 332. The definitive statement or manifesto of the School appears in Savigny’s 1814 pamphlet “On 
the vocation of our age for legislation and jurisprudence.” See also Peter Stein, Roman Law in European 
History (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 116.  
10 Stein, Roman Law, 118. See also George Heiman, ed. and trans., introduction to Otto Gierke 
Associations and Law: The Classical and Early Christian Stages (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 
1977), 56-68. 
11 For an overview of Savigny’s peculiar reading of Roman law, see Heiman, introduction, 27-33. 
12 Friedrich Carl von Savigny, Jural Relations; or the Roman Law of Persons as Subjects of Jural Relations: 
Being a Translation of the Second Book of Savigny’s System of Modern Roman Law, ed. and trans. W.H. 
Rattigan (London: Wildy & Sons, 1884), 2.  
13 Ibid. 
14 Ibid., 176. 
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feudalism.15 This theory and the principles of Roman law espoused more generally by 
Savigny supported the political purposes of centralisation by making legal recognised 
association dependent on the state. At the same time, this interpretation avoided purely 
formalistic codification by ostensibly rooting the law in a Roman past.  
 In his assertion of the real personality of groups, Gierke thoroughly rejected this 
position. While law may aid in social organisation, associations do not take their personality 
from law.16 The personality of ancient German fellowships did not come from any 
sovereign, but in a decentralised fashion, reflected the fellowships’ own sense of unity. 
Gierke claims that just as the individual is a person before legal recognition occurs, so too 
is the group; this personality arises organically. Gierke insists “that we recognize in the social 
body the unity of life of a whole arising out of separate parts,—such a unity as we do not 
find elsewhere except in natural living creatures.”17 As individuals associate, they do so by 
transferring part of their own living self to the group; it is from this transference of life that 
groups attain their own life.18 This produces a real living unity in the association; it is a 
“spiritual unification.”19 There is, for Gierke, almost a second stratum of existence from 
which the collective derives its unity: “[a]bove the individual spirit, the individual will, the 
individual consciousness, we recognise in thousandfold expression of life the real existence 
of common spirit, common will, and common consciousness.”20 While invisible, this 
common spirit is no less real for Gierke than a visible, living organism. It follows for Gierke 
that if group personality is real and occurs naturally, then legal recognition is a process by 
                                                     
15 Savigny’s reading of the doctrine of persona ficta was far more stringent than Pope Innocent IV’s original 
articulation of the idea, which most certainly did not also include the concession theory. For an overview of 
Savigny’s peculiar reading of Roman law, see Heiman, introduction, 27-33. This will be dealt with in more 
detail later in the chapter.  
16 Gierke, “Human Associations,” 140.  
17 Ibid., 145.  
18 Heiman, introduction, 9.  
19 Ibid., 146. The specific status of this ‘reality’ for Gierke is somewhat ambiguous. Gierke was strongly 
influenced by Hegel and thus it might be assumed that, like the Idealists in England, Gierke’s idea of the 
real was a fundamentally Hegelian one.  
20 Quoted in David Nicholls, The Pluralist State (London: The Macmillan Press Ltd., 1975), 26. 
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which that personality is given its due effect in law, and not one which creates that 
personality and unity, as the fiction theory suggests. Thus, as regards legal recognition, 
Gierke asks, is it possible “that law, when it treats organized associations as persons, is not 
disregarding reality, but giving reality more adequate expression? Is it not possible that 
human associations are real unities which receive through legal recognition of their 
personality only what corresponds to their real nature?”21 
 At the heart of this debate is a question about the relationship between law, and 
specifically the law of the state, and associational life. Savigny denies that there is a “natural 
and fundamental right to associate without any previous consent” thus making all 
associational life dependent on the state.22 The theory of real personality, in contrast, locates 
this personality in the association itself, effectively collapsing any distinction between law 
and life. While these theories may seem completely opposed, they are paradoxically similar 
in effect. In both theories, there is an identity between law and life. In the fiction theory, 
associational life is only possible by virtue of the law. Thus, if an association exists with a 
‘personality’ of its own, this personality derives from and is identical to the law. The real 
personality theory imposes a legal personality on associations, whether they like it or not.  
 This much can be seen in how advocates of the real personality of groups have 
interpreted key instances of legal recognition in practice. In the early twentieth century, 
Gierke’s ideas had considerable influence, particularly in England where some of his work 
had been translated by Frederic Maitland.23 This, in turn, influenced the disparate group of 
                                                     
21 Ibid. 
22 Heiman, introduction, 30. 
23 While Maitland was not as definitive in his statement of real corporate personality as Gierke, he also did 
not deny that this personality exists, as some claim, for instance Mack, J.A., “Group Personality--A Footnote 
to Maitland.” The Philosophical Quarterly 2, no. 8 (1952): 249–52. H.L.A. Hart was also eager to absolve 
Maitland of any metaphysical leanings and to recuperate him for the positivist tradition. But Maitland is 
clear that it is "the morality of common sense" that makes the group a person. Frederic William Maitland, 
“Moral Personality and Legal Personality,” in The Collected Papers of Frederic William Maitland, Volume 
III, ed. H.A.L. Fisher (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1911), 314. While he refrains from delving 
too deeply into what he regards as the territory of philosophers, he suggests that group personality is “at 
least as ‘real’ as the man” (ibid., 319). See also Janet McLean, Searching for the State in British Legal 
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thinkers known as the English Pluralists.24 In their reading, the theory of the real personality 
of groups appeared to find affirmation in the law’s recognition of corporate groups that 
were not explicitly created by the state.25 One commonly cited example is the controversial 
Taff Vale [1901] case, concerning the Amalgamated Society of Railway Servants, a 
registered trade union that had gone on strike.26 Their employer, the Taff Vale Railway 
Company, sought to sue the union for damages, even though trade unions were 
unincorporated entities in law.27 It was determined that they were in fact liable, because they 
were acting as a corporate group. The pluralists, including Gierke, heartily praised the 
                                                     
Thought: Competing Conceptions of the Public Sphere (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2012),81. See also David Runciman, Pluralism and the Personality of the State (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press: 1997), 108-112. Maitland himself was responding to John Austin’s theory of an absolutist 
sovereignty and what he observed as a troubling centralising tendency in in Britain. Austin’s theory of 
sovereignty, not unlike Hobbes, emphasized sovereignty as a “determinate superior authority” that makes 
commands, backed by sanctions. Janet McLean, Searching for the State in British Legal Thought: 
Competing Conceptions of the Public Sphere (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press: 2012), 57. As 
McLean notes, Maitland used Gierke’s ideas to “oppose the centralizing trend in the UK domestic system 
of government and expressed a desire for more power to and trust in local government and officials” 
(ibid.,72).  
24 English pluralism refers to the ideas of a diverse set of thinkers and a current of thought which were 
prominent in the early 20th century, represented by writers such as G.D.H. Cole, John Neville Figgis 
Harold Laski, as well as Frederic Maitland, whose reading and translation of the work of German jurist 
Otto von Gierke were very influential for English pluralism. For overviews of English pluralism, see Paul Q. 
Hirst, ed. The Pluralist Theory of the State: The Selected Writings of G.D.H. Cole, J.N. Figgis and H.J. 
Laski (London: Routledge, 1989), David Nicholls, The Pluralist State (London: The Macmillan Press Ltd., 
1975) and David Runciman, Pluralism and the Personality of the State (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1997). The English pluralists were motivated in part by what was conceived of as an English cultural 
tradition of working class associationalism, focused on values of mutual aid. There is a romanticisation of 
‘voluntary association’ found in the work of the pluralists, when they invoke the idea of the association, they 
have in mind the particular history of associational life in England, including friendly societies, co-
operatives, and trade unions, as well as companies and trusts. For an overview of the “cultural tradition” of 
English pluralism, see Julia Stapleton, “English Pluralism as Cultural Definition: The Social and Political 
Thought of George Unwin,” Journal of the History of Ideas 52, no. 4 (1991): 665-684. 
25 English law was consistently held to have avoided the harshest aspects of the doctrine of persona ficta 
because of the existence of the trust. See Frederic William Maitland, “Trust and Corporation,” in State, Trust 
and Corporation, eds. David Runciman and Magnus Ryan (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 
75-130; and Frederick Pollock, “Has the Common Law Received the Fiction Theory of Corporations?” Law 
Quarterly Review 27 (1911): 219–35. 
26 Taff Vale Railway Co v Amalgamated Society of Railway Servants [1901] UKHL 1. 
27 Following the Trade Union Act of 1875, trade unions were unincorporated entities and could sue and be 
sued, but this did not expressly extend to liability for torts. They present the somewhat perplexing 
circumstance in which associations can have certain corporate ‘privileges’ without being fully incorporated. 
Notably trade unions have never been considered as persons in law in the United Kingdom and remain 
unincorporated associations to the present day. The Trade Disputes Act of 1906 effectively reversed the 
Taff Vale decision.  
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decision, even though the union had explicitly not wanted this recognition. 28 The judgment 
“showed how real was its existence in despite of statute [sic].”29  
 Although the reasoning in the judgment was not about the ontological or moral 
existence of the corporation, J.N. Figgis suggests that “the judgment bears witness to the fact 
that corporate personality, this unity of life and action, is a thing which grows up naturally 
and inevitably in bodies of men united for a permanent end, and that it cannot in the long 
run be denied merely by the process of saying that it is not there.”30 It does not matter why 
the decision was made, only that the reality of the group was recognised by the court. 
Maitland triumphantly cites A.V. Dicey, who had finally admitted this real personality, 
writing that "when a body of twenty or two thousand or two hundred thousand men bind 
themselves together to act in a particular way for some common purpose, they create a 
body which, by no fiction of law but from the very nature of things, differs from the 
individuals of whom it is constituted.”31 This tendency to valorise the legal recognition of 
groups can also be seen in Maitland’s praise of the Companies Act of 1862, which extended 
limited liability to joint stock companies. The Act was “splendidly courageous” for having 
recognised the reality of the groups in question.32 In asserting the real personality of groups 
and then linking that personality to the particular form of recognition imposed or granted 
to the state, advocates of the ‘real entity theory’ elide a particular legal understanding of 
corporate personality with the identity of the group itself.  
                                                     
28 Indeed, trade unions were particularly sceptical of incorporation (and most forms of legal recognition). 
Although they weren’t the only ones — many long-standing English associations, such as the Inns of Court, 
had no interest in taking on such a form, as it was understood to entail greater control by the state. See 
Pollock, “Has the Common Law,” 224.  
29 Harold J. Laski, Studies in the Problem of Sovereignty (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1917), 272.  
30 J.N. Figgis, “The Great Leviathan,” in Churches in the Modern State (London: Longmans, Green and 
Co., 1913), 64. 
31 A.V. Dicey, “The Combination Laws as Illustrating the Relation Between Law and Opinion in England 
During the Nineteenth Century,” Harvard Law Review 17, no. 8 (1904): 513.  
32 Frederic William Maitland, introduction to Political Theories of the Middle Age, trans. Frederic William 
Maitland (Boston: Beacon Press, 1959), xxxviii. 
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 The tensions inherent in the realist position, and its proximity to the fiction theory, 
were not lost on some of the critics of this debate. In particular, Gierke has been roundly 
critiqued and dismissed for this almost mystical conception of the reality of groups.33 He 
and other pluralists were strongly rebuked by their American contemporaries, particularly 
Morris Cohen and John Dewey,34 who were both wary of the metaphysical implications of 
the fiction theory and the real personality of groups, and of the seemingly intractable link 
these theories created between law and life. The only real difference between Savigny and 
Gierke was in where they would locate the ‘spirit of the people’; in the state or in association. 
However, their attempt to move beyond the metaphysical question posed by ‘real’ and 
‘fictitious’ personality only defers it, while also obfuscating the potential effects of legal 
recognition.  
Cohen and Dewey turn to a more pragmatic understanding of corporate personality, 
arguing, as Dewey puts it, that the “‘person’ signifies what law makes it signify.”35 Corporate 
personality is just a “group-name” and a matter of convenience.36 Their critiques focused 
on two main observations. Firstly, there is no necessary connection between legal 
personality and the presence of collective unity; instead, there are many ways of conceiving 
of collective existence, but not all of them are relevant for legal purposes. The ‘team’, for 
                                                     
33 See Gunther Teubner, “Enterprise Corporatism: New Industrial Policy and the ‘Essence’ of the Legal 
Person,” The American Journal of Comparative Law 36, no. 1 (1988): 134. To his credit, Gierke was aware 
of the limits and dangers of the organic metaphor. See Heiman, introduction, 23. For its shortcomings, his 
idea of the unity of groups was an incredibly nuanced one, which allowed at the same time for plurality 
within groups, and for individuals to retain their individuality outside of the group. Moreover, not all 
associations had this organic personality; some, such as those created entirely by fiction, were devoid of life 
(the “dead fund”). Quoted in Teubner, “Enterprise Corporation,” 134. (couldn’t find the full reference) In 
addition, legal recognition is necessary for associations, not just because denying it would be unjust, but also 
for the sake of the Rechtstaat. When associations are entirely private, they do not participate in the public 
life of the state, and have no sense of obligation to a broader community. See Otto von Gierke, Community 
in Historical Perspective, ed. Antony Black, trans. Mary Fischer (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1990), 11. 
34 John Dewey, “The Historical Background of Corporate Legal Personality,” Yale Law Journal 35, no. 6 
(1926): 655–73; Morris R. Cohen, “Communal Ghosts and Other Perils in Social Philosophy,” The 
Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods 16, no. 25 (1919): 673–90. See also Max Radin, 
“The Endless Problem of Corporate Personality,” Columbia Law Review 32 (1932): 643-667.  
35 Dewey, “Historical Background,” 655. 
36 Radin, “Endless,” 650.  
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instance, is not a unit in law, but it may well be in other facets of life.37 Secondly, the 
attribution of legal personality is a “practical question as to whether [certain groups] should 
be made collectively the subject of certain rights and duties.” 38 Max Radin, furthering these 
arguments, suggests that legal personality is a convenience, and “an important mercantile 
device rendered necessary by a credit economy, that is, by a system of economic 
organization that involves speculation to any degree whatever.”39 The debates about the 
‘nature’ of legal personality conflate and confuse these questions of responsibility with the 
existence of corporate personality as such. Thus, they advocate “eliminating the idea of 
personality,” as though it should correspond to some entity in the world, and yet suggest 
that “retaining the word will then do no great harm.”40  
Their response to the problem of corporate personality was, as Barkan observes, 
“to write it out of existence.”41 The corporate person is instead reducible to its practical 
consequences. However, in reducing the corporate person in this way, they implicitly accept 
“certain assumptions about both the corporation and the relations between law and 
society.”42 They take the corporation to be a private entity, and suggest that the form merely 
responds to particular socio-economic needs and the practical concerns of lawyers and 
judges (who they believe are the real arbiters of what it means to be corporate). As Barkan 
argues, this position “implied that the problems with corporations were not problems in 
their legal definition, much less in the relation between law and right, but in the social 
relations that occurred under the guise of that legal name.”43 While rightly pointing out that 
there is no direct correspondence between the legal form and the world, their avoidance of 
                                                     
37 Cohen, “Communal Ghosts, 684. 
38 Ibid., 680. 
39 Radin, “Endless,” 653.  
40 Dewey, “Historical Background,” 673. Emphasis in original.  
41 Joshua Barkan, Corporate Sovereignty: Law and Government under Capitalism (Minneapolis: University 
of Minnesota Press, 2013), 85.  
42 Ibid., 85.  
43 Ibid., 85-86.  
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the metaphysical question raised by notions of ‘real’ and ‘fictitious’ personality means that 
they overlook the importance of the form itself, which is not simply the outcome of a series 
of practical considerations about how to facilitate a credit economy. The end result of these 
critiques was that the metaphysical question was largely laid to rest in favour of the more 
pragmatic approach to collective personality. However, the pragmatic approach had only 
managed to defer the metaphysical problem rather than resolve it. The debate over 
corporate personality was quietly abandoned, with an undefined consensus seeming to 
form around the idea that corporate personality, for any relevant purpose, a legal fiction.  
Positivism and Naturalisation 
 Some thirty years after the provisional conclusion of the debate over the nature of 
corporate personality, Hart, in his Inaugural Lecture at Oxford, “Definition and Theory in 
Jurisprudence,” returns attention to the issue, claiming that “the juristic controversy over 
the nature of corporate personality is dead,” and as such, “we have a corpse, and the 
opportunity to learn from its anatomy.”44 Hart’s main innovation in relation to the old 
debates is to treat incorporation as a right and as an element of legal discourse, with no 
immediate correspondence to some entity in the world. As such, all of the previously held 
ideas about corporate personality—that it is a fiction, a reality, or simply standing in for a 
more complex reality—are misleading. For Hart, none of these ideas help to elucidate the 
specific legal meaning of the corporation. However, while claiming to provide a novel 
approach to the question of corporate legal personality, Hart curiously re-inscribes both 
fiction and reality through his particular approach to the way in which law constitutes social 
reality. Hart’s position is worth reviewing in some detail, not least because his introduction 
of the conception of incorporation as a right takes for granted and reproduces the way in 
                                                     
44 H.L.A. Hart, ‘Definition and Theory in Jurisprudence’ in Essays in Jurisprudence and Philosophy 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1983), 21, n36. This was originally published in 1954.  
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which incorporation came to be understood in the mid-nineteenth century. This section 
will first outline Hart’s general position, and then draw out the tensions that emerge from 
his conception of incorporation as a right. 
The basis of Hart’s intervention into the debate is ordinary language philosophy, 
and in his Oxford lecture, he develops many of the ideas that would form the basis of his 
seminal work, The Concept of Law.45 He claims that the “three great theories of corporate 
personality” were so problematic, and ultimately defective, because they assumed that, like 
ordinary words, legal terms such as “corporate person” have a direct correspondence with 
the world.46 For Hart, the irreconcilability of these theories demonstrates the difficulty in 
defining such words adequately, while ultimately failing to “throw light on the precise work 
they do.”47 This confusion “distort[s] the distinctive characteristics of legal language.”48 As 
Roger Cotterrell summarises: [t]he endless debate on the nature of corporate 
personality…sought to fix the meaning of the concept without adequate reference to the 
immense variability of the circumstance in which it could be invoked, and of the legal 
consequences which could follow from it.49 For Hart, incorporation can only be understood 
by restricting its potential meaning to that which it is given by its articulation within legal 
discourse, and within particular statements. Unlike ordinary language, the use of corporate 
names “silently assumes a special and very complicated setting, namely the existence of a 
legal system with all that this implies by way of general obedience, the operation of the 
sanctions of the system, and the general likelihood that this will continue.”50 The statement 
will necessarily have some connection to a rule of the legal system itself, in which it takes 
                                                     
45 H. L. A. Hart, The Concept of Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012).  
46 Hart, “Definition and Theory,” 24.  
47 Ibid., 25. 
48 Ibid., 26.  
49 Roger Cotterrell, The Politics of Jurisprudence: A Critical Introduction to Legal Philosophy 
(Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1989), 88. 
50 Ibid., 28.  
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on a particular meaning.51 A statement regarding a corporate person “is therefore the tail-
end of a simple legal calculation: it records a result and may be well called a conclusion of 
law.”52  
Unlike Gierke and Savigny, who were concerned with the question of what the 
corporation ‘is’, and unlike the pragmatists who focused on the practical consequences of 
incorporation, Hart is only concerned with the circumstances under which the law will 
recognise an entity as corporate. He stresses the importance of the particular rules that must 
be followed in order to take advantage of the privileges and duties associated with corporate 
personality. As Hart writes: 
Here can be seen the essential elements of the language of legal corporations. For 
in law, the lives of ten men that overlap but do not coincide may fall under separate 
rules under which they have separate rights and duties, and then they are a 
collection of individuals for the law; but their actions may fall under rules of a 
different kind which make what is to be done by any one or more of them depend 
in complex ways on what was done or occurred earlier. And then we may speak in 
appropriately unified ways of the sequence so unified, using a terminology like that 
of corporation law which will show that it is this sort of rule we are applying to the 
facts.53  
 
While we may be misled into thinking that the corporation reflects the presence of a 
“corporate spirit,” as it did for Gierke, which may be “real enough,” no such spirit is 
necessary for the operation of the legal rule, which is the true essence of the corporation.54 
Metaphysical readings of corporate personality “confuse the issue because they look like 
eternal truths about the nature of corporations given us by definitions; so it is made to 
appear that all legal statements about corporations must square with these if they are not to 
be logically inconsistent.”55 The corporation so-called is thus an outcome of a particular 
sequence wholly determined by the operation of a legal rule. This position may seem close 
                                                     
51 Ibid.  
52 Ibid.  
53 Ibid., 30. 
54 Ibid. 
55 Ibid., 45.  
 
 
CHAPTER 3 | 165 
 
 
to that held by the pragmatists, but Hart insists that “the fundamental point is that the 
primary function of these words is not to stand for or describe anything but a distinct 
function,” or operation of law.56 In ordinary interactions, one could determine the legal 
meaning of the corporation, which would not require "mentioning fiction, collective names, 
abbreviations, or brackets."57 All of the relevant meaning would be exhausted by 
understanding the legal consequences of the terms.  
Hart’s account of incorporation brings some clarity to the old debates. By removing 
the assumption of any essential feature of the corporation, Hart, at first, avoids the 
problematic equation, given by the ideas of ‘real’ and ‘fictitious’ personality of groups, 
between the personality produced by law and groups’ self-perception. There are, simply, 
“many varieties of widely different conditions (psychological and others) under which we 
talk in this unifying personal way. Some of these conditions will be shown to be significant 
for legal or political purposes; others will not.”58 Simultaneously, Hart’s theory maintains 
the idea that incorporation is a product of law, like the fiction theory, but does so without 
itself becoming a form of absolutism in which associations can only exist by virtue of 
sovereignty authorisation. Instead, Hart relies on linguistic philosophy to produce a view of 
law as constitutive, in which the legal concept, by virtue of its status as law, creates a 
particular social reality. As Cotterrell writes, “Hart's form of linguistic philosophy does not 
necessarily claim to be concerned with words or statements as representations of a social 
reality. The statements are, in themselves, the social reality. They constitute it.”59 Unlike the 
earlier debates, Hart draws attention to the way in which law actively shapes social reality, 
instead of merely reflecting it. Law creates social realities, making certain relations possible 
                                                     
56 Ibid., 31. 
57 Ibid., 36-37.  
58 Ibid., 43.  
59 Roger Cotterrell, The Politics of Jurisprudence: A Critical Introduction to Legal Philosophy 
(Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1989), 91.  
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through the facilities it provides. However, despite these initial insights, Hart collapses the 
distinction between law and life, thereby naturalising law, precisely through his 
consideration of incorporation as a form of right.  
As noted above, for Hart all that is needed to understand the meaning of 
incorporation is a reference to the legal system in which it takes on meaning. Any statement 
regarding the existence of a corporation, or indeed any legal right, presupposes that a legal 
system exists and that there is a relevant rule corresponding to the circumstances that will 
fall within the law. Finally, it presupposes that this right is invoked by choice.60 The existence 
of a right means that “the obligation to perform the corresponding duty is made by law to 
depend on the choice of the individual who is said to have the right or the choice of some 
person authorized to act on his behalf.”61 This element of choice is a key part of the radical 
difference between power-conferring rules and commands from the sovereign that Hart 
elaborates in The Concept of Law. In a critique of earlier forms of legal positivism which 
‘reduce’ law to coercion and commands of the sovereign, particularly those of Jeremy 
Bentham and John Austin, Hart attempts to rescue positivism by demonstrating a necessary 
social and normative dimension of law, and by removing the need for a sovereign at all. 
Certain types of law, which he will come to call “secondary rules” cannot be explained 
within the basic coercive model because they function to confer powers, private and public, 
rather than imposing obligations as such.62 This form of power “is one of the great 
contributions of law to social life; and it is a feature of law obscured by representing all law 
as a matter of orders backed by threats.”63 Unlike commands, secondary rules, such as those 
of incorporation,  
do not impose duties or obligations. Instead they provide an individual with facilities 
for realizing their wishes, by conferring legal powers upon them to create, by certain 
                                                     
60 Hart, “Definition and Theory,” 35. 
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62 Hart, Concept of Law, 24, 28.  
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specified procedures and subject to certain conditions, structures of rights and 
duties within the coercive framework of the law.64  
 
Moreover, these laws are not simply useful facilities; they also constitute social reality. As 
he writes, such laws are essential to social life, because “if such rules of this distinctive kind 
did not exist we should lack some of the most familiar concepts of social life, since these 
logically presuppose the existence of such rules.”65  
At this point, a revealing tension emerges between the constitutive effects of Hart’s 
conception of law and the element of choice that forms a necessary part of his conception 
of rights. Although such rules require an element of choice – an element that forms the 
basis of the assertion that they are fundamentally non-coercive – they also have an identity 
with social life. If we would not be able to recognise social life without these legal 
instruments, as Hart describes above, this begs the question of what it would mean to live 
without them and, in turn, whether or not foregoing the use of such instruments constitutes 
a meaningful ‘choice’ in such a society. This is not a problem that Hart addresses. While 
Hart specifically acknowledges that power-conferring rules such as incorporation function, 
like all law, as a mechanism of social control, that they are fundamentally non-coercive is a 
central presumption of his entire system in The Concept of Law. Their power is normative 
rather than derived from sovereignty.66 The consequence of not following such rules is 
                                                     
64 Ibid., 27-28. Emphasis in original.  
65 Ibid., 32.  
66 See H.L.A. Hart, ‘Legal Rights’ in Essays on Bentham: Jurisprudence and Political Philosophy (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1982), 163; and H.L.A. Hart, ‘Legal Powers’ in Essays on Bentham, 194. This 
movement from sovereignty to normativity is conveyed most clearly by Hart in his critique of Bentham on 
legal rights and powers (such powers are conceived as rights when possessed by a private citizen). Hart 
agrees with Bentham that ‘a permission is simply the absence of legal prohibition and hence the absence of 
a legal duty not to do a certain act.” H.L.A. Hart, “Legal Powers,” 197. However, he differs fundamentally 
on how this power is to be understood. In Bentham’s account, legal powers still derive from the imperative 
of the sovereign. “The sovereign,” as Hart explains, ‘“allows” the mandate to be issued.” (Ibid., 211). 
Absent this permission from the sovereign, “it is an illegal mandate and to issue it is an offence.” Ibid. This 
is problematic for Hart, precisely because he wants to do away with the necessary role of the sovereign. 
Bentham’s approach in this regard is a “mistake.” (Ibid., 212). Turning to ordinary language philosophy to 
circumvent this reliance on the sovereign, Hart claims that acts that create powers will have certain 
“operative words” which, by virtue of their status as law, obtain a particular legal force to effect legal 
relationships. (Ibid., 217). However, Hart claims that these are “legal normative effects or consequences, 
not natural effects.” (Ibid.) These, in turn, can be compared to non-legal cases where such powers are 
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merely invalidity, rather than illegality. The consequences of failing to comply with the 
stipulations of power-conferring rules, if not made criminal by some other provision, can 
only be a ‘nullity’, ‘without legal “force” or “effect”’.67 He contrasts these rules with those of 
criminal law. 
In the case of a rule of criminal law we can identify and distinguish two things: a 
certain type of conduct which the rule prohibits, and a sanction intended to 
discourage it. But how could we consider in this light such desirable social activities 
as men making each other promises which do not satisfy legal requirements as to 
form. This is not like the conduct discouraged by the criminal law, something which 
the legal rules stipulating legal forms for contracts are designed to suppress. The rules 
merely withhold legal recognition from them.68 
 
The denial of legal recognition is thus relatively inconsequential for Hart. Indeed, he 
specifies that it would only matter “if we think of power-conferring rules as designed to 
make people behave in certain ways and as adding ‘nullity’ as a motive for obedience, can 
we assimilate such rules to orders backed by threats.”69 The power that is conferred by rights 
such as incorporation is one that allows the holder of the right to alter the freedom of 
another, but that does not appear to affect the freedom of the holder in any meaningful 
sense.70   
However, as I will show later in this chapter, this ostensibly exceptional 
circumstance in which such rules would be designed to influence and control behaviour 
forms a particular historical reality that emerges in the nineteenth century. This is also the 
                                                     
invoked, but with “no background of imperative laws.” (Ibid.) The comparison allows Hart to conclude that 
“powers to change normative situations need not rest on a Sovereign’s commands at all.” (Ibid., 218.) As he 
explains “they are more like instructions how to bring about certain results than mandatory impositions of 
duty.” (Ibid., 219. Emphasis in original). Hart thus replaces the sovereign with the normative concept of a 
rule. While the “effect is to bring individuals within the scope of existing commands or prohibitions or 
exceptions to them,” these rules confer the power to “enter into legally effective transactions… [and] cannot 
be construed as commands or prohibitions.” (Ibid., 213). 
67 Hart, Concept of Law, 28.  
68 Ibid., 31.  
69 Ibid., 34.  
70 This is further supported by Hart’s contention that the only naturally occurring right is an equal right to 
freedom. It is this originary freedom that the bearers of Hart’s legal powers appear to retain when they 
exercise legal powers. H.L.A. Hart, “Are There Any Natural Rights?” The Philosophical Review 62 no. 2 
(1955): 175.  
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historical moment when incorporation, which had long been a narrow privilege available 
only by a grant from the sovereign, comes to be understood as a right. Unfortunately this 
history does not figure in Hart’s account of incorporation, nor of law more generally. As 
Peter Fitzpatrick has argued, Hart’s account of law is ultimately grounded in myth, not 
social fact.71 As a consequence, Hart does not resolve the debate between the idea that 
corporate personality is a fiction and that it reflects the real personality of groups, but rather 
collapses the distinction between the two, entrenching them and the metaphysical problems 
they posed even more deeply. By insisting that the meaning of corporate personality cannot 
be understood outside of its relation to other legal rules, Hart maintains the idea of 
corporate personality as a legal fiction, albeit without naming it as such. He simultaneously 
claims there to be an identity between the law and the social reality it creates.  
Despite their very different orientations, Hart’s conclusions are not wildly different 
from Gierke’s. Law—through secondary rules—functions for Hart, as it did for Gierke, “to 
recognize the sociologically real.”72 By maintaining that incorporation is a choice by virtue 
of its status as a right, Hart fails to appreciate the way in which incorporation constitutes 
social reality, not just as a ‘facilitative’ gesture, but one that is ultimately coercive and 
intimately connected to sovereignty. The end product of this is the perceived technical 
neutrality of law discussed in chapter 1. However, as I will show later in this chapter, the 
very idea of incorporation as a right obscures this element of choice.  
The Political Theology of the Body Corporate 
 The body corporate does not simply derive its meaning from the legal system in 
which it is given effect, as Hart suggested; nor is it simply a reflection of reality. And it is 
certainly far more than a mere practical device meant to simplify a complex set of relations. 
                                                     
71 Peter Fitzpatrick, The Mythology of Modern Law (London: Routledge, 1992) 183-210. See also Peter 
Fitzpatrick, Modernism and the Grounds of Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 97-99.  
72 McLean, Searching for the State, 82.  
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The body corporate has its own history, and this history affects how it shapes and ultimately 
constitutes social relations. The theories of corporate personality above neglect this history, 
or at least misconstrue its relevance, while also obscuring the constitutive effects of legal 
recognition, creating a problematic identity between law and life. In contrast to both the 
positivist view of the law, presented through the work of Hart, and the historical reading of 
the law, presented through Gierke and Savigny, a constitutive theory of law focuses on how 
law actively shapes material relations and perceptions of reality, while also being a kind of 
fiction connected to sovereignty. As Pierre Bourdieu describes, "[t]he law is the 
quintessential form of 'active' discourse, able by its own operation to produce its effects. It 
would not be excessive to say that it creates the social world, but only if we remember that 
it is this world which first creates the law."73 This suggests a more complex dynamic between 
law and life than that indicated by the terms ‘real’ and ‘fictitious’ personality.  
 While there are many potential sources for a constitutive theory of law, I will 
primarily focus on the work of Foucault.74 Foucault’s genealogies of power in modernity 
help to contextualise this constitutive function of law historically. This allows for a 
consideration not only of the historicity of the body corporate in its integral connection to 
sovereignty and the juridical, but also the particular way in which it came to be used in the 
nineteenth century, in the context of the emergence of disciplinary power and biopolitics, 
                                                     
73 Pierre Bourdieu, “The Force of Law: Toward a Sociology of the Juridical Field,” The Hastings Law 
Journal 38, no. 5 (1987): 839.  
74 See for instance, John Brigham, The Constitution of Interests: Beyond the Politics of Rights (New York: 
New York University Press, 1996), 1-28. Brigham provides a useful overview, situating a constitutive theory 
of law within the broader discipline of the sociology of law. See also Rosemary Coombe, “Critical Cultural 
Legal Studies,” Yale Journal of Law & the Humanities 10, no. 2 (1998): 463-486. For Coombe, 
“constitutive theories of law recognize law’s productive capacities, as well as its prohibitions and sanctions, 
shifting attention to the workings of law in ever more improbable settings” (ibid., 475). Among the many 
potential sources for a constitutive theory of law, Engle Merry provides perhaps the paradigmatic 
formulation, recounting that ‘[t]he focus of our work is not on law and society but on the ways in which law 
and society are mutually defining and inseparable. One fundamental point is that law is intimately involved 
in the constitution of social relations and the law itself is constituted through social relations. Sally Engle 
Merry, “Culture, Power and the Discourse of Law,” New York Law School Law Review 37 (1992): 209. See 
also Michael McCann, “Causal versus Constitutive Explanations (or, On the Difficulty of Being so 
Positive…),” Law and Social Inquiry 21, no. 2 (1996): 459. 
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and the normalisation of law this entailed.75 In relation to the foregoing discussion of 
corporate personality, a constitutive theory of law would suggest, in short, that incorporation 
functions constitutively, by creating the unity that it recognises, and supplanting alternative 
forms of relationality. This is particularly problematic for co-operatives and the ethos of 
mutuality that animates them, as the next chapter will show.  
 This section will take a more genealogical approach to the question of corporate 
personality, examining its development and metaphysicalisation in the medieval church, 
and its gradual integration into English law.76 There are two key features of the corporation 
that emerge from this early history. Firstly, the corporate form, from the universitas of 
Roman law to the early modern body politic, has served as a means of extending the power 
of a centralised authority through the grant of exemptions and privileges; as such, the 
corporate form cannot be divorced from questions of sovereign power, and particularly 
modern configurations of sovereignty. Secondly, the specific form of the body corporate, 
which is also shared with the state, was constructed through a transcendent metaphysical 
structure that was then secularised through its integration into English law.  
 The conception of the body corporate that is found in English law derives primarily 
from the medieval church and the doctrine of persona ficta, by which ecclesiastical 
associations were attributed with a fictitious personality, as will be described in more detail 
below. There has been considerable debate over whether English law ‘received’ the fiction 
theory from canon law. Yet at the heart of these debates is a shared acknowledgement that 
                                                     
75 Foucault, History of Sexuality, 144.  
76 There are, as Alberto Toscano has pointed out, significant tensions between the concept of genealogy and 
political theology as it is generally understood, particularly by Giorgio Agamben. A political theology of the 
body corporate arises from the genealogy pursued here because theology, while not the only aspect, is a key 
element of its historicity. The influence of theology arises not only as a general paradigm, but as the more 
or less direct influence of the medieval church on English law. This theological influence is not taken to be 
pernicious. Instead, it is a matter of historicising the concept which in turn, as an important aspect of any 
genealogy, helps to denaturalise or denormalise it in the present. See Alberto Toscano, “Divine 
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the fiction theory at the very least provided the notion of corporate personality as such, 
whether that personality is subsequently deemed to be fictitious or real.77 As Harold Laski 
writes, “the phrase, whatever its author meant it to imply, gave exactly the impulse to the 
current of men's thoughts for which they had long been waiting. For immediately we have 
the acts of a person, the nature of that person may be matter of debate."78 Frederick Pollock 
similarly observes that basic form of juristic personality, in which it is “distinct from that of 
its members, and is not associated with an individual body capable of suffering corporeal 
punishment…is allowed, and indeed required, by the realist no less than the fictionist 
doctrine. 79 It is this notion of corporate personhood that is eventually integrated into 
English law.  
The corporation, understood as a discrete unity with legal personality, first appears 
in English law only in the fifteenth century.80 While the common law had recognised various 
forms of association from before the Norman Conquest, as Pollock and Maitland explain, 
“[o]ur forefathers found it hard to conceive that one and the same community can continue 
to exist unless each new member steps into the place of some departed member.”81 These 
associations were largely considered to be “land communities,” not corporate entities. They 
included larger entities such as cities, townships and boroughs, but also shires and 
hundreds.82 Amongst these land communities, the borough—designated as the liber burgus 
                                                     
77 Moreover, at least as far as the doctrine of persona ficta itself is concerned, it was not applied in an 
absolutist manner. While the collective person was a fiction, this fiction did not necessary emanate from the 
state. It was not, as Kantorowicz points out, used in a derogatory manner. The fiction was an imitation of 
nature and therefore must have an element of truth to it. Ernst H. Kantorowicz, The King’s Two Bodies: A 
Study in Mediaeval Political Theology (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1957), 306.  
78 Harold J. Laski, “The Early History of the Corporation in England,” Harvard Law Review 30, no. 6 
(1917): 575. 
79 Pollock, “Has English Law,” 231.  
80 In examining the history of corporations in English law, Pollock and Maitland employ a very general 
definition of the corporation as “some organized group of men…treated as a unit which has rights and 
duties other than the rights and duties of all or any of its members,” finding it otherwise impossible to 
generalize about other features that might be considered ‘natural’ elements of corporateness. Frederick 
Pollock and Frederic William Maitland, The History of English Law Before the Time of Edward I, 
Volume I (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1899), 488.  
81 Ibid. 677.  
82 Pollock and Maitland, History of English Law, 510.  
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[free borough]—came the closest to being a corporation, yet as John P. Davis explains, this 
was more “a medium through which the law viewed the burgess himself, rather than a legal 
entity.”83 The term communitas, which was most often used to describe these entities, did 
not offer any clear distinction between the group and the individuals that comprised it.84 
These entities, while often recognized through Royal Charters, were not created through 
them, being, as they were, pre-existing territorial groupings. As Pollock and Maitland 
explain, "[a]s yet the charters contain no creative words. Nothing is said, as in the charters 
of the fifteenth century, about the erection of a 'corporation' or 'body politic'; nothing, as in 
the charters of the fourteenth, about the formation or confirmation of a communitas. The 
communitas is already there; it may want privileges, but it exists.”85  
 The conception of the corporation that English law would eventually adopt 
originates in the Roman law, but it comes to English law through the medieval church. This 
influence appears in early accounts of church property. In the Anglo-Saxon land books, 
Pollock and Maitland find that God and the saints are capable of owning land.86 Similarly 
in the Doomsday Book, saints are frequently listed as the owners of various church lands.87 
Of this curious structure, Maitland suggests we imagine what the monks themselves would 
have said in answer to the question “who owns this land and the property of the house?”88 
They would say, according to Maitland, “[w]e monks are not owners, we are but caretakers, 
administrators, agents of another person. That person is assuredly no fiction of the mind. 
In one sense, it may be no natural person, for he is supernatural, but real he is; he is our 
                                                     
83 John P. Davis, Corporations: A Study of the Origin and Development of Great Business Combinations 
and of Their Relation to the Authority of the State, Vol. II (New York: Capricorn Books, 1961), 218.  
84 Pollock and Maitland, History of English Law, 531. The term communitas lacked any precise definition: 
“[i]t is a large, vague word” (ibid., 494). A communitas is not regarded as an entity apart from its members. 
That the common law did not use the term universitas is indication of the lack of direct influence of Roman 
law on these early conceptions of association.  
85 Ibid., 704. 
86 Quoted in ibid., 499.  
87 Ibid., 500.  
88 Maitland, “Corporation Aggregate: The History of a Legal Idea,” Lecture, May 25, 1893, 11-12. 
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patron saint; he is owner; we do but administer his goods for him.”89 Maitland readily 
suggests that it is this idea, of God and the saints as owners, that comes to be translated in 
secular law to the idea of a fictitious corporate person. “It would be long,” Maitland writes, 
“to tell how deeply our medieval law is permeated by this idea, that God and the saints are 
capable of owning land, how slowly the idea gives way to a theory which puts an admittedly 
fictitious person, a corporation aggregate, in the place of real though supernatural beings.”90  
 Although written somewhat hyperbolically, Maitland’s description of the monks’ 
conception of ownership and early accounts of church property gestures toward the 
transcendent conception of unity that will ultimately make its way into early modern 
conceptions of the corporation through the notion of the universitas. While the concept of 
the universitas originates in Roman law, it is only in the medieval church that it comes to 
have a metaphysical dimension and to be conceived of as a person. 91 There were many 
forms of group or collective in Roman law, but initially none of them were ‘corporate’ 
except for the universitas, a term meaning ‘the whole’ which emerged toward the end of 
the Republic.92 Other forms of association, such as the collegia and the societas could not 
hold property as a collective, but only jointly as individuals.93 The category of universitas, as 
applied to groups, arose specifically as a way to signify the ownership of public property. 
Public property was not, under the jus civile, capable of being owned, “it was said to be 
extra commercium.”94 The universitas effectively served as a means of bridging private and 
                                                     
89 Ibid., 11-12. 
90 Ibid., 12. 
91 For a concise and recent overview of this trajectory, see Edward Mussawir and Connal Parsley, “The law 
of persons today: at the margins of jurisprudence,” Law and Humanities 11, no. 1 (2017): 45. For Mussawir 
and Parsley, the Roman conception of persona is a legal technique rather than a metaphysical concept.  
92 William L. Burdick, The Principles of Roman Law and Their Relation to Modern Law (Rochester: The 
Lawyers Co-operative Publishing Co., 1938), 282-283. Some of these other non-corporate categories 
include collegia (trade guilds) and societas, which are sometimes erroneously cited as having been corporate 
bodies, which has led in turn to an overemphasis on Roman law as the source for the modern notion of 
incorporation (ibid., 280).  
93 Ibid., 281. It was only in imperial Rome that corporate status, expressed as habere corpus, was extended 
to private associations (ibid., 284-285).  
94 Ibid., 283.  
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public by making the jus publicum subject to a form of ownership. Universitates were thus 
initially municipal or public corporations, and served as a vehicle by which public property 
could be owned by specific municipalities, as entities separate from their individual 
members. As Burdick explains,  
as a technical legal term it meant something different from all the members who 
comprised it. It did not mean that the property of a university...was owned by all 
the members jointly, for it was only private property that could be so owned, but 
it means that apart and distinct from the individual members there was an abstract 
something that had rights and liabilities.95  
 
However, this “abstract something” was not explicitly a persona, even if it had acquired 
some of the characteristics of personhood by virtue of the rights of action it accrued in 
relation to the ownership of property.96 While exceeding a mere collection of individuals, 
the universitas was not immortal, and would die whenever all of its members had died.97 As 
Maitland writes, there was very little theorisation of the corporation as such in the Digest, 
and more generally, “[t]he admission must be made that there is no text which directly calls 
the universitas a persona, and still less any that calls it a persona ficta.”98  
                                                     
95 Ibid., 282-283. 
96 Geoffrey Samuel conceptualizes this ‘indirect’ personhood as follows: “Now, if a legal person is an entity 
capable of bringing or defending a legal action in its own right, then the moment that a person – or more 
importantly a group of persons (Universitas) – is granted the procedural power to bring an action in his, her 
or its own name, this will have the effect of turning that person or group into a legal person. In other words, 
a legal persona can be created indirectly simply through the rules attaching to the institution of the action.” 
Geoffrey Samuel, Epistemology and Method in Law (London: Routledge, 2003), 130. However, he also 
writes that “the texts devoted to legal personality in the Roman sources are fragmented and there is no 
theory of legal personality as such” (ibid.). Moreover, as Harold J. Berman observes, Roman law did not 
provide any answers to some of the most central questions of corporate personhood. As he writes, “…many 
questions such as whether a corporation derives its existence and its powers from a grant by a public 
authority or from the will of its founders or from its own nature as an association, what powers are exercised 
by its officers and what cannot be done by them without the consent of the members, and how the officers 
are to be chosen and how and why they may be dismissed were not discussed by the Roman jurists. Even 
the phrases "legal person" and "legal personality" were rarely used by them, and were never analyzed. Only 
in retrospect can one discern several implicit principles of Roman corporation law that became explicit in 
Western legal thought in the twelfth century when corporation law first began to be systematized. Two of 
these were, first, the principle that a corporation has legal capacity to act through representatives, and 
second, the principle that the rights and duties of the corporation are distinct from those of its officers.” 
Harold J. Berman, Law and Revolution: The Formation of the Western Legal Tradition (Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 1983), 215.  
97 Burdick, Principles of Roman Law, 292.  
98 Maitland, introduction, xviii. That said, Kantotowicz suggests the connection is readily made in the lex 
mortuo, which directly referred to the municipality as a person.  
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 The more systematic development of the corporation and its personification occurs 
in the medieval church. Ecclesiastical ‘corporations’ have a long history in the structure of 
the Church.99 The life of such groups formed an important part of the early history of the 
Church. Dating back to at least the fourth century AD, churches were established in far-
flung corners of the old empire, and monasteries housed zealous believers who separated 
themselves from the Church. These entities could not be effectively administered by any 
centralised church authority, and thus required structures of decentralised authority. As 
Davis summarizes,  
[a]s often happens in the development of corporate life, the superior organization of 
society proved unable to absorb into its own structure the inferior corporate life that 
it had called into being; it had to be content with annexing the subordinate structure; 
the Church was unable to comprehend the results of monastic activity within the 
hierarchy of pope, bishop, and priests, and had to make monasteries a part of its 
structure.”100  
 
In the tenth century, the monasteries were brought within the structure of the Church. 
Thus, in a manner not unlike that of Romans, the corporate form enabled the exercise of 
a form of public power or authority, derived from the papacy. “The Papacy,” as Davis 
describes, “was the source from which the monasteries obtained exemptions and privileges: 
the monks in return became the standing army of the papacy.”101  
 The canonists readily applied the notion of universitas to various forms of 
ecclesiastical associations, as well as to the church as a whole from a very early date: “being,” 
as Kantorowicz explains, “the universitas fidelium according to oldest definitions, the 
universal Church was also legally universitas without restriction.” 102 It is unclear when 
                                                     
99 This history, and the primacy of the ecclesiastical corporation, are given in some detail (and far more than 
can be dealt with here) by John P. Davis, Corporations: A Study of the Origin and Development of Great 
Business Combinations and of Their Relation to the Authority of the State, Vol. I (New York: Capricorn 
Books, 1961) 35-88. Davis specifically points to the regularity of visitation to churches as an important part 
of what gives the church its early unity and lends to the creation of a more centralized hierarchy.  
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precisely the canonists began to ascribe personality to the universitas. There must, as 
Kantorowicz argues, have been a fairly widespread tendency to treat the universitas as a 
person by the time it was formally personified in law in 1245.103 The legal personification of 
the corporation, when it is finally made explicit, is widely attributed to Sinibaldus Fliscus, 
who became Pope Innocent IV (1243-1254). In response to “the general tendency to treat 
the various ecclesiastical collegia as though they were real persons who could be punished 
and excommunicated,” he declared the universitas to be a persona ficta. 104 The various 
“universitates…were ‘names of Law’ only and not of persons.”105 More specifically, as 
Kantorowicz describes, the  
universitas was a person without a body, a pure nomen intellectual and a thing 
incorporeal which, as later canonists were quick to point out, could not be 
condemned because it was lacking a soul, nor be decapitated because it was lacking 
a body. The personified universitas, therefore, was only an imaginary ‘represented 
person’ (persona representata) or a ‘fictitious person’ (persona ficta).106 
 
This was a relatively limited intervention, intended to differentiate the corporate, fictional 
person from the natural one, by showing the limits of the analogy. Nonetheless, this 
proclamation had the more extensive effect of making it possible for all manner of 
universitas to be considered persona ficta, effectively formalising prior tendencies, while 
also clarifying their nature. As Kantorowicz suggests, this created “the possibility of treating 
every Universitas (that is, every plurality of men collected in one body) as a juristic person, 
of distinguishing that juristic person clearly from every natural person endowed with body 
and soul, and yet of treating a plurality of individuals juristically as one person.”107 
                                                     
103 Ibid. J.P. Canning suggests that it can be found in the writings of the Decretalists, at least from Pope 
Innocent IV onward, and that it is further developed by the Commentators. J.P. Canning, “Law, sovereignty 
and corporation theory, 1300-1450,” in ed. J.H. Burns, The Cambridge History of Medieval Political 
Thought c. 350-1450 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), 474. 
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 The metaphysical conception of the corporate person from canon law, as I have 
already elaborated to some extent as in chapter 2 a way of situating Hobbes' use of the 
fictitious person in the Leviathan, conceives of the unity of the person through a 
transcendent metaphysical structure. By way of review, this transcendence figures in two 
ways. First, the corpus mysticum [the mystical body of Christ] gives a kind of bodily unity 
by referring to the body of Christ in heaven to create an earthly unity in the Church. This 
is supplemented by the attribution of angelic temporality to the universitas, which allowed 
it to exist, like the angels, between the infinite time of God, and the finite time of man. It 
could have a moment of creation, like man, but exist immortally, like God. This 
transcendent metaphysical structure is shared by both the corporate group and the state, 
but it was applied to lesser associations long before it was ever applied to the state.  
 The notion of the corporate body adopted by English law is a more or less direct 
inheritance from the medieval church. It was not only motivated by the same concerns that 
prompted the church to recognise ecclesiastical corporations, but it drew directly on the 
structure that had been developed within the church for conceiving the corporate body as 
fictitious and immortal. “The question,” as Pollock and Maitland recount, “[w]hen did our 
English borough become incorporate? Is one to which no precise answer can be given.”108 
It is a gradual process that extends over several centuries. In the thirteenth century writings 
of Henri de Bracton, Pollock and Maitland can find no general theory corresponding to 
the corporation, even if some terminology, such as universitas, occasionally appears.109 
However, it was in part because the courts had to deal with ecclesiastical corporations that 
they came to acknowledge and integrate the concept into secular jurisprudence. Laski 
                                                     
jurisdiction over their members. The can act through an ensemble of the members instead of only 
representatives. They were severally liable for the debts of the corporation. See also Harold J. Berman, Law 
and Revolution: The Formation of the Western Legal Tradition (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 
1983), 218.  
108 Pollock and Maitland, History of English Law, 687. 
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suggests that the Statute of Mortmain (1279), which forbade the acquisition of property by 
churches, are an indication that they understood these entities to be immortal, hence the 
risk of their coming to own property, that the statutes sought to curtail.110 These statutes 
were also eventually applied to the boroughs.111  
 By the fourteenth century, Pollock and Maitland observe that “the king had begun 
to interfere with the creation of new communitates, with the creation of voluntary 
associations or gilds.”112 The motivation for this was primarily “political expedience and 
financial needs.”113 The granting of such licences formed a source of income for the crown: 
gilds, wishing to exercise not merely a private power, but to share in the public exercise of 
sovereign authority, would readily pay for such privileges, as would boroughs, which were 
increasingly formed in the manner of gilds.114 Yet, as Pollock and Maitland explain, “the 
charters contain no creative words.” 115 
The notion that there is some ‘feigning’ to be done, some artifice to be applied, has 
not yet been received from the canonists, and perhaps we ought to regret its 
reception…. The foundation, however, is being laid for a rule which will require a 
royal licence when a new corporation is to be formed.116 
 
It was the length of the licences themselves, which necessarily entailed succession, that 
appears to have precipitated a juridical turn to corporate forms.  
In the great boroughs, large sums of money were subscribed in order that privileges 
might be bought from the king, and the subscribing townsfolk naturally conceived 
that they purchased those privileges for themselves. Some definition of the privileged, 
the franchised, body was necessary, and yet in the great boroughs that body could not 
assume any of the old accustomed forms.117 
 
                                                     
110 Laski, “Early History," 577.  Mortmain translates as ‘the dead hand’. The Statutes of Mortmain were a 
way for the newly consolidating secular state to prevent property transferring to the church indefinitely. 
See Sandra Raban, “Mortmain in Medieval England,” Past & Present, no. 62 (1974): 3-26.  
111 Pollock and Maitland, History of English Law, 496.  
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The borough, with reference now not to the landed community, but to those who hold the 
licence or franchise from the king, takes on a kind of corporate identity. The borough is 
no longer a physical entity, but an ideal one, which individual burgesses become members 
of by taking vows, not unlike monks. However, the legal language of incorporation is still 
lacking, and the charters are granted to mere pluralities, to ‘the burgesses’ or ‘the men’, as 
Pollock and Maitland describe.118 The burgesses are ‘co-proprietors’ rather than a corporate 
entity. In the year books of Edward IV [1461-1483], Pollock and Maitland find discussions 
of corporations, referred to as corporacion (used interchangeably with corps corporat and 
corps politik), which include “abbot and convent, dean and chapter, mayor and 
commonalty.”119 These are contrasted to “aggregates of men that are not incorporated, 
townships, parishes, gilds.”120 This corporation is a persona ficta, but it still has elements of 
an anthropomorphic and organological structure, as all such corporate entities must have 
heads. By the mid-fifteenth century, terms such as corpus had begun to enter the English 
law, indicative of the influence of the Church.121 Then, in 1440, the phrase “one of perpetual 
and corporate commonalty” was used in a charter granted by Henry VI to Kingston-upon-
Hull.122  
 The first clear articulation of the corporation in English law is widely regarded to have 
come from Sir Edward Coke in the Sutton’s Hospital (1612) case. This definition clearly 
reflects the influence of the church. There he wrote that "...a corporation aggregate of many 
is invisible, immortal, and rests only in intendment and consideration of the law."123 He also 
specified that corporations cannot commit treason, be outlawed or excommunicated, "for 
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they have no souls, neither can they appear in person, but by attorney."124 These basic tenets 
of the corporation in English law were elaborated more fully by William Blackstone in his 
Commentaries on the Laws of England, where he wrote that "...it has been found necessary, 
when it is for the advantage of the public to have any particular rights kept on foot and 
continued, to constitute the artificial persons, who may maintain a perpetual succession, 
and enjoy a kind of legal immortality.”125 Corporations, as Blackstone indicates, were 
formed for the public benefit and had to be authorized by the Crown: “the King’s consent 
is absolutely necessary.”126  
 The historical integration of the idea of fictitious corporate personality from 
medieval canon law to secular English law makes the body corporate a form of theological 
inheritance. A transcendent metaphysical structure, a form of abstraction that relied on the 
unity of the body of Christ in heaven to establish a collective unity on earth, as well as the 
temporality of supernatural, angelic beings to conceive of immortality, is brought within the 
world through a juristic fiction, effectively reproducing this metaphysical structure.  
Incorporation and Governmentality 
 While the corporate form took several centuries to find its way into English law, it 
subsequently served as a vital means by which the early modern state extended its authority. 
This section traces the movement from incorporation as a narrow privilege available as a 
mechanism of public law in the early modern period, to the introduction of incorporation 
by registration and the conceptualisation of incorporation as a private right in the nineteenth 
century. These are read alongside Foucault’s conceptualisation of governmentality. 
Governmentality describes a certain “art of government” as it appears in the sixteenth and 
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seventeenth centuries, in which the concern is no longer simply to establish the legitimacy 
of sovereignty and law, but with the articulation of a rationality of government.127 In 
Foucault’s work, he describes two forms of governmentality: one associated with ‘police’ 
and the other with biopolitics and liberalism.  
From its roots in Roman law and medieval canon law, to its eventual integration in 
early modern English law, the body corporate became a central means by which the rapidly 
consolidating early modern state extended and reinforced its power and authority. While 
he does not explicitly mention them, chartered corporations formed important part of what 
Michel Foucault describes as “police power.”128 In the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, 
police was understood to mean a public body, or some collective governed by public 
authority.129 However, in the seventeenth century it came to indicate “the set of means by 
which the state’s forces can be increased while preserving the state in good order.”130 Police 
power was primarily focused on commerce, “because at that time commerce is thought of 
as the main instrument of the state’s power and thus as the privilege object of a police whose 
objective is the growth of the state’s forces.”131 Police power was concerned, amongst other 
things, with the management and increase of the population, the management of resources, 
and the early use of statistics. The state also ensured what Foucault refers to as “the 
necessities of life.”132 This meant that the state took an active role in ‘supervising’ the price 
and quality of basic goods, as well as their circulation. 133 This includes the development of 
infrastructure—roads and railways—but also other forms of regulation that allow for the 
circulation of goods to proceed with as few hindrances as possible. 
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 The means used by the state to pursue this mode of government were varied, but 
Foucault suggests that  
…it will have to provide itself with whatever is necessary and sufficient for effectively 
integrating men’s activity into the state, into its forces, and into the development of 
these forces, and it will have to ensure that the state, in turn, can stimulate, determine, 
and orientate this activity in such a way that it is in fact useful to the state.134  
 
The state could do this through the use of corporations by giving them a share in its 
sovereignty, thereby extending its control over an array of activities that it would not have 
the capacity to manage directly. As Joshua Barkan suggests "…in seventeenth-century 
England, the corporate charter became a technique by which the Crown both recognized 
the autonomy of these groups and attempted to redirect their power toward the fiscal and 
physical health of the state."135 There are numerous examples, from the early boroughs 
described in the preceding section which gave the state more control over the distribution 
of power domestically, to the imperial corporations of the seventeenth century.  
 This wide variety of functions taken on by corporations can be observed in the 
typology of corporations outlined by Blackstone. Corporations are first divided between 
ecclesiastical and lay. Lay corporations, in turn, are divided between civil and eleemosynary. 
Civil corporations are all those that have been established for temporal purposes such as 
those that have been “erected for the good government of a town or a particular district”—
the mayor, the burgesses, and bailiffs. These also include trading companies, professional 
colleges and associations, for instance the Royal Society, and universities. Eleemosynary 
corporations, on the other hand, are those that fulfil the direction of a founder, such as 
alms houses and hospitals. Through all of these functions, as Barkan summarizes, 
“…corporations became the very basis for regulating conduct" in the early modern period.136 
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Notwithstanding the increasing prevalence and importance of corporations, England 
maintained a notoriously strict approach to their creation all the way up to the mid-
nineteenth century. Incorporation was a narrow public affair requiring either a Royal 
Charter or, later, an Act of Parliament. It could cost upward of £1000 to obtain corporate 
status.137  
This restrictive and selective dynamic of incorporation changes significantly in the 
mid-nineteenth century, with the introduction of general incorporation laws, which made 
the corporate form available by a relatively simple process of registration. This occurred as 
part of a broader shift in the dominant modalities of power and governmentality, from 
police to biopolitics.138 The eighteenth century saw a critique of police and the modes of 
intervention described above, and a turn to regime of biopolitics and liberal 
governmentality premised on the notion of limited intervention, articulated in part through 
a discourse of political economy. Despite this critique, as the epithet “make live and let die” 
neatly expresses, this modality of power functioned through creating and enabling particular 
forms of life in a far more expansive way then had been done under the auspices of police 
and raison d’etat.139 While political economy initially developed as part of raison d’etat, it 
comes in the late eighteenth century, particularly with the work of Adam Smith in The 
Wealth of Nations, to specify a principle of limitation for government intervention, as a 
framework of evaluation intervention as such.140 This principle is the market.  
Police power had also been concerned with a conception of the market, but on 
mercantilist terms and always in service of the growth and expansion of the state.141 In liberal 
governmentality, the market became a “site of truth,” and the law had to function so as to 
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allow that truth to express itself. 142 Government interventions could not be regarded as ends 
in themselves or, as was the case with the old power of police, the expansion of the state.143 
The forms of regulation and intervention associated with mercantilism ceased to have any 
direct purpose because in the market there was a natural equilibrium. In order to allow this 
equilibrium to emerge, competition must “be allowed to operate between private 
individuals,” ostensibly without the state getting in the way.144 Individuals, in the classic (and 
often abused) formulation of Adam Smith, must be allowed to pursue their own self-
interest. As Foucault summarizes, “[t]he good of all will be assured by the behaviour of 
each when the state, the government, allows private interest to operate, which, through the 
phenomena of accumulation and regulation, will serve all.”145 
 However, this does not mean that government no longer intervenes or that the 
level of intervention decreases; in other words, the limitation of government prescribed by 
political economy is not a “negative boundary.”146 Instead,  
[a]n entire domain of possible and necessary interventions appears within the field 
thus delimited, but these interventions will not necessarily, or not as a general rule, 
and very often not at all take the form of rules and regulations. It will be necessary to 
arouse, to facilitate, and to laissez faire, in other words to manage and no longer to 
control through rules and regulations. The essential objective of this management will 
be not so much to prevent things as to ensure that the necessary and natural 
regulations work, or even to create regulations that enable natural regulations to 
work.147  
 
As far as liberal economic theory is concerned, the state simply cannot have knowledge of 
the market. As Foucault summarises, “the economic world is naturally opaque and 
naturally non-totalizable. It is originally and definitely constituted from a multiplicity of 
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points of view which is all the more irreducible as this same multiplicity assures their 
ultimate and spontaneous convergence.”148  
 In relation to corporations, this shift manifested in relation to a particular form of 
organisation, the unincorporated joint stock company. As a model of business organization, 
the joint stock company had been around since at least the early sixteenth century. The 
earliest examples of this form of organisation operated without any formal legal status. 
However, by the sixteenth century, it had become a distinctive form of incorporated 
business organisation, alongside the regulated company. Joint stock companies would have 
been incorporated, usually with monopoly privileges, by Royal Charter. In the first two 
decades of the seventeenth century, chartered joint stock companies flourished, only to 
decline significantly and fall out of favour by the end of the century.149 They began to come 
into use again with the success of the East India Company and the extension of 
incorporation powers to Parliament. Around the 1690s, the unincorporated joint stock 
company also appeared for the first time.150  
 As the story goes, these unincorporated joint stock companies and the unbridled 
speculation they enabled, proliferated to such an extent that they created the notorious 
‘South Sea Bubble’, and subsequent crash, resulting in the passage of the Bubble Act of 
1720, which prohibited unincorporated joint stock companies.151 This, however, is not quite 
accurate. The Bubble Act was, as Harris clarifies, passed before the crash happened. 
Although the Act contained a clause which explicitly made unincorporated joint stock 
companies illegal, this was not the main focus of the Act and this provision was rarely 
enforced. While the Bubble Act of 1720 formally banned and created criminal sanctions 
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for unincorporated joint stock companies, Harris suggests that from its inception the law 
was effectively a “dead letter.”152 There was only one criminal prosecution under the Act in 
nearly a century. After a period of relative inactivity, unincorporated joint stock companies 
began to flourish again in the early nineteenth century, prompting a new conversation 
around joint stock companies and, for a time, a revival of the Bubble Act.153  
 As unincorporated joint stock companies proliferated, they presented a problem for 
regulation as many companies were fraudulent. At the same time, investment in them was 
becoming increasingly widespread, leading to increased pressure to create a legal 
framework for them. Public opinion in general, however, was not in favour of joint stock 
companies. The speculation that drove joint stock investment was considered to be a 
particularly egregious sin. Those who petitioned on behalf of legal protection for joint stock 
companies put forward a variety of arguments which were not immediately influential, but 
nonetheless anticipated a logic that would eventually become dominant. In particular, in a 
way that lends credence to Foucault’s description of political economy and biopolitical 
governmentality, they argued for corporate privileges through a claim to commercial 
freedom and a right to the privileges of corporate status. Company promoters, as James 
Taylor describes, “couched their arguments in the language of laissez-faire and freedom 
from judicial and legislative interference.”154 There was also an attempt to situate the joint 
stock company within a longer history of commercial association, implicitly suggesting that 
corporate status was itself something natural. One promoter, in an anonymous pamphlet, 
derided attempts “to mislead the Country, to suppose that an Association of Gentlemen 
for commercial purposes is illegal. Such Associations have existed for centuries past; and 
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are we now, in this age of civil liberty, to be deprived of commercial freedom.”155 Finally, 
promoters tried to show that their activities were in the national interest, because they 
promoted competition and helped to break up monopolies.156 In spite of these arguments, 
it was paradoxically a negative view of unincorporated companies that led to free 
incorporation, as there was a sense that fraud occurred because the joint stock companies 
were unincorporated.157 The space of illegality in which the companies operated offered 
very little accountability: once a company had been deemed illegal, there was little that 
investors and creditors could do to retrieve their funds. Initial measures taken in 1834 and 
1835 sought to extend some privileges, but also to maintain control over incorporation 
itself.158 As a result, the prevailing regime in which incorporation was a selective grant or gift 
largely held during the first several decades of the nineteenth century.  
 The Joint Stock Companies Act of 1844 changed all of this, at least in law — the Act, 
as Taylor summarises, effectively “transform[ed] incorporation from a closely-guarded 
privilege into a freely-available right.”159 This was the first time in the history of incorporation 
that they “could be formed without explicit, deliberated, and specific State permission.”160 
However, the intention of the act was not to create a freely available right, echoing Hart, 
but rather “to bring these companies within the law where they would cease to be such a 
disruptive influence on the economy, and to enable shareholders to perform their 
regulatory duties more effectively."161 It represented a different way of regulating 
corporations, by removing the state from the role of deciding which associations and 
endeavours warranted protection. It replaced the old process of procuring Royal Charters 
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and Acts of Parliament “with a mechanical self-regulating system which would exclude 
government discretion altogether, and establishing a new authority at one remove from 
central government to oversee the operation of this system, the Join-Stock Companies 
Registrar."162 In keeping with Foucault’s understanding of liberal governmentality, it was 
thought that the government could not decide which corporations were legitimate and 
which would be fraudulent. As a result, they adopted free incorporation as “a blanket 
solution: security to the public was to be provided by applying the same rules to all 
companies, good, bad and fraudulent."163  
  The provision of incorporation by registration for joint stock companies highlights a 
key tension at the heart of liberal governmentality. While being depicted (mostly 
retrospectively, as highlighted above) as a retreat of the state motivated by a concern with 
how to govern less, it is demonstrates a concern to regulate more. Incorporation by 
registration was comprised of a set of interventions which increase rather than decrease the 
role of law in the constitution and maintenance of economic and social relations. Free 
incorporation was understood as a privatization of the corporation, yet “their formation 
relied on a State statute and was subject to State regulation.”164 However, the fact of this 
greater penetration is masked by the conception of incorporation as a right. This, as I will 
argue in the next section, is a consequence of the normalisation of law and the corporate 
form.  
The Normalisation of Incorporation  
 This section will argue, drawing on Foucault, that the historical shift from 
incorporation as a “gift of sovereignty” to a private right constitutes a normalisation of law. 
Alongside the shift in forms of governmentality described above, from police to biopolitics, 
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Foucault also describes a shift in the dominant modalities of power, or at least in their 
configuration. There is on the one hand, a sovereign or juridical form of power that comes 
from the Middle Ages. In the constitution of the monarchies, and eventually states, this 
form of power “functioned as a principle of right” through which the sovereign could 
transcend localised conflicts, “identifying its will with the law.” 165 The law served as a 
mechanism of coordination and a force that could reconcile the interests of feudal lords in 
service of a nascent state.166 This ascendancy of a discourse of right is historically tied for 
Foucault to the reception of Roman law in the twelfth century, and the form of royal power 
to which it corresponds “has provided the essential focus around which legal thought has 
been elaborated. It is in response to the demands of royal power, for its profit and to serve 
as its instrument or justification, that the juridical edifice of our own society has been 
developed. Right in the West is the King’s right.”167 This form of power operates as “a 
subtraction mechanism, a right to appropriate a portion of the wealth, a tax of products, 
goods and services, labour and blood, levied on the subjects.”168 Sovereign or juridical power 
is primarily characterised by the sovereign’s “right to decide life and death.”169 While not 
an unconditional right, it was allowable as a “defense of the sovereign” and in the name of 
“his own survival.”170 
While Foucault is clear that power was not simply or purely exercised in a juridical 
manner even in the Middle Ages, prohibition and right were nonetheless “the language of 
power” as well as its “mode of manifestation and the form of its acceptability.”171 The theory 
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of sovereignty served as a legitimation mechanism for a particular consolidation of power 
and a particular form of domination. The movements for popular sovereignty and 
parliamentary democracy in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries maintained this focus 
on sovereignty, even as they struggled against the monarchies. As Foucault observes, “it is 
always the limits of this sovereign power that are put in question, its prerogatives that are 
challenged.”172 The theory of sovereignty becomes an instrument of opposition and critique, 
but one that does not challenge “the juridico-monarchic sphere as such.”173 Instead, this 
critique argued for “a pure and rigorous juridical system to which all the mechanisms of 
power could conform… it did not challenge the principle which held that law had to be the 
very form of power, and that power always had to be exercised in the form of law.”174  
However, alongside the demands for popular sovereignty and the rise of 
parliamentary democracy, Foucault also observes the emergence of another modality or 
“mechanism of power,” one that is “absolutely incompatible with the relations of 
sovereignty.”175 This is disciplinary power. It is not found in or emanating from the state, but 
in heterogeneous sites like the factory, the barracks, the school, and the clinic. Discipline 
describes not a hierarchical exercise of power, but a form of power that manifests in 
“relations that go right down to the depths of society.”176 Disciplinary power is “diffuse, rarely 
formulated in continuous, systematic discourse; it is often made up of bits and pieces; it 
implements a disparate set of tools or methods.”177 These ‘tools’ or ‘methods’ operate in the 
realm of bodies and subjectivities, fashioning individuals for the extraction of productive 
value (time, labour) while also engendering their submission. “The historical moment of 
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the disciplines,” he explains, “was the moment when an art of the human body was born, 
which was directed not only at the growth of its skills, nor at the intensification of its 
subjection, but at the formation of a relation that in the mechanism itself makes it more 
obedient as it becomes more useful, and conversely.”178 It is “centered on the body as a 
machine: its disciplining, the optimization of its capabilities, the extortion of its forces, the 
parallel increase of its usefulness and its docility, its integration into systems of efficient and 
economic controls….”179 
While mechanisms of discipline had long been in existence, in monasteries, 
workshops and armies, Foucault suggests that it is only in the seventeenth and eighteenth 
centuries that they became “general formulas of domination.”180 Discipline’s emergence at 
this level not only coincided with popular sovereignty, but also made it possible. As Foucault 
explains,  
The juridical systems--this applies both to their codification and to their 
theorization--have enabled sovereignty to be democratized through the 
constitution of a public right articulated upon collective sovereignty, while at the 
same time this democratization of sovereignty was fundamentally determined by 
and grounded in mechanisms of disciplinary coercion.181  
 
Where sovereign power was exercised deductively, as a power to take life, disciplinary 
power is a power over life. “Discipline,” as Foucault writes, “'makes' individuals; it is the 
specific technique of a power that regards individuals both as objects and as instruments of 
its exercise."182 These individuals, the effects of disciplinary power, may then in turn be the 
subjects of popular sovereignty. To this end, the discourse of right that emerges from the 
French Revolution onward is the product of “a normalizing society” and “the historical 
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outcome of a technology of power centered on life.”183 These forms of right, as Foucault 
suggests, “made an essentially normalizing power acceptable.”184 
The emergence of disciplinary power on this level, while exceeding the confines of 
formal institutions, also had a profound effect on law and the mechanisms of justice. While 
the formal institutions remain, “other types of other types of assessment have slipped in, 
profoundly altering its rules of elaboration.”185 Alongside this, Foucault also observes that 
the function of judgement, usually confined to the juridical sphere, has become dispersed 
in society, through an array of “subsidiary authorities.” 186 Yet discipline does not derive its 
rules from the juridical, but from a conception of nature, and reproduces itself through 
norms: “[t]he code they come to define is not that of law, but that of normalization.”187  
 These two forms of power, disciplinary and juridical or sovereign power, remain 
absolutely heterogeneous, so much so “that they cannot possibly be reduced to each 
other.”188 However, law and sovereign power do not disappear with the emergence of 
disciplinary power; instead, they operate in tandem. “The powers of modern society,” he 
writes, “are exercised through, on the basis of, and by virtue of, this very heterogeneity 
between a public right of sovereignty and a polymorphous disciplinary mechanism."189 The 
shifts in governmentality from police to biopolitics described above configure these forms 
of power somewhat differently. Governmentality more broadly describes a certain art of 
government as it appears in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, in which the concern 
is no longer simply to establish the legitimacy of sovereignty and law, but with the 
articulation of a rationality of government. In particular, the art of government transfers a 
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conception of economy previously located in the management of the family to the state. It 
is “the correct manner of managing individuals, goods and wealth within the family (which 
a good father is expected to do in relation to his wife, children and servants) and of making 
the family fortunes prosper—how to introduce this meticulous attention of the father 
towards his family into the management of the state.”190 It is this same notion of economy 
that, in the eighteenth century, comes to figure as “a level of reality, a field of intervention…” 
and that forms the basis of political economy in the nineteenth century.191  
This conception of economy escapes the circularity of sovereign legitimacy, which 
is ultimately grounded in obedience to the law, and creates an end for government that is, 
in a sense, beyond itself. It is not for the sake of legitimacy that the state might intervene, 
but for a plural conception of utility. “Government,” as Foucault explains, “is defined as a 
right manner of disposing things so as to lead not to the form of the common good, as the 
jurists’ text would have said, but to an end which is ‘convenient’ for each of the things that 
are to be good.”192 The justification for government is no longer divine right, but a technical 
“knowledge of things.”193 In practical terms, it is connected to the specific practices of ‘police’ 
which accompanied mercantilism, but these, as noted above, were still focused on the 
expansion of the state as such, and thus still very much anchored in a theory of sovereignty. 
It is the development of the notion of economy, and with it the idea of the population, that 
takes governmentality thoroughly beyond the confines of sovereignty. The population has 
its own dynamics and tendencies that are understood as being intrinsic to the population, 
knowledge of which then determines appropriate techniques and ends of government. With 
the advent of population, police is supplanted by biopolitics, a form of governmentality that 
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addresses itself to biological life and population-level phenomena, including “accidents, 
infirmities, and various anomalies,” as well as “more subtle, rational mechanisms: insurance, 
individual and collective savings, safety measures, and so on.”194  
Biopolitics exceeds the bounds of the old right of sovereignty, which was “unable to 
govern the economic and political body of a society that was undergoing both a demographic 
explosion and industrialization.”195 However, sovereignty does not disappear with the advent 
of biopolitics, nor does disciplinary power. Biopolitics “penetrate” and “permeate” the 
sovereign’s “old right—to take life or let live,” infusing it with “the power to ‘make’ life and 
‘let’ die.” 196 Biopolitics also “embed[s] itself in existing disciplinary techniques,” functioning 
not to individualise, as disciplinary power does, but to ‘massify’ and regularize the 
collective.197 This becomes, as Foucault describes, a “power of regularization.”198  
In the context of this shift from a sovereign and juridical form of power to one of 
discipline and biopolitics, it has frequently been argued that Foucault ‘expelled’ law from 
modernity.199 However, Foucault insists that sovereignty is an “absolutely integral” part of 
the “general mechanism of power in our society.”200 However, the particular manner in 
which sovereign and juridical power function changes, as do their articulation in relation to 
disciplinary power and biopolitics. To this end, a series of comments in The History of 
Sexuality have been particularly relevant. After elaborating the shift from a sovereign 
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modality of power to one of biopolitics and discipline, Foucault suggests first that “law 
cannot help but be armed, and its arm par excellence, is death; to those who transgress it, it 
replies, at least as a last resort, with that absolute menace. The law always refers to the 
sword.”201 This is followed by a qualification in which Foucault explains that  
I do not mean to say that law fades into the background or that institutions of justice 
tend to disappear, but rather that the law operates more and more as a norm, and 
the judicial institution is increasingly incorporated into a continuum of apparatuses 
(medical, administrative, and so on) whose functions are for the most part 
regulatory.202 
 
These comments have been interpreted in a variety of ways, from reinforcing the so-called 
expulsion of law from modernity to forging a split between juridical power and law. 
However, at a minimum, Foucault’s insistence that law always refers to the sword suggests 
an enduring connection between law and sovereignty, even as law comes to function “more 
and more as a norm.”203 The challenge for political and legal theory is not to think of law 
without sovereignty, but to understand how sovereignty and law function as mechanisms of 
biopolitical and disciplinary power. Moreover, Foucault emphasises that “[t]he system of 
right, the domain of the law, are permanent agents of these relations of domination, these 
polymorphous techniques of subjugation,” suggesting that even as the underlying form of 
domination changes, law and sovereignty persist.204 
The history of incorporation demonstrates how law might retain a connection to 
sovereignty and also become normalised. The body corporate is a paradigmatic example 
of the sovereign or juridical mechanism of power. While it is not explicitly negative or 
deductive in the way that Foucault describes, it is intimately bound up with sovereignty, as 
a grant or ‘gift’ of sovereignty itself.205 As Barkan argues, "...corporate power and state 
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sovereignty depend on one another, each establishing the other's condition of possibility."206 
Corporations are amongst the many “subsidiary authorities” that proliferate as part of the 
coincidence of disciplinary and sovereign forms of power.207 The early modern corporations 
provided numerous heterogeneous sites where a newly ascendant disciplinary power could 
take hold, implicitly and indirectly shaping the conduct of individuals, while simultaneously 
increasing the power of the state. However, while the early modern corporations help to 
facilitate the operation of disciplinary power, police more generally was still fundamentally 
rooted in sovereignty, justifying forms of direct intervention in, for instance, the creation of 
monopolies. The corporate charter is a limited, not to mention tightly controlled, form of 
sovereign power. Moreover, in this context, sovereignty does not function in a simply 
repressive manner. It always “oversteps” these boundaries.208  
When incorporation was only available by Royal Charter or Act of Parliament, this 
integral connection to and limitation by state sovereignty was explicit, in part because it had 
to be. Recalling Thomas Hobbes’ description of these “bodies politic,” he emphasizes that 
“the power of the representative is always limited: and that which prescribeth the limits 
thereof, is the power of the sovereign. For power unlimited, is absolute sovereignty.”209 
However, as argued in the last chapter, the state’s supremacy is not inherent. As Paul Stern 
writes regarding the colonial corporations, they “exercised a great deal of autonomy, some 
were even literally self-constituting,” even though they were “theoretically dependent on the 
Crown, in both principle and practice.”210 It is precisely the act of creating these corporations 
and giving them formal privileges, that helps to constitute the state. The state could produce 
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the appearance of an inherent supremacy by differentiating itself from these corporations, 
producing its identity as the state through a process of negation.  
While the introduction of incorporation by registration made incorporation more 
readily available, it did not fundamentally change this dynamic. Incorporation is no less 
connected to sovereignty than it is in the early modern period. However, as Taylor writes, 
“[t]he reform was also facilitated by, and helped to perpetuate, a reconceptualisation of 
corporate privileges as private rights, and of joint-stock companies as private bodies.” 211 The 
reconceptualization of incorporation as a right only obscures its enduring connection to 
sovereignty, making incorporation appear to be a form freedom. Not only that, but the 
corporate form appears to inhere or come from the group itself rather than a legal fiction, 
making it such that incorporation is an act of recognition rather than the grant of a privilege. 
Incorporation as a right, in other words, creates a form of disciplinary subjection, similar to 
that which enabled popular democracy, that normalises the law. This normalised form of 
incorporation conforms to the demands of liberal governmentality. As a right and a 
freedom, incorporation can be regarded as a merely ‘facilitative’ form of intervention, while 
the prior restrictive regime “became an unjustifiable interference” in private enterprise 
which had to be removed. 212  
However, the private sphere, as it comes to be constituted in the mid-nineteenth 
century is not beyond the control of the state, but rather “the effect of a multitude of state 
and other governmental interventions.”213 Rights may grant ‘freedoms’ but these freedoms 
are always also a form of subjection and ultimately domination. As Foucault suggests 
“right…transmits and puts in motion relations that are not relations of sovereignty, but of 
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domination.”214 Thus, incorporation, as a right, should be viewed “not terms of a legitimacy 
to be established, but in terms of the methods of subjugation that it instigates.”215 
Incorporation as right and norm instigates a much different form of subjugation from early 
modern forms of incorporation. Corporations become not just sites of discipline; the form 
itself takes on a disciplinary function, organising social life for the purposes of the market. 
Conclusion 
 This form of discipline and its relationship to the market, and particularly co-
operatives, will be discussed in more detail in the next chapter through the concept of 
enclosure. This chapter will conclude by returning to the debates over the nature of 
corporate personality introduced at the opening. Conceptions of incorporation as a right, a 
practical device, or a reflection of the real personality of associations participate in and 
reflect the normalisation of law described above. The body corporate, as shown above, 
imports a transcendent metaphysical structure into secular law. Thus, far from being a 
reflection of the ‘real’ personality of groups, as Gierke argues, the body corporate imports 
its own historicity in connection to a medieval political theology and imposes it on the 
groups that receive legal recognition. The pragmatists, by supposing that incorporation can 
be reduced to the specific rights and duties it imposes, neglect the potential effects of this 
form and its history. Finally, Hart’s argument that incorporation is a right and a freedom 
normalises the form by disregarding the ways in which it remains connected to sovereignty 
and might coercively discipline social life. In contrast to these arguments, this chapter 
argues that legal recognition as a body corporate has a constitutive effect. In particular, the 
emergence of biopolitics forges a union between law and life, or “the inscription of natural 
life into the juridico-political order of the nation-state”—so much so that the distinction 
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between law and life would become at times indiscernible. 216 In this respect, law functions 
constitutively by supplanting other forms of relation. It does not matter if this status is freely 
given, a narrowly guarded privilege, or a practical device. Any identity with the world reflects 
not its ability to approximate or give form to what groups may perceive as their own unity, 
but the penetration of law in everyday life. In spite of these fundamental shifts, Foucault 
laments that political theory continues to operate as though sovereignty were the dominant 
modality of power, and the law the main mechanism through which it is exercised. “At 
bottom,” he writes, “despite the differences in epochs and objectives, the representation of 
power has remained under the spell of monarchy. In political thought and analysis, we have 
not cut off the head of the king.”217  
Jean-Luc Nancy suggests that individual and collective unity must always be a kind 
of fiction, because any such unity is impossible. The pretence to unity is both predicated 
upon and simultaneously undermined by an inoperative (dèsoeuvrement) sociality. The 
specifically legal fiction of incorporation imports a transcendent metaphysical structure of 
the person from the medieval church. The normalisation of incorporation, when it is taken 
to be a right, or a reflection of a natural or real unity, as became the case in the mid-
nineteenth century has the effect of immanentizing the transcendent reference, making the 
incorporated group appear to be an immanent totality.218 The body corporate thus becomes 
a form of “deific substitute,” like the state had a few centuries prior, albeit one that relies 
not on the perpetual generation of its identity through negation, but that continues to take 
its authority from law, even if it is no longer conceived of as doing so because the form has 
been normalised.219 The next chapter will explore the specific consequences of this 
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normalisation and immanentisation of the body corporate for the legal recognition of co-
operatives 
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Chapter 4: Constituting the Co-operative  
 
So common an object of the courts has the corporation aggregate become, that sometimes 
when one reads the law reports, one dreams of a time coming when natural persons will 
have ceased to exist, and the last man will have turned himself into a company with limited 
liability.1 
 
Introduction 
 This chapter finally turns to a more specific account of the legal recognition of the co-
operative movement in mid-nineteenth century England, elaborating how incorporation 
served to both discipline and depoliticise the co-operative. In chapter 1, I began from an 
account of the history of the co-operative movement in which the law was afforded only a 
minor role. The law, if it mattered at all, was only an instrument of other, more dominant 
forces such as the economic; or simply an enabling participant in the growth and 
development of the movement. It also obscured an underlying political question to do with 
the transition between the practices associated with food riots and rebellions of the moral 
economy in the eighteenth century, to the co-operative as a distinct form of organization in 
the mid-nineteenth century. In the two intervening chapters, I suggested firstly that legal 
recognition is constitutive of the state, emphasising that the ‘moral economy’ and the ‘co-
operative’ are not autonomous legal orders from that of the state, but reflect shifting forms 
of power and governmentality in the constitution of the modern state. Then, I suggested 
further that the law functions constitutively, imposing a particular form—the body 
corporate—onto the co-operative. This chapter argues that legal recognition functioned to 
discipline and depoliticise the co-operative, with the body corporate functioning as a form 
of metaphysical enclosure.  
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The legal recognition of co-operatives, as recounted in earlier chapters, has 
generally been regarded as enabling or facilitative for the co-operative movement. G.D.H. 
Cole, for instance, suggests that legal recognition met specific ‘needs’ that co-operatives had, 
thereby allowing them to flourish. The co-operative societies, as Cole writes, were beset 
with legal “disabilities” – impediments to their operation that needed to be removed if they 
were to be successful.2  
The difficulty was not that Co-operative Societies were under the ban of the courts, 
but rather that no special provision had been made for them, so that they were 
unable to enlist the positive protection of the law when it was needed either to 
secure them against fraudulent or negligent officials or to enable them to carry on 
trade in such a way as to enter into firm contracts, to sue or be sued as collective 
bodies, or to enjoy any reasonable security of their funds.3 
 
These impediments were not, Cole cautions, active restraints: “co-operation never suffered 
under legal disabilities as severe as those which beset the Trade Unions.”4 Moreover “[i]t 
must not be thought... that these disabilities were due in any considerable degree to a 
deliberate attempt to hamper the growth of the Movement.”5 Instead, the impediment is 
precisely the lack of an adequate legal structure and in particular legal personality. The 
opposition that Cole sets up between the overt repression experienced by the trade unions 
and the relatively benign neglect experienced by co-operative societies underscores the 
perception that legal recognition was simply enabling for the co-operative movement. 
However, as the last two chapters have suggested, the legal recognition of co-operatives 
involves more than just a ‘bringing within’ or the provision of useful facilities.  
 This chapter will provide a different narrative of the legal recognition of co-
operatives and the debates that led up to it, situating them in relation to the emergence of 
liberal and biopolitical governmentality, and focusing particularly on the role played by the 
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Christian Socialists. The Christian Socialists are so important in this genealogy, not because 
they have a monopoly on the meaning of co-operation, nor because their understanding is 
more truthful or accurate than others, but because they played such a central role in 
securing legal recognition for co-operatives and in the movement that grew thereafter. As 
this chapter will show, the Christian Socialists and other supporters of legal recognition for 
co-operatives saw them as a means of disciplining the working classes by exposing them to 
the market. This view is explored through a reading of the two parliamentary Select 
Committee reports that eventually led to the Industrial and Provident Societies Act of 
1852.6 These reports place co-operatives at the centre of shifting views about the 
relationship between morality and the market, and the role of government in facilitating its 
natural laws. These debates also helped to reopen a wider conversation about limited 
liability in the mid-nineteenth century. The pressure to provide limited liability for 
companies came, in the first instance, from the Christian Socialists themselves, who argued 
that this would enable the working and middle classes to participate in the market.  
The chapter then turns to the relationship between incorporation and market 
discipline, arguing that incorporation functioned as a form of metaphysical enclosure that 
both disciplined and depoliticised the co-operative. While the corporate form and limited 
liability are generally regarded as a response to the needs of business or the consequence 
of shifting modes of production under capitalism, the inclusion of working class co-
operatives as integral to the development of these forms helps to expose the disciplinary 
character of these forms. “Discipline,” as Michel Foucault writes, “sometimes requires 
enclosure.”7 Continuing the discussion of the normalisation of the corporate form in the 
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nineteenth century from the previous chapter, I argue that functioning as a form of 
metaphysical enclosure, not unlike the physical barriers that enclosed the commons, or the 
subjectifying walls of the prison in the panopticon. The metaphor of enclosure links the 
specific history of the body corporate form and its metaphysicalisation in the medieval 
church with its use in the nineteenth century. As a form of transcendent unity, signified by 
the corporate person, it functions in an “immanentist” or “totalitarian” manner as described 
by Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe and Jean-Luc Nancy.8  
Legal Recognition and Market Discipline  
 
 The legal recognition of co-operative societies is not the story of a social movement 
struggling for recognition by the state. Not only was there no widespread effort on the part 
of co-operative societies to reform the law in the mid-nineteenth century, as Phillip N. 
Backstrom writes, there was not much of a co-operative ‘movement’ at all.  
To say that Co-operation in England in the 1850s lacked definition is to understate 
the situation. While it is true that the work of the Equitable Pioneers had gained 
considerable attention, Rochdale was not viewed as the centre of a Co-operative 
Movement—indeed, no such centre existed, nor for that matter was there much of 
anything to be called a Movement.9 
 
Instead, the legislation was in many respects the by-product of a much wider debate about 
social reform and the role of capital and the market in society. While it was intended to 
promote the development of co-operative societies, these were imagined not simply as a 
means of improving the condition of the working classes, but also facilitating their moral 
and political discipline by exposing them to the market.  
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 The main proponents of legal recognition for co-operative societies were the Christian 
Socialists. In the late 1840s, the Christian Socialists were a relatively new and ultimately 
short-lived group of philanthropists and social reformers linked by their shared dismay at 
the miserable condition of working class labour and a vague “common desire to somehow 
Christianise socialism and to socialise Christianity.”10 Their group began to form on the day 
of the Chartist meeting at Kennington Common, partially motivated by an anxiety that 
disorder might ensue. While their views differed on whether or not working men should 
ever have the suffrage, they shared the notion that the capacity of the working classes must 
be improved for them to be capable of those rights. As one of their founders and arguably 
the most ‘democratic’ among them, John Malcom Ludlow writes in their first journal, 
Politics for the People,  
I long for Universal Suffrage. I long for the day when every man in England shall have 
a vote—ay, and more than a vote; that is to say, when every man in England shall enjoy 
a share in the government of his country, in the full proportion of his capacity and 
worth, and when every means shall be supplied by all his fellow men for the full 
development of his capacity—for the full perfecting of his worth….But I cannot claim 
the suffrage—I cannot claim any other privilege for those who are unworthy and 
incapable of exercising it, so long as they are thus unworthy or incapable.11  
 
At first, they did not know how best to apply their principles and focused their efforts on 
sanitation projects. However, some in the group felt that this focus took them too far away 
from the working classes. It was then that James Ludlow, often cited as the founder of the 
Christian Socialists, returned from a trip to France, where he had observed the success of 
self-governing workshops (associations ouvrieres). He convinced the rest of the group of the 
virtue of such associations, which “were endeavouring to beat down competition by 
competition itself.”12 
                                                     
10 Ibid., 29.  
11 John Townsend, “The Suffrage,” Politics for the People 1 (1848): 11. John Townsend was a pseudonym 
for James Ludlow.  
12 James Ludlow, The Autobiography of a Christian Socialist, ed. A.D. Murray (London: Frank Cass and 
Company Limited, 1981), 156.  
 
 
CHAPTER 4 | 207 
 
 
 In 1850, the Christian Socialists constituted themselves as The Society for Promoting 
Working Men’s Associations, tasked “[t]o carry out and extend the principles and practice 
of associated Labour.”13 None of the Christian Socialists had been involved in co-operative 
societies prior to this effort. As Cole writes, “[i]t is a curious fact that the Christian Socialists, 
when they first launched out on their attempt to foster Producers’ Co-operative Societies of 
working men, seem to have known practically nothing about all the previous attempts that 
had been made in Great Britain to achieve this very thing.”14 The Christian Socialists did 
much to galvanize the co-operative movement, setting up offices in the North, organising 
conferences and touring local societies. 
 The Christian Socialists’ legal reform efforts seem to have been motivated as much 
by a desire to protect their own investments in co-operative societies, which were prone to 
failure, as they were to provide a legal basis for co-operation more generally. As Rob 
McQueen explains, “[t]he more often co-operatives failed, the more strident became the 
voice of those in the Christian Socialist camp calling for the introduction of a measure that 
would allow such undertakings to assume corporate status and the cloak of limited 
liability.”15 There was some interest in legal reform from the ‘Northern Societies’, as 
indicated by a conference held in Manchester in December of 1850, organised by the 
Christian Socialists. At least forty-four societies were represented at a similar conference 
held the following year. However, by the time these conferences were held, the Christian 
Socialists had already started the process of lobbying parliament. This early focus on legal 
reform may derive from the fact that several of the Christian Socialists were lawyers, and 
Ludlow in particular specialised in company law. As Ludlow writes in his autobiography,  
                                                     
13 The Society for Promoting Working-Men’s Associations, “Constitution,” in eds. G.D.H. Cole and A.W. 
Wilson, British Working Class Movements: Select Documents 1789-1875 (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 
1965), 435. 
14 G.D.H. Cole, A Century of Co-operation (Manchester: The Co-operative Union Ltd., 1944), 97.  
15 Rob McQueen, A Social History of Company Law: Great Britain and the Australian Colonies 1854-1920 
(London: Routledge, 2009), 68.  
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It is hard at the present day to realise the hindrances to almost every kind of 
commercial association that existed in 1850…All we lawyer members of the Council 
of Promoters were fully aware of this; none probably so much as myself. In advising 
working men to associate under such legal conditions, we were therefore morally 
bound to pledge our utmost energies [to reforming the law].16  
 
That the Christian Socialists were working at a remove from the immediate concerns of co-
operative societies is evidenced by the frequent admonitions of those societies in the pages 
of the Journal of Association, a periodical set up in part to chronicle their legal reform 
efforts. They begin by reassuring societies that the government is inclined to help them, so 
much so that the government “allowed this Bill to be prepared by a member of our Society, 
a lawyer, and a writer in this paper—one of your own friends, therefore.”17 However, when 
the request for petitions to support this bill only received twelve responses, the tone palpably 
shifts. “I tell you, that the only reason your Bill was not passed last Session was, because 
most of you didn’t show that you cared a straw about the matter.”18 Working class co-
operative societies are scolded for their lack of forethought.  
‘Well’, you might say, ‘he was right; we didn’t mind waiting, and we don’t mind 
waiting—our Associations and Stores are getting on well enough without the help of 
the Law.’ Good; I admit it, so they are—and why—because they are not yet worth 
ruining—no man can make his fortune yet by breaking up or cheating an Association 
or Store; therefore very few rogues have joined you as yet. But just get on for another 
year or two as you are doing now—make your £10 notes in £100 or £1000 notes, and 
then see whether some Association-King won’t arise, pocketing your property and 
setting you at defiance.19 
 
That working class co-operative societies were initially uninterested in legal reform 
complicates Cole’s suggestion that co-operatives suffered under particular “legal 
disabilities”20 While the legal position of co-operative societies was indeed precarious in a 
formal sense, as will be described below, the suggestion that they required a legal form 
participates in the tendency to read the history of the co-operative movement in terms of 
                                                     
16 Ludlow, Autobiography, 197.  
17 Thomas Hughes, “Law for Associations,” Journal of Association 1, no. 1 (1852): 1.  
18 Ibid., 2.  
19 Ibid.. Emphasis in original.  
20 Cole, Century, 114. 
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what it would become, and casts legal recognition as the progressive realisation of this 
outcome. This, in turn, obscures the ways in which legal recognition served to constitute the 
co-operative and the disciplinary logic that motivated legal recognition. 
 Further, the Christian Socialists’ remonstrations underscore their belief that the 
working classes were not yet ready for political rights, nor would they be unless they 
committed to the legal reform process the Christian Socialists were leading. 
Then you’ll all sing out loud enough, I’ll warrant; you’ll make your voices heard from 
John O’Groats to Land’s End; there’ll be public meetings, placards, and spouting 
matches, enough to deafen one, and your Ernest Jones’s, and such like, who shirk 
and carp at the movement now, will be thundering out sonorous sentences on ‘Class 
legislation’, ‘Association persecuted in Parliament’, ‘Co-operation not represented’—
Humbug! I don’t believe that you would have so good a chance of getting this Bill 
passed at once in a Universal Suffrage Parliament as you have in this present one—the 
Government is with you, and ready to do your work; influential men in every party 
(except the ultra Free-traders) have promised to support the Bill—Why, not a single 
member to whom we went last Session (and we saw between us 30 or 40) refused to 
support you. You are represented for this purpose and if you don’t avail yourselves 
of this chance, I shall begin to think you don’t deserve to be represented for any 
other.21  
 
The legal position of co-operative societies was indeed ‘precarious’ prior to the passage of 
the Industrial and Provident Societies Act 1852, particularly for middle class reformers who 
wished to invest in them. However, this precarious position does not reflect an inherent 
need for legal forms, but a shifting terrain in which it became increasingly difficult to operate 
without one. Before the first IPS Act, many societies operated without any explicit legal 
form, falling instead under the general laws of partnership. This status was made 
problematic by the passage of the Joint Stock Companies Act 1844 which required 
partnerships with more than twenty-five people to register as companies. This was a problem 
for co-operative societies, not least because the shares in joint stock companies are 
transferable, meaning that a society could be potentially taken over by investors who did not 
share their values. Some societies had also registered as Friendly Societies, under the 
                                                     
21 Hughes, “Law for Associations,” 1. 
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auspices of what was known as the Frugal Investment Clause, which allowed friendly 
societies to engage in trade with their own members. However, this status only allowed them 
to hold property through trustees, and they fell outside the protection of the law as soon as 
they traded with non-members.  
 Moreover, none of these legal forms, at this time, offered limited liability. It was widely 
acknowledged that limited liability was of negligible importance to the working classes 
themselves. As Ludlow writes, “…the real safety of the members of our associations lay in 
this, that very few of them had anything to lose.”22 Nonetheless limited liability became a 
central aspect of the debates over the legal recognition of co-operatives. The Christian 
Socialists had what was then considered quite a radical position on limited liability, 
advocating that it should be available for all forms of enterprise and not just co-operative 
societies.23 In this position, they found themselves in the company the staunchest supporters 
of political economy and laissez-faire.24 Limited liability was a notoriously controversial 
issue. The same reluctance to grant corporate privileges to joint stock companies described 
in the last chapter persisted in debates about limited liability and reflect predominant views 
about the relationship between morality and the market. In the early nineteenth century, 
approaches to the morality of the market were dominated by evangelism, particularly 
associated with Thomas Chalmers. In the evangelical view, the market functioned in a 
retributive fashion: failure to conform to the demands of the market, which required 
particular forms of moral restraint, led to failure as a form of punishment.25 In turn, hard 
                                                     
22 Ludlow, Autobiography, 197.  
23 See McQueen, Social History, 72. As Ludlow writes, “Above all, I had formed a strong opinion on what 
was then a moot question, though now long since settled in the sense which I advocated, vis. that of limited 
liability in association trading.” (Ludlow, Autobiography, 199).  
24 Jeremy Bentham, for instance, advocated limited liability, writing “[w]ere it lawful for every one to engage 
in commercial undertakings for a limited amount, how many facilities would be afforded to men of genius! 
All classes of society would furnish assistance to inventive industry…. The spirit of gaming, diverted from its 
pernicious direction, might serve to increase the productive energy of commerce” (Quoted in Hilton, Age of 
Atonement, 257).  
25 See Paul Johnson, “Market Disciplines,” in ed. Peter Mandler, Liberty and Authority in Victorian Britain 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), 203-223. Under the influence of evangelism, success or failure on 
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work was to be rewarded: “[e]ffort and enterprise were rewarded with high wages and profit; 
idleness and inattention punished with poverty and the bankruptcy court.”26 In order for this 
retributive mechanism to work, investors needed to bear the full responsibility of their 
actions. Consequently, there was a reluctance to adopt regulatory measures that would 
provide protection in the event of business failure, such as limited liability.  
The shift in attitude away from the retributive, evangelical view was precipitated by a 
range of factors. Boyd Hilton suggests that one reason may be the new permissibility of 
economic growth.27 Other countries in Europe had begun to industrialise, and Thomas 
Malthus’s concerns about overpopulation were diminishing in their hold, as faith in the 
ability to produce to meet the demands of an increasing population grew. The fear of 
overpopulation was replaced by a concern with underinvestment: it was thought that the 
severe consequences of business failure would serve as a deterrent to investors. Alongside 
this, Hilton cites a new desire to maximize the public benefits associated with profit-seeking 
as particularly important.28 In addition, as more people from the middle classes began to 
invest, it was difficult to justify holding them accountable for the sins and failures of more 
powerful businessmen over whom they had no control. These could be the elderly or 
widows, even servants, whose primary motivation for investment was not speculation, but 
security.29 There needed to be some regard for the “innocence of the average investor.”30 
                                                     
the market was conceived of as reward or punishment. Unlimited liability was an important part of this 
dynamic, as in order to work investors needed to bear full responsibility for the risks they took. Extreme 
events, such as the Irish famine, were only taken as further proof of the retributive balancing mechanism of 
the market. For Malthusians, drawing on Malthus’ own reflections “the famine was simply the inevitable 
physical check to population which resulted from the people’s failure to adopt greater moral restrain over 
time” (ibid., 208). Chalmers, similarly thought that “it was the backward nature of the Irish economy as 
much as the backward nature of the people that was to blame” (ibid.). The short duration of the famine 
appeared to vindicate the free market view.  
26 Ibid., 210.  
27 Boyd Hilton, The Age of Atonement: The Influence of Evangelism on Social and Economic Thought, 
1785-1865 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986), 265.  
28 Ibid. 
29 Ibid.  
30 Ibid.  
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The evangelical ideas of Chalmers gave way to the “more optimistic liberalism” of J.S. Mill.31 
Instead of retribution, he advocated the importance of a “reputation for honesty” in order 
to enable success on the market.32 This reputation, along with a system of registration and 
accounting to foster transparency and public scrutiny, would determine whether or not a 
business could be successful. The political economists advocated limited liability as a way 
of creating opportunities and dismissed concerns by suggesting that “[l]imited companies 
are harmless since no man is obliged to trade with one, and none will do so unless the 
company enjoys a good reputation.”33 The market was still endowed with “providential 
design” but with greater protections in place, it would become a site for the development of 
good character.34 Moreover these enduring links to Christianity were important as very few 
believed that “market principles would automatically produce a morally beneficial 
outcome.”35 In order to be successful, it was necessary to demonstrate integrity.  
This new morality was most important for the working classes themselves, whom it 
was feared did not believe in the laws of political economy. They “have nothing in them of 
the timid, prudent, calculating spirit of the middle class.”36 In the early nineteenth century, 
it was thought that working classes should not be taught the laws of political economy, only 
that their characters might be improved in anticipation of their judgment by the market. 
However, the political success of Chartism precipitated a shift in this thinking: working men 
should learn the laws of the market, so that their characters might be shaped by it, and thus 
prevent seditious uprising. The sooner they could see that the workings of the market were 
beyond their control, the sooner they would abandon their revolutionary impulses. These 
                                                     
31 Ibid., 259.  
32 Ibid. 
33 Ibid., 261.  
34 G.R. Searle, Morality and the Market in Victorian Britain (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1998), 19.  
35 Ibid., 22. Emphasis in original.  
36 Ibid., 37.  
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aims are made plain in contemporaneous works such as John Lalor’s Money and Morals.37 
Working men are impulsive, most evidently so in their politics, and socialism, as Lalor 
understood it, was delusional.38 In light of this propensity toward socialism and intractable 
disdain for the middle and upper classes, it is necessary “to anticipate and prevent any such 
movement, by providing, if it be possible, channels into which the tendencies which would 
lead to Socialism may find outlets, not only safe but eminently beneficial.”39 In order to do 
this, it is necessary to generate empathy between the working man and the capitalist; he must 
be made to understand the capitalist’s position “by practical experience.”40  
Working men, once enabled to act together as the owners of a joint capital, will soon 
find their whole view of the relations between capital and labour undergo a radical 
alteration. They will learn what anxiety and toil it costs to hold even a small concern 
together in tolerable order; what amazing difficulties there are in the way of organizing, 
by voluntary consent, that industrial discipline which capital now enforces; and what 
losses, what cruel disappointments in markets, what trembling uncertainties, may 
carry off the mind of the owner of capital in painful abstraction when the children are 
on the knee at the fireside, or may whiten the hair on a sleepless pillow. Operatives 
who go through this experience will find not only their thoughts, but their sympathies 
enlarged. They will grow both in wisdom and clarity."41  
Moreover, it is their “right” to have access to these legal instruments.42 On this score he 
praises the Christian Socialists, who have caused “a numerous body of intelligent working 
men to feel that amongst the educated and aristocratic classes are many of their firmest and 
most zealous friends.”43  
The Christian Socialists were instrumental in opening a wider conversation about 
limited liability as a means of enabling the working and middle classes to participate in the 
market. While there had been several attempts throughout the early part of the nineteenth 
century to introduce legislation that would enable joint-stock companies to have easier 
                                                     
37 John Lalor, Money and Morals: A Book for the Times (London: John Chapman, 1852), 194. 
38 Ibid.  
39 Ibid., 199.  
40 Ibid., 202.  
41 Ibid., 203.  
42 Ibid.  
43 Ibid., 197.  
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access to limited liability, all of them failed.44 By the time it was taken up again in 1850, there 
had been no discussion of limited liability in Parliament for at least six years.45 The Christian 
Socialists found support in Parliament from the Liberal Member of Parliament for 
Shropshire, R.A. Slaney. Slaney was first and foremost a Christian philanthropist who saw 
it as his Christian duty to “improve the lot of poor working men locked up in dark industrial 
towns.”46 However, he was also deeply influenced by an extensive reading of classical 
political economy, and he shared the Christian Socialists’ disdain for Chartism. “His 
sincerity,” as Richards writes, “his desire to better the lot of the labourer, is not in doubt. 
But once he assumed that the unfettered activities of the industrial capitalist were for the 
benefit of ‘every class’ he was bound to oppose the demands of working men for reform.”47 
It was Slaney’s view that “social disorder” was a consequence of parliamentary neglect of the 
working classes, and he thus advocated for a range of interventions, from infrastructure and 
housing, to welfare and education.48 In 1850 Slaney presented a motion to appoint a Select 
Committee to “suggest means for giving facilities to safe investments for the middle and 
working classes; and affording them the means of forming societies to insure themselves 
against coming evils.”49 This provided “an unlooked for opening” for the Christian Socialists 
to make their case for legal reform to support co-operative societies.50  
 The proceedings of the Select Committee on Investments for the Savings of Middle 
and Working Classes (1850), followed the next year by the Select Committee on the Laws 
of Partnership (1851), help to situate the legal recognition of co-operatives within a wider 
                                                     
44 See John Saville, “Sleeping Partnership and Limited Liability,” The Economic History Review 8, no. 3 
(1956): 418.  
45 Ibid.  
46 Paul Richards, “R.A. Slaney, the Industrial Town, and Early Victorian Social Policy,” Social History 4, no. 
1 (1979), 87.  
47 Ibid., 88.  
48 Ibid., 92.  
49 United Kingdom, Hansard Parliamentary Debates, Series 3, Volume 110 (1850). Cited in Lambourne, 
Slaney’s Act, 17.  
50 Ludlow, Autobiography, 197.  
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context of shifting views about the market.51 The reports of both committees are at the 
intersection of two problems: one, the unfair legal advantages accruing to “larger capital,” 
which have the effect of excluding the working and middle classes from “fair competition;” 
and two, the “rapid increase in population and in wealth of middle and industrious classes,” 
and the need to “improve their condition and contentment” in a way that would prevent 
“injury to any class” and provide “security to the welfare of all.”52 In effect, these committees 
were concerned to democratise the market and in so doing transcend class antagonisms and 
the social disorder they caused. As Donna Loftus observes, “capital was at the center of 
liberal visions of community in these debates. The social reform argument for limited 
liability imagined local communities tied together by capital investments, a potent example 
of mutual interests.”53 In practice, however, they were primarily concerned with how the 
working classes could be “initiated into the duties and responsibilities of citizenship through 
their engagement with the free market under the tutelage of more experienced men of 
capital.”54 
 In this respect, the market was regarded as a site of discipline for the working classes. 
Limited liability and the legal recognition of co-operative societies were means of facilitating 
this discipline. The discipline of the market would be a moral one as well as a political one 
for the working classes, diverting their attention from dreams of revolution and shaping 
them into responsible subjects. Limited liability, as Loftus describes, “was mobilized as a 
strategy of ethical governance, capable of manufacturing character through the sharing of 
                                                     
51 This chapter will focus primarily on the first of the two as this is where co-operatives are given the most 
attention. While Ludlow complains of “leading questions” in the committee, there is no reason to believe 
that the Christian Socialists misrepresented their views for the sake of appeasing the committee, or 
deliberately making co-operative associations more palatable to those who believed them to be too 
revolutionary (Ludlow, Autobiography, 199).  
52 U.K. Parliament, Investments, 1. 
53 Donna Loftus, “Limited Liability, Market Democracy, and the Social Organization of Production in Mid-
Nineteenth Century Britain,” in eds. Nancy Henry and Cannon Schmitt, Victorian Investments: New 
Perspectives on Finance and Culture (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2009), 85.  
54 Ibid.  
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capital in local communities.”55 As the select committee report on the Law of Partnerships 
states in summary,  
it would be desirable to remove any obstacles which may now prevent the middle and 
even the more thriving of the working classes from taking shares in such investments, 
under the sanction and conjointly with their richer neighbours; as thereby their self-
respect is upheld, their industry and intelligence encouraged, and an additional motive 
is given to them to preserve order and respect the laws of property.56  
 
These aims reappear frequently in the evidence presented to the select committees by the 
Christian Socialists and supporters of co-operation, which emphasize the benefits of 
enabling the working classes to associate with their ‘richer neighbours’. As the Christian 
Socialist Thomas Hughes remarked, “the great difficulty that the working classes have to 
contend with now is the want of competent persons to assist them in managing their 
investments, and I think that with limited liability they would find persons to come forward 
and assist them.”57 At another stage, Ludlow is asked whether “limited liability would have 
the effect of inducing benevolent people who take an interest in the working classes to join 
them and lead them?” to which he responds, “I think decidedly it would.”58  
However, it was not just by virtue of the opportunity to associate with their social 
betters that the working classes would be improved. The experience of the market would 
both shape their characters and teach them the inviolable laws of political economy. Would 
“facilities,” as Slaney asked, “given for such purposes, within the law…tend to foster habits 
of forethought and providence?”59 To which Ludlow responded, “I cannot say that I know 
of any more powerful means of increasing the security of the country.”60 According to the 
evidence of John Stuart Mill, the experience of even a small number of co-operative 
                                                     
55 Donna Loftus, “Capital and Community: Limited Liability and Attempts to Democratize the Market in 
Mid-Nineteenth-Century England,” Victorian Studies 45, no. 1 (2002), 94. 
56 U.K. Parliament, Laws of Partnership, vii. 
57 U.K. Parliament, Investments, 42 at 428.  
58 Ibid., 11 at 116. 
59 Ibid., 10 at 101.  
60 Ibid., 10 at 101. 
 
 
CHAPTER 4 | 217 
 
 
societies would show working classes that the laws of the market were natural and that they 
laboured by choice, not compulsion.  
[T]here would be this great advantage, that supposing those associations embrace only 
a small part of the working classes, they would have almost the same salutary effect 
on their minds as if they embraced the whole… the whole of the working classes would 
see that all such disadvantages arose not from the law, but from the nature of the case, 
or from the absence of the necessary qualities in them; therefore those who might 
continue to be receivers of wages in the service of individual capitalists, would then 
feel that they were not doing so from compulsion but from choice, and that taking all 
the circumstances into consideration their condition appeared to them preferable as 
receivers of wages.”61  
 
In addition, it was argued that the mere provision of such facilities would help to disabuse 
the working classes of any desire to overturn the government.  
I think it would enable them to ascertain by trial whether the ideas which they have, 
and I believe they are very extensively entertained, as the real means of bettering their 
condition, can be carried out, or whether they cannot be. At present they may fancy 
that there is a paradise which would be very delightful if they could get into it, and if 
they think that it can only be done by overturning the laws, they may be disposed to 
endeavour to do so.62 
 
It was not just the success of these projects that would be so beneficial, but also their 
propensity for failure. When Slaney asked if their inevitable disappointment would “show 
that they were wrong in the idea that any injustice so far had been done to them?”63 Ludlow 
responds, saying “yes; it would promote their submission to things as they are.”64 It would 
take nothing less than the tedium of a lived socialist experiment to reform the working 
classes. “Their enthusiasm,” as Lalor writes, “would probably bear any trial better than the 
trial of a Socialist experiment itself, for it is very much easier to die on a barricade…than to 
work on for a twelvemonth side by side with a lazy co-operative colleague, and see him 
regularly swallowing the half of one's own earnings."65  
                                                     
61 Ibid., 80 at 854.  
62 Ibid., 20 at 200.  
63 Ibid., 10 at 105.  
64 Ibid., 10 at 105. 
65 Lalor, Money and Morals, 198.  
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Incorporation and Enclosure 
The sense that the market would serve to discipline the working classes evidenced 
in debates over the legal recognition of co-operatives coincides more broadly with the 
emergence of a liberal and biopolitical form of governmentality in the nineteenth century, 
concerned with the management of populations and wealth, as described in the last chapter. 
These biopolitical concerns animate the debates over limited liability and the legal 
recognition of co-operative societies. The problem before the select committees is how to 
manage the wealth of an increasing population, and what the role of the state should be; or, 
more precisely, how the state can ‘facilitate’ the operation of the natural laws of the market. 
The market, in Foucault’s terms, was no longer a “site of justice,” as it had been in relation 
to older conceptions of moral economy, but a “site of veridiction.”66 That is, the market had 
become a site where truth would be produced, determining by its precepts not only the 
proper objects of government, but also, as the debates above demonstrate, exposing those 
who would participate in it to its inviolable truths.  
This shift in conceptions of the market, for Foucault, is at once a “history of truth” 
and a “history of law.”67 The intersection of these two allows for a “connecting up of a regime 
of truth to governmental practice.”68 The emergence of the market as a site of veridiction 
within discourses of political economy is coupled with the question of what its 
corresponding public law should be. If the market is governed by its own natural laws, then 
the role of government is no longer to intervene directly, but to ‘facilitate’ the operation of 
these natural laws. In the last chapter, it was argued that incorporation was one way this 
could be done. In the early modern period, incorporation had been regarded as a narrow 
privilege and intimately connected to sovereignty; in the mid-nineteenth century, it was 
                                                     
66 Michel Foucault, The Birth of Biopolitics: Lectures at the College de France 1978-1979, ed. Michael 
Sellenart, trans. Graham Burchell (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), 30 and 32. 
67 Ibid., 35.  
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recast and normalised as a private right through the introduction of incorporation by 
registration. Even though it involved an increase in regulation and subjection to the state, it 
could be regarded as a form of commercial freedom. This is a paradoxical form of freedom, 
at once a liberty and a limitation. As Foucault writes, “[l]iberalism must produce freedom, 
but this very act entails the establishment of limitations, controls, forms of coercion, and 
obligations relying on threats, etcetera.”69  
Incorporation, construed as a right and a freedom, also functions in a disciplinary 
capacity, such that “economic freedom…and disciplinary techniques are completely bound 
up with each other.”70 The desire for co-operative societies to be incorporated and given 
limited liability is an instantiation of this dynamic. The corporate form itself would ‘facilitate’ 
the discipline of the market that the Christian Socialists and other reformers envisioned by 
functioning, as I will argue, as a form of enclosure. “Discipline,” as Foucault explains, 
“sometimes requires enclosure, the specification of a place heterogeneous to all others and 
closed in upon itself. It is the protected place of disciplinary monotony.”71 While Foucault 
was referring to the physical spaces of the prison, the school and the barracks, this section 
will argue that the body corporate may be seen analogously as a form of metaphysical 
enclosure that disciplines social life in order to facilitate the market and show how the legal 
form of the body corporate comes into tension and conflict with the ethos of mutuality that 
animates co-operative societies.   
The modern corporate form has generally not been regarded as disciplinary.72 This 
is not least because, as argued in the foregoing chapter, when incorporation by registration 
was made available in the mid-nineteenth century, it came to be articulated as a right and a 
                                                     
69 Ibid., 64. 
70 Ibid., 67. 
71 Michel Foucault, Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison, trans. Alan Sheridan (New York: 
Vintage Books, 1995), 141. 
72 Joshua Barkan, Corporate Sovereignty: Law and Government under Capitalism (Minneapolis: University 
of Minnesota Press, 2013) is the major exception to this.  
 
 
CHAPTER 4 | 220 
 
 
real freedom in relation to the state, obscuring both its historicity and its enduring 
connection to sovereignty. In commercialisation models of economic history, incorporation 
by registration, and later, the provision of limited liability for registered companies, have 
been regarded as a removal of barriers to the operation of the free market.73 As James Taylor 
summarises, in these accounts, “prejudiced legislators and lawyers, demonstrating an 
extraordinary unresponsiveness to the needs of the business community, were slow to 
appreciate the necessity in a modern economy of removing all impediments to joint-stock 
enterprise.”74 Economic pressure and the demand for more efficient forms of business 
organisation are thought to have driven legal reform.  
More nuanced and critical accounts of this transformation have emerged in recent 
years, but some, such as that of Ron Harris, seem to reproduce this dynamic. Given a range 
of historical alternatives, such as the partnership and the trust, Harris suggests that the 
incorporated joint stock company became the dominant form of industrial organisation 
from the mid-nineteenth century onward because of a sort of “path dependency.”75 This 
path is in part a matter of chance and circumstance, but in retrospect revolves around the 
integral connection between the interests of the state and the interests of investors in joint-
stock companies, that led to the early development of the corporate form for business 
purposes. The corporate form was the most efficient for business purposes because it had 
already been tailored for this purpose in the early modern period. While the historical 
development of the form is undoubtedly important, Harris’s argument reproduces the 
narrative that a demand for more economically efficient forms drove legal reform. Paddy 
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Ireland, in a critique of Harris, suggests in contrast that we must look to capitalism to 
understand the corporate form. Ireland looks not to a need for efficiency but to shifting 
modes of production in order to understand the rise of the incorporated joint stock 
company. In particular, the rise of production costs associated not only with capital-intensive 
projects like canals and railways, but the costs of disciplining labour, led to the “the rapid 
development of the credit system and the emergence of a range of new financial instruments 
in the form of titles to revenue – what Marx called money or interest-bearing capital. 
Prominent amongst these was the joint stock company share.”76 The incorporated form of 
joint-stock company allows the separation of ownership and control that characterises the 
modern corporate economy.77 This argument fits with Ireland’s broader claim about an 
emerging class of rentier investors ultimately driving legal reform.78 Drawing on E.P. 
Thompson, Ireland suggests that we need to return to an understanding of capitalism, not 
just as an economic system, but as one that “has imposed itself on society in ever more 
intensive ways, increasingly penetrating every nook and cranny of existence.”79 Capitalism, 
Ireland stresses, “shapes all identities and social relations.”80 However, it is unclear how 
Ireland’s arguments, while more nuanced, escape the economic determinism that he 
attributes to Harris. While introducing a conception of class power in connection with 
capitalism, legal reform is nonetheless driven by economic processes.  
A range of recent scholarship on the history of the company has problematised any 
ready connection between specifically ‘economic’ developments and the introduction of the 
                                                     
76 Paddy Ireland, “Critical Legal Studies and the Mysterious Disappearance of Capitalism,” Modern Law 
Review 65, no.1 (2002): 120-140.  
77 Ibid., 134.  
78 In particular see Paddy Ireland, “Efficiency or Power? The Rise of the Shareholder-oriented Joint Stock 
Corporation,” Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies 25, no. 1 (2018): 291-330. Paddy Ireland, “Limited 
Liability, Shareholder Rights, and the Problem of Corporate Irresponsibility,” Cambridge Journal of 
Economics 34 (2010), 837-856.  
79 Ireland, Critical, 129.  
80 Ibid., 130.  
 
 
CHAPTER 4 | 222 
 
 
modern company form with limited liability. Not only was the introduction of the limited 
liability company “not directly referable to demands being made by those in key sectors of 
business,” the form was not widely taken up until the late nineteenth century, several 
decades after it became available.81 As Taylor argues, “far from responding to the needs of 
industry, the state, in allowing free incorporation between 1844 and 1862, was in fact acting 
in advance of economic developments.”82 In his own work, which focuses on popular 
conceptions of companies and financial speculation more generally, Taylor has shown how 
legal reform was a highly contested process, concerned much more with instituting a 
particular model of political economy than realising the natural order of the market or 
responding to economic pressure.83 In addition, recent scholarship has also significantly 
broadened the terms of inquiry by taking account of the relationship between new regulatory 
forms and shifting social, political and religious attitudes about the market. As Loftus 
suggests, it is precisely the context described above, the concern over working class co-
operatives and working and middle class participation in the market, that is often ignored. 
As she writes, “[t]he economic history of limited liability has unpacked the legal and 
financial complexities of reform, but the social and political aspects of the question—in 
particular, the vision of a market democracy composed of working-and middle-class men, 
have been marginalized or considered separately in the social history of English labor.”84 
The inclusion of these ‘other’ narratives suggests some of the difficulty in 
determining a specific cause for the increasing prominence of the body corporate form in 
the organisation of the market in the nineteenth century. In Foucault’s work on biopolitics, 
he eschews the need for causal explanations more broadly, citing a confluence of multiple 
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factors and saying that “…I do not think we need to look for—and consequently I do not 
think we can find—the cause of the constitution of the market as an agency of veridiction.”85 
To this end, and in keeping with a more Foucauldian orientation, my concern is with what 
the body corporate form did in the context of this new form of governmental reason, why 
this decidedly ‘unmodern’ legal form was an appropriate response for the problems raised 
by political economy, and how this has shaped what we imagine the co-operative to be.86 
Incorporation and limited liability were not simply mechanisms for furthering the interests 
of business, but reflected a broader disciplinary logic through which the market and a 
corresponding ‘economic society’ were constituted in the nineteenth century.87 These 
interventions reflected a new way of governing; one that, in its implementation, helped to 
manifest the division between the political and the economic that was required for the 
creation of the ostensibly free market.  
In relation to working class associations, this new form of regulatory intervention had 
begun several decades earlier, with the passage of the Friendly Societies Act of 1793.88 
Friendly societies, as Alasdair Hudson notes, “were the first form of lawful structure 
permitted for working class people to form a common bond for their mutual welfare under 
English law."89 Following the French Revolution the British state had grown increasingly 
wary of associations amongst lower and working classes. As a manifestation of this 
apprehension, the Combination Acts of 1799 and 1800 consolidated a range of prior acts 
"which were directed against any treasonable or seditious society."90 While the focus of these 
acts was on trade associations (early unions), A.V. Dicey points out that the fact that these 
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acts included special provisions for societies such as the Freemasons and the Quakers, and 
for charities, "betrays the width of their operation and the fears of their authors. Clubs of 
all kinds were objects of terror."91 Alongside this general ban and fear of conspiracy, the 
Friendly Societies acts created a narrow permissive framework for the recognition of certain 
kinds of associations that were deemed to be desirable. However, friendly societies, it 
should be noted, were virtually indistinguishable from trade unions at this time; friendly 
societies provided the social basis for many different kinds of organisation, including the 
early co-operative societies. The recognition of friendly societies as a form of welfare 
provision became a means of separating desirable activities from undesirable activities. 
Desirable activities included those that helped to reduce government expenditure on the 
poor rates and encouraged moral reform, while undesirable activities were strikes and other 
forms of political agitation. As Gosden summarises,  
Until about 1830 the idea of encouraging the friendly societies to develop under the 
supervision of the local justices with a view to relieving the demands of the poor rate 
can be seen in the legislation enacted. Proper supervision by the magistrates would 
eliminate any temptation to indulge in or to support illegal combinations or to help 
trade unions.92 
 
In other words, the creation of a permissive or facilitative framework that was, 
paradoxically, intended as a deterrent. The passage of this act “was an example of the 
government identifying and classifying its allies to winnow out its enemies.”93  
 The act effectively set up a scheme whereby in exchange for registration with a newly 
appointed registrar, the societies could enjoy some of the privileges usually associated with 
incorporation, including using courts to recover debts, the ability to sue and be sued, as well 
as getting some important tax exemptions. Registration, in turn, required societies to submit 
their rules to “the justices of the peace, who would verify that they did not violate the law 
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and could alter them by adding or deleting clauses.”94 The Friendly Societies Acts, working 
in tandem with the Combination Acts, implicitly made unregistered associations illegal, 
creating a totalising effect, even though enrolment was not mandatory. However, these 
efforts were not terribly successful. Many friendly societies preferred to remain unregistered 
without any consequence. 95  
 However, as the nineteenth century progresses, and the market comes to be an 
increasingly important determinant of regulation, the source of discipline is no longer 
accountability to a state selectively encouraging desirable activities while discouraging 
others, but the market. Even though Ludlow had identified the need for incorporation and 
limited liability early on, incorporation itself was not central to the debates on the legal 
recognition of co-operatives. The early debates on limited liability were focused on the en 
commandite partnership form rather than the incorporated joint stock company, while all 
that was sought for co-operatives was an extension of the Friendly Societies Acts. Even 
limited liability, as noted above, was not regarded as essential for working class co-
operatives. It was nonetheless a disappointment when the Industrial and Provident 
Societies Partnership Act 1852 only offered a very partial limitation of liability to two years 
after a member had left the society. The Christian Socialists were prepared to soldier on 
without it.  
Some may say: But how are we to work under an unlimited liability clause? I would 
rather not have seen that clause in the Bill. But I can only say, that if its presence there 
prevents the working classes from co-operating, they never will be fit to co-operate, 
and don’t deserve to enjoy the benefits of co-operation. What are all existing Working 
Associations now doing? Working under unlimited liability. What are all Registered 
Companies doing? Working under unlimited liability.96 
 
                                                     
94 Ibid., 46.  
95 Ibid.,  
96 James Ludlow, “The Industrial and Provident Societies Bill,” Journal of Association 1, no. 26 (1852), 203.  
 
 
CHAPTER 4 | 226 
 
 
Notably, however, they accepted this less than satisfying outcome, not because they thought 
limited liability unimportant, but because registered companies also did not have limited 
liability. In other words, it was acceptable because they would be on more or less equal 
footing with registered companies. This same principle of equality underlies petitions for a 
reform of the legislation in 1862. In 1856, registered companies were granted limited 
liability.97 This did not escape the attention of co-operative societies. As multiple petitions 
to parliament on behalf of co-operative societies make clear, co-operative societies 
registered under the 1852 Act “labour under serious disadvantages as compared with other 
trading bodies.”98 “Your Petitioners,” they continue, “are held to be liable to an unlimited 
extent for the debts of their society, whereas members of joint stock companies are only 
liable to the amount of their shares in such companies. We therefore ask your honourable 
house to put us on the same footing in this respect as that whereon joint stock companies 
are now placed.”99 It was only fair that co-operative societies should also be bodies corporate 
with limited liability. This was remarkably uncontroversial. These requests were granted by 
an amendment to the Industrial and Provident Societies Act in 1862. Not long after, the 
absence of incorporation and limited liability could be regarded as mere “anomalies” in the 
original act and how it always ought to have been.100 The law had now made it such that co-
operative societies would have “a chance of fighting their way in the competitive market, 
with vizors up and the law to back them.”101 
Incorporation thus served as the form by which these entities could be regarded as 
equal for the purposes of the competitive market. However, the co-operative society and 
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the joint stock company are not equivalent. While there are significant differences in 
opinion about the principles and practices that should guide co-operation, at a minimum, it 
has historically been concerned with mutuality. Moreover, as argued in chapter 1, co-
operation emerged as a ‘self-help’ dimension of the moral economy of the crowd, a form 
of co-operative direct action that sought to rectify unfair dealing and meet the basic needs 
of members through mutual support. In contrast, the joint stock company has primarily 
functioned to create profit for its shareholders. Prior to the mid-nineteenth century, they 
both existed largely ‘outside’ the law. Legal recognition and the body corporate status makes 
them subject to the law and gives them an equivalent status and form in order to facilitate 
the competitive market.  
In creating a formal equality between these two forms with incorporation and limited 
liability, the legal form functions, as Isaac Balbus suggests, like the commodity form. The 
commodity form for Marx functions as an abstraction that makes otherwise 
incommensurable objects exchangeable.102 Money, itself a commodity, functions as a 
“universal economic equivalent” that makes it possible for any given commodity to stand in 
for or represent another.103 As Balbus summarises, “the fully developed commodity form, 
or the money form, thus entails a common form which is an abstraction from, and masking 
of, the qualitatively different contents of the objects and the concrete human needs to which 
they correspond.”104 The commodity fetishism that ensues completely obscures the concrete 
conditions in which the object was produced through a “double mystification.”105 Balbus 
argues, drawing on Marx’s disparate writings on legal theory, that the bourgeois legal form 
functions similarly, with law operating as a “universal political equivalent” that makes it such 
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that individual citizens can form contracts with one another. As he writes, “[t]he existence 
of political exchange or representation thus requires that qualitatively distinct individuals 
with otherwise incommensurable interests enter into a formal relationship of equivalence 
with one another, i.e., that the qualitatively different subjects become what they are not: 
equal.”106 Incorporation serves as the “common form” that makes the otherwise very 
different practices of the co-operative and the joint stock company equivalent for the 
purposes of the participation in the market.107 It is, “an abstraction from, and masking of, 
the qualitatively different contents of the needs of subjects as well as the qualitatively 
different activities and structures of social relationships in which they participate.”108 And 
like the commodity form, the legal form also mystifies its own operation precisely through 
its status as law.  
 The analogy between legal form and commodity form captures an important aspect 
of the equalising and homogenising effects of legal recognition and incorporation. However, 
as I will argue below, metaphor of enclosure helps us to understand the particular ways in 
which incorporation disciplines and depoliticizes social life, especially in relation to the co-
operative and the moral economy, drawing on the specific history of the body corporate 
elaborated in chapter 3. Enclosure is a term that in the context of the creation of the market 
usually refers to the enclosures of the commons that occurred primarily in the seventeenth 
and eighteenth centuries. It describes a process of removal of land from the commons, 
where it could be shared for activities such as grazing and foraging, and its placement within 
a regime of private property. For Karl Polanyi, the enclosures of land created a “fictitious 
commodity” from nature, which is itself emphatically not produced for sale on a market, 
unlike other commodities: “[w]hat we call land is an element of nature inextricably 
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interwoven with man’s institutions.”109 The enclosure and commodification of land were part 
of a wider process in which the market was ‘disembedded’ from other forms of social 
relation, which were then in turn subordinated to the principle of the market. As Polanyi 
writes, “[n]ever before our own time were markets more than accessories of economic life. 
As a rule, the economic system was absorbed in the social system, and whatever principle 
of behaviour predominated in the economy, the presence of the market pattern was found 
to be compatible with it.”110 The creation of fictitious commodities, through processes such 
as the enclosures, helped to disembed the market by imposing a form through which not 
only land, but also labour and money in Polanyi's reading, could be exchanged and 
preventing other forms of social relation from inhibiting that exchange.111  
The metaphor of enclosure is useful for understanding the legal recognition of co-
operative societies, in part because it helps to capture the movement from the moral 
economy of the crowd to the co-operative as a process of disembedding. The moral 
economy of the crowd, as described in chapter 1, reflected a wider expectation of justice 
and fairness in the provision of basic goods. It emphasized and attempted to give effect to 
social obligations over marketized calculations designed to increase profit. Incorporation 
encloses this moral economy and subordinates it to the market, providing a way for it to 
persist in a limited form without undermining the operation of the market economy. 
However, as argued in chapter 2, The moral economy the crowd was not just an instantiation 
of ‘tradition’ or ‘custom’, but a form of resistance to the emerging market system that took 
place in the space of the sovereign's silence, navigating dynamics of tacit consent and 
repression that were characteristic of sovereign modalities of power. To this end, enclosure 
also helps to show how incorporation disciplined, and ultimately depoliticised, this 
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resistance as well as social life more broadly, as part of the operation of disciplinary power 
and biopolitical or liberal governmentality.  
 Enclosure is an integral part of the operation of disciplinary power, as noted at the 
opening of this section. For Foucault, the paradigmatic example of this enclosure is the 
panopticon, at once an architectural design and “a figure of political technology.”112 In 
physical spaces such as the prison, the school or the hospital, the panoptic enclosure creates 
an order that allows for the efficient exercise of an individualising disciplinary power. More 
than this, Foucault argues that the panopticon “must be understood as a generalizable model 
of functioning; a way of defining power relations in terms of the everyday life of men” and 
not just as a particular institution.113 The disciplinary techniques of the panopticon form “the 
very formula of liberal government.”114 As a disciplinary enclosure, the corporate form 
functions much like the prison cell. As Foucault describes, the prison cell limits lateral 
perception between inmates while also enabling a “compulsory visibility,” by one who 
watches from an unseen position.115 The corporate form, while an invisible, metaphysical 
enclosure similarly limits lateral perception, not by physically preventing sight, but by 
creating an entity that appears to exist completely unto itself, separable and separated from 
other such entities. It works precisely by making itself invisible. The invisibility of the 
corporate form is a consequence of its normalisation, which, as argued in chapter 3, made 
incorporation appear to be a right and a freedom, as opposed to a form of subjugation. 
Incorporation, in turn, enables compulsory visibility, which includes both regulatory and 
public scrutiny. Incorporation by registration as argued in the last chapter was designed to 
bring fraudulent companies within the scope of the law, but simultaneously put the state at 
a remove, allowing public opinion and the market to determine their integrity. So, too, with 
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co-operatives, albeit with the more explicit purpose of subjecting them to the discipline of 
the market. The creation of the market, as Polanyi writes, “demands nothing less than the 
institutional separation of society into an economic sphere and a political sphere.”116 
The lack of lateral perception and the invisibility of authority function together as “a 
guarantee of order.”117 As Foucault explains, 
[i]f the inmates are convicts, there is no danger of a plot, an attempt at collective 
escape, the planning of new crimes for the future, bad reciprocal influences…if 
they are workers, there are no disorders, no theft, no coalitions, none of those 
distractions that slow down the rate of work, make it less perfect or cause 
accidents. The crowd, a compact mass, a locus of multiple exchanges, 
individualities merging together, a collective effect, is abolished and replaced by 
a collection of separated individualities.118  
 
Incorporation constitutes the co-operative as an object of regulation, infinitely replicable, 
making them “interchangeable” as “elements of discipline.”119 This, as the Christian 
Socialists imagined, helps to prevent sedition and popular uprising, redirecting the energies 
of the working classes toward more desirable activities that ultimately contribute to the 
formation of an economic society. In the market as in the panopticon, “a real subjection is 
born mechanically from a fictitious relation. So it is not necessary to use force to 
constrain....”120  
 Incorporation is ultimately depoliticising, not just because it defers and deters 
demands for political rights, but because it encloses the ‘ethos of mutuality’ that animates 
co-operatives within a “totalitarian” or “immanentist” form, and in the same moment 
constitutes them within a system in which they will be read as economic.121 In chapter 1 it 
was argued that the moral of economy of the crowd and the early co-operative societies 
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could be understood as a political gesture of “tying and enchainment of each to each.”122 
The ethos of mutuality that comes from the moral economy of the crowd and crystallises in 
the early co-operative societies is, as argued in chapter 1, an example of a non-essentialising 
and non-sovereign form of politics imagined by Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe and Jean-Luc 
Nancy as part of the “retreat of the political.”123 The body corporate, in strong contrast to 
this, not only integrates the co-operative into the biopolitical and disciplinary order of 
political economy, but it also imposes an essentialising and immanentist unity. Enclosure 
links the specific historicity of the body corporate in the medieval church with its use in the 
nineteenth century, helping to articulate how this transcendent form of unity depoliticises 
the moral economy of the crowd in the very constitution of the co-operative. Nancy uses 
enclosure as a way of describing the persistence and effects of Christian metaphysics in the 
ordering of the world. As he writes, “…metaphysics sets a founding, warranting presence 
beyond the world. This setup stabilizes beings, enclosing them in their own being-ness…. 
Closure is the completion of this totality that conceives itself to be fulfilled in its self-
referentiality.”124 The body corporate, as described in the last chapter, imports a 
transcendent metaphysical structure from the medieval church. This is a form of unity that 
is only possible because it is imagined as transcendent, located beyond the confines of the 
world. Unity of this kind, according to Nancy, is impossible. It is always undermined by a 
prior, inoperative sociality that exceeds its confines. However, in the nineteenth century, 
when the body corporate is normalised through its reconceptualization as a private right, 
this unity is immanentized: it no longer derives from somewhere ‘beyond’ the collective, in 
the state or the mystical body of Christ, but inheres in the collective itself. “Totalitarianism,” 
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as Ian James describes, “would be predicated on a loss of the principle of transcendence 
and the attempt to overcome such a loss by seeking to realize this principle in a single figure, 
to realize this figure here and now within the totality of the social body or community to the 
exclusion of all other possibilities.”125 It is precisely these 'other possibilities' that are at stake 
in the legal recognition of co-operatives.  
Conclusion 
 This chapter has argued that the legal recognition of co-operatives in the mid-
nineteenth century was premised on a liberal and biopolitical concern to facilitate the 
operation of the natural laws of the market, so that they might discipline the working classes 
and make them more amenable to capitalism. This was evidenced primarily with reference 
to the Christian Socialists who were largely responsible for the legal reform effort. Their 
particular way of framing co-operatives as economic initiatives geared toward the 
improvement of the working classes coincided with these broader biopolitical concerns. The 
debates over the legal recognition of co-operatives were not simply “obscuring or legitimating” prior 
understandings of co-operation, “they actually constituted new sectors of reality, new problems and 
possibilities….”126 In particular, it is the corporate form that helps to manifest the co-operative as an 
‘economic’ rather than ‘political’ entity within the dichotomy of political economy—not specific 
practices such as the distribution of dividends, or a more ‘pragmatic approach’ amongst co-operative 
societies, but incorporation. This is when co-operation comes to be seen as economic, as something 
requiring the protection of laws to compete in the newly constructed sphere of the ‘free’ market. As 
Nikolas Rose writes, “[g]overning does not just act on a pre-existing thought world with its 
natural divisions. To govern is to cut experience in certain ways, to distribute actions and 
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repulsions, passions and fears across it, to bring new facets and forces, new intensities and 
relations into being.”127  
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Conclusion 
 
 This thesis has argued that the co-operative in England was constituted as a 
commercial and economic entity in the mid-nineteenth century through a process of legal 
recognition. Following a critique of dominant historiographical approaches to the co-
operative movement, which situate its origins with the founding of the Rochdale Society of 
Equitable Pioneers in 1844, I argued that the 'beginnings' of the co-operative, from a 
genealogical perspective, should be located in the moral economy of the crowd in the 
eighteenth century. This historical reorientation, in turn, made it possible to construct a 
different historical narrative for the co-operative--one in which legal recognition could be 
seen to function constitutively, particularly in the context of nineteenth century political 
economy and biopolitical governmentality. The body corporate form was taken to be the 
most important aspect of this constitutive process, specifically because the transcendent 
form of unity that it imposes comes into conflict and tension with the ethos of mutuality that 
animates co-operatives and derives from the moral economy. Incorporation, as I argued in 
the final chapter, served as a form of enclosure that served to discipline and depoliticise the 
co-operative.  
 The notion that incorporation would have a disciplining effect on co-operatives is 
not merely speculative. In the early twentieth century, the incorporated status of co-operative 
societies would come explicitly into conflict with their commitment to mutuality. “The law,” 
as Neil Killingback observes,  
concealed a contradiction. The Industrial and Provident Societies Acts incorporated 
societies, i.e. defined them as separate legal entities distinct from their members. 
Societies were to continue to function under the law independently of changes in 
leadership and membership. Members were grated limited liability in return. These 
were, already, limitations on, or particular definitions of, mutuality. In these respects, 
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co-operative societies had the same legal status as joint-stock companies while not in 
fact being the same forms.1 
 
From at least the 1890s, if not before, co-operative societies met resistance from private 
traders. Most notable amongst these was W.H. Lever (of what would become the company 
Unilever), who helped to organise associations of private traders in the North. The onset of 
economic depression in the late nineteenth century led to attempts to control the prices of 
goods domestically. Co-operative societies, as Killingback explains, “blocked the extension 
and easy establishment of resale price maintenance,” which limited their ability to distribute 
dividends. Manufacturers, in turn, boycotted societies. In addition to the frequent boycotts, 
a political campaign led by associations of private traders pressed for co-operative societies 
to be “taxed to the full,” or to the same extent as limited companies.2 These campaigns were 
conducted with the more or less explicit intent that “co-ops would reduce their prices and 
so go bankrupt.”3 Since the passage of the Industrial and Provident Societies Act 1862, 
registered co-operative societies were only liable to pay tax on income from the ownership 
or occupation of land, in recognition of the fact that co-operative surpluses from trade with 
their own members are not, strictly speaking, profits. In addition, members of co-operative 
societies could be liable to pay tax on the interest they accrued from co-operative shares or 
loans made to a society, if their individual income was above the threshold. The 1862 Act 
exempted them from paying tax on their trading surpluses and any government securities, 
although this exemption was later restricted to only those societies that allowed for open 
membership.4  
                                                     
1 Neil Killingback, “Limits to Mutuality: Economic and Political Attacks on Co-operation During the 1920s 
and 1930s,” in ed. Stephen Yeo, New Views of Co-operation (London: Routledge, 1988), 210. 
2 Ibid. 
3 Ibid., 213.  
4 Industrial and Provident Societies Act 1893.  
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This ‘advantage’ was deemed unfair by private traders, leading to a series of 
committees that considered whether “co-operative societies were favoured by any undue 
exemption,” starting in 1905.5 However, the view that co-operatives were “engaged in mutual 
exchange” prevailed for some time.6 The logic was that individual members of co-operative 
societies, who were entitled to their share of the ‘profits’ through dividends, could only be 
liable for tax if their individual incomes were above the threshold. The society was not to 
be taxed as a unit. As Killingback summarises, “the implications of societies being seen as 
separate entities from their members were not pressed home.”7 In the meantime, the co-
operative movement continued to grow, in part because of their ability to facilitate mass 
distribution during the First World War. Yet this growth only prompted further 
consternation amongst private traders.8 The Royal Commission on Income Tax in 1920 
revisited the question of taxation, determining that co-operatives should be taxed on any 
‘undivided’ surplus—that is, on any surpluses that had not been distributed to members as 
dividends. The justification for this view, as Killingback explains, was that “[c]o-operative 
societies, then, were seen as dynamic and successful. The basis for this success, in the 
opinion of members of the Commission, was maximization of profit. Success in the 
economy must, they thought, indicate the existence of capitalist relations.”9 However, no 
additional tax was levied as a result of this report. It wasn’t until the 1930s that private traders 
were finally successful. Yet another committee was set up to consider the tax position of co-
operative societies. This committee confirmed the status of co-operative societies as 
incorporated entities, with the Chairman of the Inland Revenue later commenting that “the 
                                                     
5 Killingback, “Limits to Mutuality,” 211. These are the Ritchie Committee (1905), the Royal Commission 
on Income Tax (1919) and the Raeburn Committee (1932).  
6 Ibid., 212.  
7 Ibid.  
8 Ibid., 213. As Killingback reports, “in 1920 co-operative societies accounted for 18 to 20 per cent of the 
total national sales of groceries and provisions. Membership rose to 4.5 millions by 1920, but over 20 
million consumers had been registered for sugar rations with the co-operative societies in 1919.”  
9 Killingback 215.  
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pure doctrine of mutuality has no relevance in the case of incorporated trading concerns 
like Co-operative Societies.”10 While ‘the divi’ continued to be regarded as a trading expense 
for co-operative societies, the remainder of their income became taxable to the same extent 
as registered companies by virtue of legislation introduced as part of the 1933 Budget.11 As 
Killingback summarises, “co-operative societies were made to accept capitalist definitions of 
economic activity, which in time thwarted their development. They remained, but the 
principle of mutuality weakened.”12  
 While this thesis has pursued its analysis largely at the level of discourse, this story 
about taxation is one concrete and particularly salient example of how the mutuality of co-
operatives has come into conflict and tension with their corporate status. Believe it or not, 
this was originally envisioned as an archival project—one that would have been based on a 
“vast accumulation of source material” that Foucault suggests is necessary for any thorough 
genealogy.13 However, after a few attempts to make my way through the archives, I soon 
realised that I lacked the conceptual framework to make much sense of what I was reading. 
Not only were the archives incredibly dense and rich, but their answers were not 
immediately forthcoming. History doesn’t readily tell itself. In many respects, this thesis has 
been an extended step back from that original project and an attempt to get to grips with 
what was at stake in the legal recognition of co-operatives. What began as a tension and a 
set of questions that emerged in relation to my own experience of participating in co-
operatives, turned into a long meditation on law and its forms, and the ways in which they 
might shape our visions of alterity.  
                                                     
10 Quoted in Killingback, 220. 
11 Ibid., 225. 
12 Ibid., 209.  
13 Michel Foucault, “Nietzsche, Genealogy, History,” in Essential Works of Foucault, Volume 2: Aesthetics, 
Method and Epistemology, ed. J.D. Faubion, trans. Robert Hurley and others (London: Penguin, 1994), 
370. 
 
 
 
 
CONCLUSION | 239 
 
 
As a consequence, this thesis does not offer much in the way of a solution to this 
problem beyond an adamant call to be mindful of the often subtle ways that law and history 
have determined how we imagine alterity. It is hardly useful advice to suggest that those 
who want to start co-operatives should avoid corporate forms, although there may be 
something to that argument. This is not least because it is indeed difficult to organise a co-
operative without a corporate form. And, crucially, what the law says about co-operatives 
does not necessarily or entirely determine what they do. If depoliticisation is understood to 
occur in part because of the normalisation of the corporate form, as I have argued here, 
then half the work is simply putting the form in relief.  
However, it remains the case, as a recent history of the co-operative movement 
observes, that “few co-operative leaders today would express an ambition to replace 
capitalism.”14 But must we accept that all co-operatives can hope to do is “…continue to 
influence, wider business practice”?15 At this stage, one might be forgiven for thinking that 
I don’t like co-operatives very much or that I believe that they don’t have any real political 
potential. Or, as the co-operative movement often says of those who attempt critique it, I 
simply don’t understand how co-operatives really work. I’ve taken an ‘outside’ perspective 
on co-operation and in so doing, the real value of co-operation has escaped notice. 
However, the metaphor of enclosure that I have used in this thesis also lends itself to a 
sense of possibility and opening. Walls, both physical and metaphysical, can be torn down 
or traversed in all manner of creative ways, and I believe the reality is that they are being 
negotiated and undermined all the time. One of the virtues of Jean Luc Nancy’s ontology 
is its emphasis on the fact that our sociality is always exceeding constituted forms. As he 
writes, "[b]eing cannot be anything but being–with–one–another, circulating in the with and 
                                                     
14 John F. Wilson, Anthony Webster and Rachel Vorberg-Rugh, Building Co-operation: A Business History 
of The Co-operative Group, 1863-2013 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 14.  
15 Ibid.  
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as the with of this singularly plural coexistence."16 While legal forms such as the body 
corporate impose themselves as immanent totalities, this immanence is ultimately 
impossible. This emphasis on discourse and law in this thesis, while important as part of an 
effort to reframe how we think about co-operatives in the first place, does not do any justice 
to what actually takes place in co-operatives, and the ways in which the practices, hopes and 
visions of alterity brought to them exceed the confines of law and legal forms. Indeed, as 
suggested at the opening of this thesis, it is this sense of alterity that gives rise to the tensions 
in the meaning and purpose of co-operation in the first place. 
                                                     
16 Jean-Luc Nancy, Being Singular Plural (Palo Alto: Stanford University Press, 2000), 3.  
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